C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

335archives, together with interviews, has not indicated that the ABiH shared intercepts with Dutchbat,UNPROFOR or Western intelligence services. General Delic is thus not correct in claiming thatintercepts of Mladic already in June and July revealed he was planning an attack.Another ABiH general claimed, however, that intercepts in real time did exist. 1868 This musthowever be doubted. If the Bosnian Muslims did indeed have real-time Comint, why did they not makeuse of it? According to a senior US intelligence official, it would have been the best public relationsstunt of all time because the Muslims could have shouted ‘bloody hell and murder’. The ABiH wouldnever have missed this chance if they had had real-time intelligence. This official supposed that theABiH simply did not have real-time capabilities. 1869 One must also ask why the ABiH, if it knew of theattack, did not pass on this knowledge to UNPROFOR or Western intelligence services. All availableintelligence was actually passed on to UNPROFOR, according to Major Sefko Tihic, Head ofIntelligence of 2nd Corps. Intelligence was passed on to SNE, but nothing was done with it there,according to Tihic. Supposedly it was estimated that the VRS wanted to take over all of Srebrenica andthat June/July would be the best time for this. There were indicators, such as the relocation of surfaceto-airmissiles from the left bank to the right bank of the Drina. 1870 No proof has been found for thislatter claim.The diary of the Deputy Commander of Sector North East, Colonel C. Brantz, shows thatofficers of the ABiH did indeed regularly give indications that the developments around the enclavewere being monitored closely. On 28 June, for instance, Brantz spoke to the Chief of Staff of the 2ndCorps, who showed on a map the place where ABiH reconnaissance units operated to monitordevelopments. They had established that increasing numbers of soldiers and amounts of equipment1871were being moved from Serbia to Srpska. During this conversation the Chief of Staff was constantlyinformed by telephone of the situation around the enclave. But it was not until 6 July that Dutchbatheard anything from the ABiH about the build-up of the VRS on 4 and 5 July. 1872 This is very late. Ifthe 2nd Corps was already informed at an early stage, then why were no stronger warnings given toUNPROFOR? Various Bosnian Muslims claim that they did this but that they were not heeded. This iscategorically denied by officials working at SNE and other staff at UNPROFOR.Was it then, as Mehmed Pargan accused the 2nd Corps, a question of gross negligence andenormous passivity?1873 Probably not: there was simply not enough real-time intelligence available.Interviewed ABiH military personnel continue to claim that the crucial intelligence was passed on. ButUNPROFOR officials who would have been the recipients of this intelligence state that they neverreceived it. Their statements are supported by the fact that little to nothing has been found in theUNPROFOR reports. Virtually nothing was found that could be interpreted as alarming information orexplicit prior knowledge at the ABiH. According to Lieutenant Colonel Baxter the ABiH have neverprovided a snippet of intelligence to General Smith, his staff or the rest of UNPROFOR. 1874 In variousother interviews with staff of foreign intelligence services, interviewees also denied that Bosnianintelligence had been received. In short, it must be concluded that the ABiH did not have prior tacticalknowledge.Prior knowledge at Sector North East (SNE) in TuzlaThe attack on the enclave came as a total surprise to the Norwegian Brigadier General Haukland, thecommander in SNE. He went on leave on 25 June. At that moment some troop movements had been1868 Confidential information (71).1869 Confidential interview (54).1870 Interview with Sefko Tihic, 08/03/99.1871 NIOD, Coll. CD-ROMs, Ziulich Mehmed to 28th Division, No. 06-05-171/95, 24/06/95.1872 NIOD, Coll. Brantz. Diary Brantz, pp. 277, 281 and 284.1873 Mehmed Pargan, ‘B-H Army Eavesdropped on VRS’, Sarajevo Slobodna Bosna (FBIS translation), 11/07/98.1874 Interview with James Baxter, 16/10/00.