C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

146The role of the CroatsThe Americans were aware that Iran had been supplying arms via Croatia since 1992, but that this hadstopped or had been significantly reduced temporarily because of the conflict between Muslims andCroats in Bosnia. The establishment of the federation now offered an opportunity to reopen theIranian pipeline. That, and the increasing American involvement, were important milestones inboosting the arms pipeline between Iran and Croatia. The Croatian Minister of Defence, Gojko Susak,also stated that in 1992 and 1993 the Americans still had no interest in the smuggling operations: ‘TheAmericans never protested. When they asked, we would say that our original weapons were simplyhatching babies.’ 698The government in Zagreb was nonetheless divided on the transit issue, which wasunderstandable, because Croatia and Bosnia had been involved in fierce fighting around Travnik andZenica. This died down only after the establishment of the Federation in March 1994. On the otherhand, Zagreb also needed arms and ammunition. At first, Croatia suffered the most under SecurityCouncil Resolution 713, in which every member state was requested to stop supplying arms andmilitary goods from their own territory to the warring factions in the Balkans. 699 However, Susak was afervent supporter of Iranian supplies because, in spite of the conflict with the ABiH, by ‘skimming’ theconsignments, many weapons could remain in Zagreb. Furthermore, with the new arms the ABiHcould tie up Bosnian-Serb units and resources, so that they could no longer be deployed against theCroats.Miroslav Tudjman and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mate Granic, were opposed to theresumption of the supplies, however. They feared an excessive Iranian influence and an intensificationof the fighting between Bosnia and Croatia. President Tudjman nonetheless took Susak’s side becausethe additional arms could ensure military successes. Tudjman need have no more worries thatUNPROFOR would take action against the supplies: in spite of all the resolutions, there was nomandate to monitor violations or to enforce the embargo. Observers were not even allowed to inspect700aircraft. Classified CIA documents to which the Los Angeles Times managed to gain access, proved thatthe American ambassador in Zagreb, Peter Galbraith, had already taken initiatives for supplies. InFebruary or March 1994, he spoke with his CIA station chief about the option of secret arms suppliesto Bosnia, to which the United States would turn a blind eye. The station chief reported thisimmediately to his headquarters. 701On 16 April 1994, Galbraith spoke with the religious leader of the small Muslim community inZagreb, Iman Sefko Omerbasic, who later informed the Iranian ambassador that American diplomatshad urged him to purchase arms for the ABiH. The CIA managed to gain access to a report of thisdiscussion, and they suspected that Galbraith was engaged in a secret operation. 702On 27 April 1994, the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Granic, visited the Americanambassador, Galbraith. The Croatian government wished to reinstate the Iranian pipeline. Granic wasstill opposed to the supplies and urged Galbraith to say no. The following day, President Tudjmanwished to discuss this with Galbraith. Tudjman wanted a formal answer to the question of how theClinton administration would respond to a resumption of the supplies. Granic had expected Tudjmanto accept a resumption of the supplies, as Zagreb wanted good relations with Washington. Galbraith,who was as frustrated as Holbrooke, thought that the supplies should be resumed. The next day,Galbraith had a brief discussion with Tudjman, who conveyed to him the Croatian request to consentto a resumption of the supplies. 703698 John Pomfret, ‘US Allies Fed Pipeline Of Covert Arms in Bosnia’, The Washington Post, 12/05/96.699 Owen, Balkans Odyssey, p. 48.700 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 124, Akashi to Annan, Z-1106, 22/07/94.701 James Risen, ‘secret messages by U.S. spies anger envoys’, Los Angeles Times, 24/12/96.702 James Risen, ‘Closer U.S. role seen on Bosnia Iran arms pipeline’, Los Angeles Times, 23/12/96.703 Ed Vulliamy, ‘Clinton’s Irangate spooks CIA’, The Observer, 02/06/96.