C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

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136van Reijn. 644 It is likewise clear that the information position of the MIS/CO, which had to advise theMinister, the CDS and senior Ministry of Defence officials, constantly lagged behind that of theMIS/Army. Raw intelligence was often held back by senior MIS officers in the Armed Forces, whoattended first to the interests of their own branch of the Armed Forces and their own Commander-in-Chief. In this sense, it reflected the relationship between the senior RNLA officers and the CentralOrganization as a whole. Here too, there was no question of a regular exchange of information, and theMinister complained about the paltry amount of intelligence that reached him from the Army.This mutual infighting had a significant influence on the coordination and rapport between theMIS analysts. In the period up to 1996, there were serious problems at the MIS as a consequence of the‘independence’ of the departments in the Armed Forces; management problems as a consequence ofthe lack of insight into these departments; a lack of insight into the effective use of personnel andmaterial resources; lack of clarity among foreign intelligence services as a consequence of diffuse andfragmented deployment of the Dutch intelligence services. The tensions between the intelligenceservices worked to the considerable detriment of their information position. Only after Srebrenica didthe realization dawn that the MIS could not continue in this way. It also needs to be said, however, thatpolitical, administrative or military guidance was also sadly lacking. An anti-intelligence attitudeprevailed in The Hague as regards the use of intelligence and security services in peacekeepingoperations in a UN context. There was no insistence from senior Army officers that additionalintelligence be gathered, and no control was asserted. What is more: no role whatsoever was set asidefor the MIS/Army. Senior Ministry of Defence officials also asserted no control or showed any specialinterest in the work of the MIS. No additional financial or other resources became available, and theyhad to make do with what they had. The Minister’s interest in the work of his service did not increasesignificantly, and in any case no specific requests were made for threat or risk analyses prior todeployment. The MIS/CO and the MIS/Army were not consulted by the Minister and senior militaryofficers regarding the deployment. Once the decision had been taken, the service was not givenadditional equipment to step up its efforts. The cutbacks in the Armed Forces appear to have beenmore important than obtaining additional intelligence that could have been important to the security ofthe Dutch soldiers in Bosnia. There was no sign of heightened awareness at the Ministry of Defence interms of evaluating this situation.The same was true of Parliament. Neither before the decision to deploy nor after the actualdeployment did Parliament insist on an improvement in the Dutch information position in the field ofintelligence. Intelligence and security services played no significant role in Parliament either. Parliamenteven thought it unnecessary to inquire cautiously about the information position. The same applied tothe press: there too, intelligence and security services played no role. If they had done, it would possiblyhave been a reason for the Ministry of Defence to do something structural about it. In terms ofstructural consideration of the use and availability of intelligence, the Netherlands is a ‘poor’ country.No enthusiasm existed for carrying out serious intelligence gathering. This is regrettable, becauseformer GCHQ employee Michael Herman rightly pointed out that good intelligence acquired bycivilian and military intelligence services puts a country in a position ‘to punch above its weight’.645There was apparently no such need in the Netherlands.When a senior foreign intelligence official did read a draft of this study chapter his commentswere very harsh. ‘Where Dutch policymakers, military leaders and lower ranking military personnelwere derelict in their duty, and failed to take the least effort at remedial action, some heads should roll’.He added to this: ‘Leaders knew the risk, sent those young boys in there with nothing but their spoons.Commanders knew it, and made it worse. General officers in UN positions of influence went out oftheir way to spit on those who may have been able to help. And they’re spitting still’. He finished withthis remark: ‘They failed to act in anticipation of the known risk, they stood by idly as the facts became644 Major General Joop van Reijn, ‘De Militaire Inlichtingendienst, vandaag en morgen’ (The MIS, today and tomorow) , in: Militaire Spectator, Vol . 170 (2001) 11 , p. 585.645 M. Herman, Diplomacy and Intelligence, Diplomatic Studies Programme Discussion Paper no. 39, z.pl. 1998, p. 10.
137more and more clear, turned a deaf ear to knowledgeable voices crying out, and afterwards seek toblame all others but themselves. These were not casual mistakes, nor easy to overlook. They extendedover years, and were deliberately continued in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary’. 646646 Confidential information (80).
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Srebrenica: a ‘safe’ areaAppend
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CIC - Current Intelligence CentreCI
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7SCS - Special Collection ServiceSE
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9still active staff of intelligence
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11Chapter 1The United Nations and I
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13with setting the objectives of gr
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15gathered, organized and analysed
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17The second phase in the intellige
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19can also be or become intelligenc
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21additional financial and other in
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23undermined the idea that the inte
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25that the safety of their personne
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27to generate an all-source perspec
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29in all, Van Kappen found it a ‘
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31The first step taken by the Bush
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33Virginia, where it was decided wh
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35a dual responsibility to support
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37had indications that this attack
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39example, the following is contain
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41played an important role. For thi
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43any indication of action taken. T
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45verification flights by unmanned
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47NATO’s most important troop-con
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49strategic systems were revamped t
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51Another problem was that good (no
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53American National Reconnaissance
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55Soviet Union’s intercontinental
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574. The perception and information
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59not detract from the fact that
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62intelligence officers even told t
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64the mandate differently or which
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67atrocities but the Bosnian Serbs
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70Republika Srpska. The work was no
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72from the fact that the Direction
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74involved in intelligence activiti
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76Forces were said to have received
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78exchange, then generally speaking
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80Chapter 3Dutch intelligence and s
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82reorganization of the MIS. In 199
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84commotion flaring up within the s
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Page 88 and 89: 88their relief goods for Bosnia tha
Page 90 and 91: 90The BVD collaborated closely on Y
Page 94 and 95: 94cutbacks recommended by the Van I
Page 97 and 98: 97information without compromising
Page 99 and 100: 99Yugoslavia did not prove to be a
Page 101 and 102: 101MIS/CO. Intelligence sharing wit
Page 103 and 104: 103German, Italian and Danish intel
Page 105 and 106: 105Originally, the European Bureau
Page 107 and 108: 107that an insight was obtained usi
Page 109 and 110: 109They made civil and military ris
Page 111 and 112: 111In other words, the flow of info
Page 113 and 114: 113three tasks: looking for indicat
Page 115 and 116: 115In reality the MIS/Army function
Page 117 and 118: 117his benefit, and many others. It
Page 119 and 120: 119too. This had already been estab
Page 121 and 122: 121negative assessment: not to go t
Page 123 and 124: 123capacity of the UN, but as descr
Page 125 and 126: 125organizations that could possibl
Page 127 and 128: 127Department, the Counterintellige
Page 129 and 130: 129MIS/Air Force officer went to Tu
Page 131 and 132: 131entering into close relationship
Page 133 and 134: 133One envelope contained several f
Page 135: 135any indications of continuous gu
Page 139 and 140: 139intended to monitor the border c
Page 141 and 142: 141opinion. 665 After Croatia had n
Page 143 and 144: 143Lake’s statement. 676 As a Can
Page 145 and 146: 145engage these countries, but each
Page 147 and 148: 147Later that day, Galbraith report
Page 149 and 150: 149form of photos taken by spy sate
Page 151 and 152: 151In the summer and autumn of 1994
Page 153 and 154: 153starting to have concerns about
Page 155 and 156: 155preferred provider of weapons to
Page 157 and 158: 157Because of the logistical useful
Page 159 and 160: 159An Islamic humanitarian organiza
Page 161 and 162: 161and 1 rocket launcher for a TF-8
Page 163 and 164: 163the convoys from Croatia with ar
Page 165 and 166: 165The attempt at a cover-upAs ment
Page 167 and 168: 167Force Commander and with General
Page 169 and 170: 169urging it, because they suspecte
Page 171 and 172: 171General and researcher, Brendan
Page 173 and 174: 173mm guns, 2000 pistols, 211,000 h
Page 175 and 176: 175divergent opinions on the Serbia
Page 177 and 178: 177had total freedom of movement al
Page 179 and 180: 179violations were observed. These
Page 181 and 182: 181and Jugoslavija Publik. Accordin
Page 183 and 184: 183command and the rival Iranian, S
Page 185 and 186: 185much contact with the population
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187from the enclave a total of 140
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189The third party country strategy
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191the warring factions, namely tha
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193Chapter 5The Signals Intelligenc
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195In addition Comint can be import
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197policymakers, however. As a resu
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199A second disadvantage of Sigint,
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201All efforts can of course also b
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203125 linguists to provide transla
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205time intercepts involved here we
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207conclusion that the contribution
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209happened during the Gulf War, wh
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211The Gulf War showed that there w
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213Despite this reservation there i
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215The NSA and CIA, as well as GCHQ
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217million messages, sent via Intel
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219Zagreb, Morgan, - Svensson was o
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221Monitoring targets in SerbiaOffi
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223jar’, said an US intelligence
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225Naturally the Serbs had taken pr
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227confirmed that monitoring walkie
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229The same month new articles appe
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231‘They more or less admitted th
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233have been part of a Bosnian gove
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235get O’Grady out of Bosnian Ser
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237as the Balkans. Two to three yea
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239Comint archive and other archive
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241Bokhoven Couzy supported him in
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243communications traffic of UNPROF
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245Moreover, the NSA is reported to
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247The role of the Netherlands: no
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249made by Krstic and other Bosnian
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251messages, which were intercepted
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253later treetops were used. Throug
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255Conclusions on the interception
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257equipment, planned operations, t
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259made it impossible to follow the
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261community that the situation was
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263commander of the Bosnian-Serb Dr
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265to headquarters. The Comint oper
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267Intelligence Community had no ac
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269aid being sent to Sarajevo. Both
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271established in 1991, also receiv
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273crypto telephone and fax with th
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275to Baxter, the Military Assistan
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277Chapter 7Imagery Intelligence in
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2792. What instruments were availab
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281would leave around 18 hours out
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283and has provided policy-makers w
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285operational in Bosnia, like the
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287lines and troop movements. After
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289around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Thi
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291that especially American, French
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293So, it would have been impossibl
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2953. With whom was imagery intelli
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297available. 1606 The head of the
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299war crimes had probably been per
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301a US national asset (unknow is w
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303Mostar and loitered in Zepa area
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305Albright shows the photosOn 10 A
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307was taken some time in 1999, eve
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309tracking the civilian toll had v
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311solution to such problems in ad
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313Chapter 8Was ‘Srebrenica’ an
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315gathered intelligence, then it m
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317the VRS attack should aim to tak
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319In January 1995 a European intel
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321stated that the deployment of th
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323The Military Intelligence Servic
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325by the Norwegian Brigadier Gener
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327Bosnian Serbs decided that they
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329the enclaves in the very near fu
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331enclave was seriously confined b
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333The VRS’s most important commu
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335archives, together with intervie
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337the hills and mountains along th
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339from Sarajevo, because they were
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341The UN headquarters in New YorkT
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343Who did have prior knowledge? In
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345offensive was stopped before the
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347leadership of the Republika Srps
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349coming 24 hours. 1963 On 11 July
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351that it was established that the
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353very short period: 2 to 6 July.
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355transport VRS troops. 2006 Howev
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357In this respect the author Russe
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359(presumably they were referring
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361nations and within NATO never to
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363expectation that ‘on balance i
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365thorny issue. A foreign intellig
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367was a correct analysis, as was l
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369believes any news in Sarajevo.
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371as said before, this is not a na
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373Chapter 9Survey of archival reco
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375Collection of the Economic Inves
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377archive a number of messages fro
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37930. Uiterweer Post Collection: n
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Bodansky, Y., Offensive in the Balk
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Halberstam, David, War in a Time of
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O.O’shea, Brendan, Crisis at Biha
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387Woolsey, R.J., Partners for Peac
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Boyle, Alan, ‘spies in the watch
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Macdonald, Lt.-Colonel Oliver A.K.,
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393Zumach, A. ‘US intelligence kn
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Arafat YasserAristide J.B.‘Arkan
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Felix M.C.J.Franken R.A.Franssen N.
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Makar AndjelkoMarchal LucMarguin J.
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Soljic VladimirSoubirou AndréSoyst
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C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

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