C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

2746. ConclusionsIt has to be said that the Comint activities of the VRS in Eastern Bosnia were excellent. Before, duringand after the fall the VRS was able to read the open and encrypted communication of the ABiH. Thistraffic held no secrets for the VRS and enabled Mladic and his generals to pinpoint ABiH operationswhen Muslims referred to them via radio connections. An ABiH general claimed that the VRS nevermanaged to break the crypto programmes of the ABiH. He was wrong. The VRS had certainly brokenthe crypto software of the ABiH and could read most of the communication of the 28 th Division. Itwas not without good reason that the 28 th Division was warned by Tuzla on 14 June that the VRS hadpenetrated the ABiH radio network. Orders were issued to especially improve the security of thecommunication, but to no avail.During the attack on Srebrenica the VRS continued to read the communications of the 28 thDivision. Hence, on 10 July 1995, the headquarters of the 2 nd Corps in Tuzla sent another message tothe 28 th Division in Srebrenica that the VRS had broken its crypto traffic. It could not, however,prevent the fall of Srebrenica. The ABiH plans for defending the enclave – if they were not sent bycourier but rather through technological channels such as walkie-talkies and other radio connections –presumably held no secrets for the VRS. If the ABiH was convinced that agreements had been reachedwith Dutchbat and then radioed this to Tuzla and Sarajevo, then it must be assumed that the VRS knewwhat was afoot. The Comint units of the VRS constantly monitored the communication traffic ofDutchbat and of the ABiH – with considerable success judging by official documents.The evidence clearly suggests that the ABiH column of predominantly men and boys headingfor Tuzla was an easy prey for the VRS units. It must have been relatively easy to pinpoint the positionsof the various segments, for example on the basis of cross bearings. At no point in the journey were theABiH soldiers safe. Their Motorola connections afforded the VRS an excellent opportunity to followthe progress of the journey. Intercepts not only enabled the VRS to determine the location of thecolumn but to also gather intelligence on the internal problems, the difficulties, and the internalagreements and planning. This gave them clear insight into the modus operandi of the ABiH and apermanent head start. The column never had a chance.Some of the intercepted messages which Butler, the military analyst at the Yugoslavia Tribunal,had access to were already published in the summer of 1998 by the journalist Mehmed Pargan inSarajevo Slobodna Bosna. He accused the 2 nd Corps of flagrant neglect and passivity because it made noattempt to lure the VRS away from the column. In his estimation, the 2 nd Corps merely waited until thefighting stopped and observed the murders. 1460 However, his accusations are ungrounded: there wassimply not enough real-time intelligence available. The murders were not observed and the 2 nd Corpswas not passive. That said, the efforts to help the column were small. 1461 The Civil Affairs Officer ofSector North East, Ken Biser, seemed to share Pargan’s opinion on the inaction of the 2 nd Corps. Hereported, for example, from Tuzla on the eve of the fall that high-placed military personnel at the 2 ndCorps thought that the VRS attack on Srebrenica was merely an attempt to divert attention fromSarajevo and they were not prepared ‘to create any additional diversions to relieve pressure on theenclaves’. 1462If the ABiH knew about the VRS attack on the enclave, the column of between 10,000 and15,000 males (including around 5,000 soldiers) and the subsequent murders, why did it not pass thisinformation on to UNPROFOR or friendly western intelligence services? High-ranking officials of theABiH who were interviewed, insisted that this crucial intelligence was definitely passed on. But themembers of UNPROFOR staff who should have received it were equally insistent that it never arrived.Notably, nothing was found relating to the matter in the UNPROFOR reports or archives. According1460 Mehmed Pargan, ‘B-H Army Eavesdropped on VRS’, Sarajevo Slobodna Bosna, (FBIS translation), 11/07/98.1461 See Part IV, Chapter 1 of the main Srebrenica report.1462 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 67, Folder 25. Report for week ending 7 July, 10/07/95.