C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

75services always worked through this section. 350 The same official was probably involved in secret armssupplies to the ABiH in Tuzla, and was also the one who maintained the contacts with the staff of afirm that had warm relations with the American intelligence world, Military Professional ResourcesIncorporated (MPRI), whose staff were sometimes spotted in Tuzla. The Norwegian commander ofSector North East (SNE) described him in an interview with the BBC as ‘a pain in the ass’. After anumber of warnings about his behaviour, he was finally again requested to leave the organization; hehad been caught op the spot trying to break into the SNE intelligence cell. In 1996 he was back inSarajevo again, where, this time in plain clothes, he worked for MPRI. 351General Rose himself also reported possible CIA staff. He had dealings with a ‘strange shadowyfigure straight out of a Graham Greene novel’. This turned out to be an American marine, who ran awater project for Sarajevo for the International Rescue Committee. Rose assumed that he worked forthe CIA. 352 The Chief of Staff under General Rose, the Dutch General A. van Baal, also suspected thatin 1994 many American intelligence officers were operating in Sarajevo, where he stayed between 24February and 1 September. He had seen many examples of this, because the American embassy wassituated next to the residence of Bosnia-Hercegovina Command: ‘We suddenly saw a host ofAmericans appear, including the former SACEUR Galvin’. According to Van Baal, Galvin hadapparently been hired in to provide military advice. 353 The interpreter of General Rose and GeneralSmith, Milos Stankovic, refuted this. According to him, Galvin was in Bosnia on a reconnaissancemission at Clinton’s behest. 354 Also an US intelligence official vehemently disputed this claim by VanBaal: ‘This is paranoid to the point of being comical!’. 355As for the other Americans, Van Baal’s British intelligence contacts said that they were CIA.Some were in plain clothes, others in uniform. Van Baal also had an American on his staff whoofficially worked as a liaison officer for humanitarian operations such as food drops, but who in factonly kept an eye on what UNPROFOR was doing and passed it on to his counterparts. There were alsoCIA employees who attempted to get onto Van Baal’s staff, but he managed to keep them out. VanBaal also found it highly significant that the Sarajevo airlift was almost exclusively maintained byAmerican aircraft and was therefore largely under American control (also on the ground). Regardingespionage at Bosnia-Hercegovina Command in Sarajevo, Van Baal commented that on his arrival hefound books in which all the positions of the warring parties, orders of battle, and so on were recorded:‘The UN was transparent. I do not know who had seen this data.’ 356The French military intelligence service also made use of French officers who were workingundercover in UNPROFOR in Zagreb and Sarajevo, but who also reported directly to the DRM. 357According to a senior UNMO official, the infiltration of intelligence organizations was ‘normal’ in relieforganizations such as UNHCR, UNICEF, the International Red Cross and NGOs. He gave as anexample the American official who was the head of UNICEF in Sarajevo; he later discovered that hewas a captain in the DIA. French NGOs were also said to have been used for arms smuggling. 358One UNMO official expressed his suspicion that UNHCR in particular was probably infiltratedby some services, 359 which was not surprising, because this organization was responsible for the reliefthroughout Bosnia and took care of the supply by road of the eastern enclaves. American Special350 Interview with H. Holm, 13/03/99.351 Interviews with C.L. Brantz, 11/06/99 and H. Haukland, 03/05/99. See also UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 193, SNE 23May-15 October 1995. Haukland to Comd. Unprofor, 31/05/95 and Hagman, UN-NATO, p. 93.352 Michael Evans, ‘US bugged me in Bosnia, says General Rose’, The Times, 10/11/98.353 Interview with A.P.P.M. van Baal, 27/05/98.354 Stankovic, Trusted Mole, pp. 239 and 244-248.355 Confidential information (80).356 Interview with A.P.P.M. van Baal, 27/05/98.357 Assemblée Nationale, Srebrenica: rapport sur un massacre, Assemblée Nationale, no. 3412, 2 parts, Paris 2001, Part 2,Audition de M. Bernard Janvier, 25/01/01, pp. 106-139.358 ‘Freigelassene Franzosen zuruckgekehrt’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20/05/94.359 Confidential interview (44).