C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

353very short period: 2 to 6 July. This was when the preparations took place. In addition 9 and 10 July areimportant because this was when it was decided to take the entire enclave. What was perceived duringthis time and how was this interpreted?According to claims in the press Western intelligence and security services had prior knowledgeof the attack. In the autumn of 1995 various daily papers reported that the Americans knew about theassault plans three weeks before the fall. This was reportedly held back from NATO and the UN inorder not to disrupt the peace efforts of Clinton’s emissaries. These articles 1992 were to a great extentderived from an article by Roy Gutman in Newsday and an article by Andreas Zumach in Die BerlinerTageszeitung on 12 October in which it was reported that unmanned US reconnaissance planes (UAVs)had followed and photographed the preparations for the Srebrenica attack for days in advance. USintelligence services had intercepted the daily conversations between the Chief of Staff of the VRS,General Perisic, and Mladic more than three weeks before the attack began, from 17 June 1995onwards. In these calls the generals planned the operation. Excerpts from the reports of theseconversations had been shown to him, and proved that the initiative for the operation came fromBelgrade. Perisic reportedly commanded the actual attack. Moreover, UAVs had collected Imint on thebuild-up of the VRS around the enclave and relocation of tanks and artillery. 1993 As shown in Chapter 7,the question is whether UAV’s were flying over Bosnia around this time and if so, whether this Imintwas analysed in time. This was very probably not the case.According to journalists the German government also knew about the VRS plans. Throughliaison the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is said to have received about 90 per cent of all its intelligence1994on Yugoslavia from the US services. But a senior BND official seriously distrusted this percentage.This would have been a more substantial intelligence liaison than with the British or French services,while NATO received even less intelligence. The US cooperation with the BND is said to haveintensified even further from September 1994 onwards when the US intelligence services cut back theircooperation with the French and the British. Independently of the Americans, the BND was able tomonitor the communications traffic between the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs. Journalists also claimedthat the BND eavesdropped on the traffic between Mladic and Perisic. A joint CIA-BND listening posteven monitored ‘all’ key telephone conversations between Belgrade and Serb field commanders inBosnia. 1995 The German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel, categorically denied that the BNDor the government had known anything. 1996 A senior German diplomat with permament access toBND intelligence confirmed this statement. No immediate forewarning was provided by the BND.There had been rumours, but these caused a sort of ‘cry wolf’ effect. 1997Interviews by the author established that the BND was initially quite successful from 1993onwards as regards Sigint operations against the VRS and VJ. However, the Bosnian Serbs soon found outand began to use different crypto and better equipment. The BND could not any longer eavesdrop on theBosnian Serb traffic. For this reason there was no Sigint available regarding the VRS attack on Srebrenica.1992 See for instance: ‘Amerikanen verzwegen voorkennis Srebrenica’ (Americans kept prior knowledge of Srebrenica tothemselves), De Stem, 13/10/95 and ‘Verenigde Staten wisten al weken tevoren van val Srebrenica’, De Gelderlander,13/10/95.1993 Andreas Zumach, ‘US Intelligence knew Serbs were planning an assault on Srebrenica’, Basic Reports, No. 47, 16/10/95.See also: ‘VS wisten van komende val Srebrenica’, Nederlands Dagblad, 13/10/95; ‘VS wisten al weken tevoren van valSrebrenica’, De Gelderlander, 13/10/95 and Ian Bruce, ‘Massacre helped Nato take charge of Bosnian conflict’, The Herald(Glasgow), 12/07/01.1994 Confidential information (87).1995 Andreas Zumach, ‘BND wusste von Srebrenica-Angriff’ (BND knew about Srebrenica attack), Berliner Tageszeitung,20/10/95; ‘Angriff auf Schutzzone Srebrenica. BND wustte angeblich vorab von serbischer Offensive’ (Attack onSrebrenica Safe Area. BND allegedly knew about Serb offensive in advance), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20/10/95; Ian Bruce,‘Massacre helped Nato take charge of Bosnian conflict’, The Herald (Glasgow), 12/07/01; ‘Woman of iron with a steelyresolve’, The Herald (Glasgow), 07/07/01 and Why these guilty men remain free’, The Herald (Glasgow), 09/05/97.1996 Andreas Zumach, ‘Ich muss diese Enklaven loswerden’ (I have to get rid of these enclaves), Die Tageszeitung, 01/11/95.1997 Confidential interview (53).