C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

23undermined the idea that the intelligence was first and foremost for the UN. 66 The Americangovernment also supplied and continues to supply satellite photographs to the International AtomicEnergy Authority (IAEA) in Vienna, which ‘monitors’ the nuclear programs of Iraq and North Korea. 67However, as Tim Crawford points out, there were various things counting against the IAEA asregards sharing intelligence with this body. One of them was that IAEA officials, steeped in the UNculture of transparency, simply did not have the “mindset” to properly handle and use sensitiveinformation. For example, on one occasion, a senior IAEA inspector was reported to have casuallyshowed sensitive over-head imagery to an official not involved in inspections. On another occasion,that same inspector left overhead imagery out on his desk during a meeting with Iraqi officials. 68To summarize, it can be stated that, during peacekeeping operations in a UN context,independent intelligence gathering was sometimes carried out, with the 1960 Congo experience being ahighlight, but in general the UN remained completely dependent on what a member state (mostly theUnited States) was prepared to supply. The exception was UNSCOM, which received intelligencesupport from a wide array of governments. But this tells us more about the real character of UNSCOMthan about intelligence sharing with the UN in general. 696. Intelligence within the existing UN cultureSince the extensive military enterprise in Congo, much has changed concerning peacekeepingoperations in a UN context. Until 1992, the mission in Congo with 20,000 peacekeepers was the largestmilitary operation so far, but that record was broken in the same year: UNPROFOR had more than40,000 personnel, plus the support of a substantial air force from NATO and a fleet from the WEU. Itis also significant that the mandate of most peacekeeping operations nowadays is much broader thanused to be the case. For instance, missions are now charged with supervising compliance withsanctions, protecting Safe Areas, providing humanitarian relief, supporting Displaced Persons,monitoring local elections, or assisting in the development of the infrastructure. 70 However, thisexpansion of tasks triggered neither a new attitude to intelligence within the UN, nor any significantchange of organizational culture.The then Secretary-General of the UN, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, had tried in the late 1980s toimprove the flow of intelligence to UN Headquarters but this ran into immediate trouble. He thencreated an Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) in the Secretariat. He taskedORCI with collecting, organizing, and analyzing political information received from all available sourcesto support his activities and to advise him of threatening developments. ORCI also did not last.According to a UN veteran who served on Cuellar’s executive staff, ORCI was stymied, not only by‘insufficient managerial skill’ but also by ‘bureaucratic resistance from other Secretariat departmentsthat were fearful of encroachment on their territory’. ORCI was disbanded in March 1992 by the newSecretary General, Boutros Boutros Gali and its functions were parceled out to other parts of the UN.Like Crawford correctly observed: a central organ for handling and analyzing sensitive information,66 A. Walter Dorn, ‘The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping’, International Journal ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 12 (1998) 4, pp. 439-440.67 Robert J. Allen, ‘Intelligence Support for Peace Operations’, Pickert, Intelligence, p. 117 and Richelson, The U.S. IntelligenceCommunity, pp. 293-294.68 Timothy W. Crawford, ‘Why Ever Not Never? Intelligence Cooperation in United Nations Security Affairs’, Paper preparedfor the Annual Conference of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, Ottawa, 28/09/02, p. 19.69 See for the recurrent problems as regards US intelligence support for the UN weapon inspections in Iraq: Colum Lynch,‘U.N. Arms Inspector Seeks U.S. Intelligence’, The Washington Post, 10/10/02; Julia Preston, ‘Weapons Inspector Ask U.S. toShare Secret Iraq Data’, The New York Times, 07/12/02; David E. Sanger and Julia Preston, ‘U.S. is to release spy data onIraq to aid inspectors’, The New York Times, 20/12/02 Pieter Spiegel, ‘Pentagon offers drone in hunt for weapons’, FinancialTimes, 16/01/03.70 A. Walter Dorn, ‘The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping’, International Journal ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 12 (1998) 4, pp. 414-427.