C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

197policymakers, however. As a result Sigint and Imagery Intelligence (Imint) started to play an ever moreimportant role in warning about an enemy attack.Fifthly, Sigint provides much more intelligence on a broad range of subjects than any otherform of intelligence. At the end of the 1960s the NSA was already producing more than 400,000intelligence reports a year, i.e. more than a thousand reports every day. 1044 Sixthly, Sigint ‘never sleeps’.After all, agents and their sources need to rest from time to time and Imint is sometimes unavailabledue to darkness, sandstorms or meteorological conditions. Sigint, however, can be used day and night:24 hours a day and 365 days a year.Seventhly, Sigint is more flexible and more focussed on the recipient than most other forms ofintelligence. This is why a report by the American Congress in 1998 stated: ‘much of the NSA’s paststrength has come from its localised creativity and quick-reaction capability’.1045 In particular the largerSigint organizations are able to eavesdrop on new targets quickly. After all, intelligence services are notable to establish a whole new network of agents and spies within 24 hours. Imint is not flexible enougheither, because bringing an espionage satellite into a new orbit involves huge costs. Eighthly, thepotential of Sigint is much greater than any other form of intelligence. A successful breakthrough incracking a foreign code can provide more valuable information than all other intelligence sourcestogether. Breaking a code is sometimes ‘equivalent not of one but of a thousand spies, all ideally placed,all secure, and all reporting instantaneously’. 1046 Even the most fervent advocate of Humint, thelegendary CIA director from 1953 to 1961 Allen W. Dulles, had to admit that Sigint provided ‘the bestand “hottest” intelligence that one government can gather about another’. 1047Finally, Sigint is said to be the most effective manner (compared to other methods) of gatheringintelligence: despite its high costs, Sigint generally provides ‘more value for money’. 1048 Sigint isadmittedly expensive. During the Cold War the American government spent four to five times moremoney on Sigint than on Humint . Since 1945 the NSA has probably spent more than $100 billion, 75percent of which was on Sigint and the remainder on Communications Security (makingcommunications links secure). 1049 In short, Sigint was and is probably one of the most productive waysof gathering intelligence. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall the relative importance of Sigint has increasedeven further. This goes not only for the United States, but also for its European allies. The latter, due tothe lack of a major Imint capability are probably even more dependent on Sigint.By way of illustration one can cite the corresponding links between the United States and theUnited Kingdom: even during the 1980s the majority (80 to 90 percent) of the intelligence supplied tothe UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) every day was derived from Sigint. In May 1999 the BritishForeign Secretary, Robin Cook, stated that ‘the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)1050work is vital in supporting our foreign and defence policies’. The 2000 annual report by theIntelligence and Security Committee to the British Parliament also indicated the importance of Sigint:‘The quality of the (Government Communications Headquarters) intelligence gathered clearly reflects1044 Vladislav M. Zubok, ‘spy vs. Spy: The KGB vs. the CIA, 1960-1962’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin (1994) 4,pp. 22-33. As comparison: in 1960 the Soviet Union decoded 209,000 diplomatic code telegrams from 51 countries and 572intercepts were distributed per day. In 1967 Moscow was able to read the coded traffic of 71 countries. See: RaymondGarthoff & Amy Knight, ‘New Evidence on Soviet Intelligence: The KGB’s 1967 Annual Report,’ Cold War InternationalHistory Project Bulletin, (1998) 10, p. 214.1045 US House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report 105-508, Intelligence Authorization Actfor Fiscal Year 1999, 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 05/05/98, p. 10.1046 Codevilla, Informing Statecraft, pp. 14-15.1047 David Kahn, ‘Cryptology’, in: The Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 8 (1987), p. 276.1048 An exception may be formed by the spy satellites of the American National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).1049 David A. Fulghum, ‘sigint Aircraft May Face Obsolescence in Five Years’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21/10/96, p.54 and William Rosenau, ‘A Deafening Silence: US Policy and the Sigint Facility at Lourdes’, Intelligence and National Security,Vol. 9 (1994), 4, p. 726. In the former Soviet Union, Sigint took up 25% of the annual KGB budget.1050 Press Release, ‘GCHQ Accommodation Project Site Announced’, 07/05/99. To be consulted at:http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?2391.