C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

245Moreover, the NSA is reported to have had a poor relationship with the Pentagon, which oftencomplained about the unwillingness of the NSA to share Sigint for fear of compromising the source. 1292The limited usefulness of Sigint sometimes prevented the taking of practical action. This wasthe case in Bosnia too. Even the supply of British Comint to UK commanders was a problematic affair.Cooke, responsible for Bosnia at the DIS, was clear about this: ‘the usual rules on the dissemination ofsensitive reports further limited what was given to troops serving in-theatre.’ But British commandersin UNPROFOR felt this lack of intelligence and often had to fall back on open sources intelligence toget a good intelligence ‘picture’. 1293In the case of Bosnia the disadvantages of Sigint probably outweighed the advantages. Thedisadvantages were: an avalanche of intercepted data; the lack of sufficient translators and analysiscapability; and the limited possibilities of interception due to cryptography, secure links via land lines,the nature of the terrain and atmospheric conditions. In particular the interception of the mostcommon form of communications traffic in Bosnia, the walkie-talkie, presented serious problems. InSeptember 1995 an American commission established that some of the ‘limiting factors identified intactical Sigint were outside the range of technical fixes – the fact that the former Yugoslav forcespractice very good Communications security/Operational security and the shortage of Serbo-Croatianlinguists’. It also established that the result of tactical Sigint (especially HF and VHF) had beeninadequate. 1294Another reason for not passing on intelligence could have been the aftermath of the openBritish support for Bush’s presidential campaign and the dominant opinion in Europe about how theBalkans crisis could best be solved. The more or less neutral attitude taken by London and Paristowards the Balkans conflict was not properly appreciated. 1295 The US-UK animosity led to theAmericans gradually reducing the flow of information from their side. The tap was not totally shut off,for that would have been in conflict with mutual agreements. But the flow slowly became less and ofpoorer quality, and the processing time was longer. Canadian intelligence officials, who still receivedthis US intelligence, confirmed that the Americans imposed these limitations. They declared that theAmericans had also reduced the flow of intelligence in the past, for instance during the Gulf War. 1296 ACanadian official confirmed that 85 percent of all intelligence from the United States ‘was stampedCan-US Only’, chiefly to keep the British out of the circuit. According to this official London reactedto this by reducing the intelligence flow to the other side of the Atlantic too. 1297Despite all the resources employed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany,France, Austria and other countries, and despite all the successes apparently achieved, it mustprovisionally be concluded that little Sigint landed on the desks of policymakers and of UNPROFORcommanders. Members of the British intelligence community claim that if American high-levelintercepts did exist, they were definitely not passed on to UNPROFOR. Officers of UNPROFOR werenoticeably bitter about this cynical behaviour by the US ally. 1298 A former UNPROFOR intelligenceofficer said in this respect that his organization ‘lost ownership of the picture of the battlefield to thepoint where it was irrecoverable’. 1299This non-sharing by the Americans involved both strategic and tactical Sigint. With respect tothe latter an US military expert said: ‘NATO-releasable Sigint reporting consistently was a day late and adollar short. It often comprised only marginally useful information as much as three to four days old.’1292 Matthew M. Aid, ‘The Time of Troubles: The US NSA in the Twenty-First Century’, in: Intelligence and National Security,Vol. 15 (2000) 3 pp. 17-20.1293 Urban, UK Eyes, p. 217.1294 Zachary Lum, ‘Balkan Eyes: Airborne Recon over Bosnia, in: IED On-Line, November 1995. For this see: http://jedprod.weblabs.com/jed/hml/new/now95/feature.html.1295 Confidential interview (47).1296 Confidential interviews (62) and (90).1297 Confidential interview (9).1298 Ian Bruce, ‘US let safe haven fall. US knew of Serb build-up’, The Herald, 24/10/95.1299 Smith, New Cloak, p. 210.