C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

301a US national asset (unknow is what Imint system) photographed the now notorious Branjevo farm atDonja Pilica. 1638 Most of the photos of the region around Srebrenica were probably a spin-off from awider reconnaissance mission above Bosnia and were not specifically intended for the collection ofintelligence on the situation around Srebrenica. The same Imint asset took photos of the village ofGlogova and of Orahovac, the area around Karakaj-Dulici, Kozluk and Cerska. 1639Imint during the attack on and fall of SrebrenicaOn 7 July, another UAV flight was carried out, this time above Western Bosnia. On the same day therewas also a flight above Eastern Bosnia, which lasted until 11.20 hours. This US national asset also flewover Dvor, where a Danish UNPROFOR soldier had been killed. It is unclear whether Srebrenica wasincluded. Given the start of the VRS attack, it might have been expected that this asset also flew aboveSrebrenica. Vicenza reported at 08.45 hours on 9 July that a U-2 was present. However, at 11.30 hours,a report came through that it had a defective camera. It was being protected by SEAD planes in orderto stave off VRS anti-aircraft fire. This is remarkable and hard to believe statement. It was probably nota U-2 but another US national asset. This can be explained as follows. The U-2 required no SEADsupport at 50-60 thousand feet and it did not fly at low altitudes, especially over a SEAD threat. Itwould run out of gas if it didn’t get shot down. The engines of a U-2 are optimized for high altitudeand that is where it’s fuel efficiency is best. Any low altitude operations would require aerial refuelimmediately off-station over the Adriatic, and the fuel tankers operating in that area were alreadyheavily committed to refuelling fighter aircraft in Deny Flight. 1640On 10 July, a US national asset flew over Pusmilici at 15.00 hours and observed burning housesin West Rajne. At 19.00 hours, this asset passed the front line directly to the east of the town. By now,Janvier, who regularly received finished Imint via his intelligence staff in Zagreb, was beginning torealize the value of the UAVs like the Predator. It should be observed that the analysts at the MIS/AirForce were in this phase still under the impression that the Predator was not operational. Theyincorrectly thought that the Predators would not fly until 14 July. 1641On 11 July Zagreb HQ asked for UAV support over Srebrenica but an UAV was not yetavailable. An US official pointed to the problems as regards getting an UAV flying over Srebrenica. Heclaimed that the UAV in the months preceding to the attack on Srebrenica did not have a night landingcapability in June, and recovery at Brac in Croatia would have been very dicey after dark. There werehesitations to risk the UAV at this time, and Srebrenica was at the farthest edge of the UAV envelope.It would be very surprising, according to this US official, if it flew over to the eastern enclaves at all dueto range considerations, and certainly not at the risk of losing the platform altogether due to crashing inthe dark. The same official wondered if the Dutch intelligence community ever submitted collectionrequirements for Srebrenica? If nobody ever asked for it, ‘you can bet it was never provided’. To hisknowledge, the Dutch never submitted any collection requirements in support of DutchBat. 1642Despite all these problems a discussion took place on 11 July in the US community on how toget a UAV above Srebrenica. This discussion was prompted by this request from Janvier for Imint onSrebrenica as he suspected ‘atrocities’. This suggests that, up till then, Janvier knew that UAV missionshad been flown over Bosnia. This was the same Janvier who claimed that he did not receive NATOintelligence. The US intelligence community told Janvier’s intelligence staff in Zagreb that there was aprobability that a UAV could be flown above Srebrenica early in the day (usually from 09.00 hours).But this mission never materialized partly because of the poor weather conditions in Eastern Bosnia1638 Confidential interview (7). See also: ICTY, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Volume II, Ex. 24/.1639 ICTY, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Volume I, Ex. 9/2 and Volume II, Ex. 16/1, 2020/1-20/2, 22/1 and 27/1.1640 Confidential information (80).1641 MoD, DCBC, 392. MID/Klu DFI (NATO secret), 13/07/95.1642 Confidential information (80).