C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

53American National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) with its British counterpart, the Joint AerialReconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC), which is part of the DIS. In the area of Sigint, theAmerican and the British Sigint services, the NSA and GCHQ, have been cooperating closely sinceWorld War II. Every British service has a liaison office in the United States that handles the exchangeof intelligence. In certain areas, British officers are also attached to American services, and vice versa.No such close collaboration exists between any other European or Asian intelligence or securityservices. The collaboration in the area of Humint is mainly geared towards the exchange of intelligenceassessments and not principally to joint operations.There are also differences in working methods between the Americans and the British. TheBritish intelligence services are more oriented to working with agents and informants, while theAmerican services devote more energy to the use of advanced technology and the processing andanalysis of large quantities of information. This means in practice that collaboration in joint operationsis difficult.The links between the American and British services are maintained not only through practicalcollaboration, but also through a joint approach to the use of intelligence. For instance, in the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom intelligence is said to have more influence on foreign policy than is thecase in continental European countries. The explanation for this could be as follows:‘The Anglo-Saxons use intelligence in an empirical way: it is aboutgatheringfacts, and if the facts are significant, the policies may get changed. Theview in London and Washington is that the French and other continentals,being essentially deductive in their thinking, develop sophisticated analyses andpolicies and then draw on intelligence to support them; but that they seldomallow intelligence to shift policy’. 218According to a French intelligence officer, this analysis is incorrect, however; in his opinion it is truethat in Paris it plays a less influential role in the formulation and execution of the French nationalsecurity policy, but not because the French political and military leadership ignore the intelligence.Bureaucratic and historical factors offer more likely explanations, such as on the one hand smallerinvestments in acquiring intelligence, and on the other hand recruitment problems. Furthermore, thereis no good intelligence structure that ensures a rapid and efficient dissemination of intelligence amongthe political and military policymakers. 219In today’s world, intelligence liaison still causes many problems. A British analyst recentlywrote: ‘America’s allies have long complained that it is particularly mean with its intelligence.’ 220 Theyhave often succeeded in gathering intelligence thanks to large financial investments, and generally it is‘heavily guarded’ within the framework of their own national security. An important White Houseadvisor during the Clinton administration made the following comment on international intelligenceliaison: ‘The U.S. intelligence community will never release its intelligence because of methods andsources.’ 221 A remarkable statement because there is rarely a genuine need to release methods andsources. What is usually needed in time-sensitive scenarios is the intelligence itself, not how theintelligence was acquired.Nonetheless, even within certain long standing intelligence alliances, such as the so-calledUKUSA agreement between the United States, Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, not allintelligence is automatically shared. The British intelligence services, for example, were confronted in1992 with the aftermath of the open British support of George Bush’s election campaign. The laterPresident Clinton held this against London. Initially this also translated into the intelligence (albeit not218 Grant, Intimate Relations, p. 6.219 Ibid., pp. 1-8.220 Ibid., pp. 4-5.221 Confidential interview (14).