C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

273crypto telephone and fax with the Dutchbat commander, the Defence Crisis Management Centre(DCBC), the Army Crisis staff, the Dutch Colonel Brantz in Sector North East in Tuzla and Bosnia-Hercegovina Command (General Nicolai). 1453Bosnian military officials confirmed that the traffic of Dutchbat was a vital source ofintelligence for the VRS. This was further borne out by intercepted communications traffic of the VRS.Sometimes, the ABiH could follow Dutchbat communications between patrols or vehicles, but theycould not intercept the more important traffic. The messages sent from Dutchbat OPs to Potocaricould not be received in Tuzla, but intercepts of the VRS communication led the 2 nd Corps to realizethat the VRS could listen in to UNPROFOR as well as Dutchbat lines. According to ABiH soldiers, theVRS could follow the communication of UNPROFOR perfectly, and the Bosnian Serbs were alwayswell informed. 1454 This was illustrated by a message at the end of June 1995. Probably, the ABiHintercepted a message from the VRS which referred to a Dutchbat report. Dutchbat had just noticednewly arrived VRS formations and spotted new tanks. According to Dutchbat, a full mobilization hadtaken place in Bratunac. The Dutchbat report said that the Opstina had ordered that no new buildingwas to be carried out in the enclave. Dutchbat subsequently concluded that a political deal had beenstruck and that an exchange of territory was in the pipeline. Moreover, people were being allowed toleave Srebrenica for a payment of DM6,000. 1455Similarly, the NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Srebrenica was an important source ofinformation for the VRS. A study of the reports of this NGO revealed that it was passing on a lot oftactical information to MSF in Belgrade. This information stemmed from Dutchbat meetings with theUNMOs, local ABiH commanders and the Opstina of Srebrenica, where MSF was also represented.These messages often went by telex or satellite to Belgrade, but it would not have been too difficult tointercept them there. After all, the Serb national security service had its own listening station inBelgrade which used word databases. This service was allegedly capable of tapping 440,000 phone callssimultaneously. 1456 The main targets were the communications traffic of UNPROFOR and NATO viaInmarsat and/or Intelsat. The traffic of Médecins Sans Frontières fell under this.The same applied to the UNHCR, the UN refugee organization, whose reports were even moremeticulous than those of MSF, because its network in the enclave probably gave it access to betterinformation, especially on the humanitarian situation. This connection also ran through the KPNcommunication node in Burum (It grutte ear). This likewise applied to the open connections of theInternational Red Cross and the communication sent from Srebrenica by the Swedish Shelter Projectand Norwegian People’s Aid. The traffic of these humanitarian organizations was an easy target for theintelligence and security services of the (Bosnian) Serbs. This was probably also true of the Muslimsbecause they, like the VRS, usually saw the representatives of UNHCR and the International Red Crossas members of the intelligence services.1457 The conclusion is that no-one trusted anyone in the enclaveand that everyone was spying on everyone else. 1458 To complete the paranoia, President Izetbegoviceven distrusted his personal staff. He had over 600 telephones in the presidential headquarters tappedby the Bosnian national security service. 14591453 MoD, CRST. G-6 RNLA Crisis Staff to CS RNLA Crisis Staff, 09/05/95.1454 Interview with Harudin Kisic, 17 and 18/05/99.1455 NIOD, Coll. CD-Roms. Section MV, 2 nd Corps to 28 th Division, no. 06-401-103-2/95, 25/06/95.1456 Interview with Bozidar Spasic, 16/09/01. See also: Udo Ulfkotte, ‘Milosevic Geheimdienst’ (Milosevic Secret Service),Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17/04/99.1457 NIOD, Coll. CD-Roms. Section MV, 2 nd Corps to 28 th Division, no. 130-13-75/94, 09/09/94.1458 See also testimony to the Tribunal of the British General Francis Richard Dannatt: ICTY, (IC-98-33) TestimonyDannatt, 25/07/00.1459 ‘sFOR discovers eavesdropping center in Sarajevo’, Belgrade Glas Javnosti, 13/01/01.