C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

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CIC - Current Intelligence CentreCINCSOUTH - Commander in Chief Southern Europe (NATO)CIR - Comité Interministériel du RenseignementCOMINT - Communications IntelligenceCOS - Chief of StaffCOS - Chief of Station (CIA)CSE - Communications Security EstablishmentCVIN - Committee on the United Intelligence Services in the NetherlandsDARO - Defense Airborne Reconnaissance OfficeDCBC - Defence Crisis Management CentreDDIS - Danish Defence Intelligence ServiceDFC - Deputy Force CommanderDGSE - Direction Generale de la Securité ExterieureDIA - Defense Intelligence AgencyDIS - Defence Information SummaryDIS - Defence Intelligence StaffDMZ - Demilitarized ZoneDND - Department of National DefenseDPA - Department of Political AffairsDPKO - Department of Peace Keeping OperationsDRM - Direction de Renseignement MilitaireDSF - Deployed Shed FacilityDSD - Defence Signals DirectorateDST - Direction de la Surveillance du TerritoireECMM - European Commission Monitoring MissionELINT - Electronic IntelligenceERRF - European Rapid Reaction ForceESDI - European Security and Defence IdentityESDP - European Security and Defence PolicyEU - European UnionEUCOM - European Command (US)FBI - Federal Bureau of InvestigationFC - Force CommanderFISINT - Foreign Instrumentation IntelligenceFRY - Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)GCHQ - Government Communications HeadquartersGPS - Global Positioning SystemGMO - Gratis Military OfficersHF - High FrequencyHIC - High Intensity ConflictHUMINT - Human IntelligenceHV - Hrvatska VojskaHVO - Hrvatsko Vijece OdbraneIAEA - International Atomic Energy AuthorityICFY - International Conference on the Former YugoslaviaICRC - International Commission of the Red CrossIDB - Inlichtingendienst BuitenlandIFOR - Implementation Force (NATO – Bosnia)IMINT - Imagery IntelligenceINTERFET - International Force East TimorIOB - Intelligence Oversight Board5
Page 1: Srebrenica: a ‘safe’ areaAppend
Page 6 and 7: JAC - Joint Analysis CenterJARIC -
Page 8 and 9: 81992, the Bosnian Muslim Army, the
Page 10 and 11: elevant. However, it turned out tha
Page 12 and 13: 12Lieutenant General Bertrand De La
Page 14 and 15: 14This need is still growing, becau
Page 16 and 17: 163. The intelligence cycleAs descr
Page 18 and 19: 18The fourth step is the analysis,
Page 20 and 21: 20of their own plans to attack Pear
Page 22 and 23: 22(UNDOF) on the Golan Heights in t
Page 24 and 25: 24with direct reporting to the Secr
Page 26 and 27: 26the Armija Bosna i Hercegovina (A
Page 28 and 29: 28In April 1993, the Situation Cent
Page 30 and 31: 30disclosed to ‘a non-member nati
Page 32 and 33: 32After the Republicans gained a ma
Page 34 and 35: 34capacity in the theatre. But neve
Page 36 and 37: 36Moreover, the MIO had no resource
Page 38 and 39: 38UNHCR, the UN’s organization fo
Page 40 and 41: 40evident, for example, from the fa
Page 42 and 43: 42In Sector North East (SNE) of UNP
Page 44 and 45: 44participated in UN operations to
Page 46 and 47: 46Chapter 2The Western intelligence
Page 48 and 49: 48Yugoslavia. A good example was th
Page 50 and 51: 50this would create problems for th
Page 52 and 53: 52infrastructures, including the Du
Page 54 and 55:
54Sigint) area, so that some Britis
Page 56 and 57:
56Sources in SIS nonetheless assert
Page 58 and 59:
58overall command, then this would
Page 61 and 62:
61as a counterweight to sound a bal
Page 63 and 64:
63American and German services ende
Page 66 and 67:
66DIS: firstly this was GCHQ, after
Page 69 and 70:
69not know where the hostages were.
Page 71 and 72:
71Sarajevo, which was quite remarka
Page 73 and 74:
73below that Western intelligence s
Page 75 and 76:
75services always worked through th
Page 77 and 78:
77For instance, the general mental
Page 79 and 80:
79Most of the CIA officials intervi
Page 81 and 82:
81service was actually disbanded in
Page 83 and 84:
83Bosnia. This raises the question
Page 85 and 86:
85specific nature of the work, ther
Page 87 and 88:
87Belgrade to place new officials f
Page 89 and 90:
89started early in 1993 by the Mini
Page 91:
91The complete picture surrounding
Page 95:
95with its Granger antenna at Eemne
Page 98 and 99:
98advice on the subject from the MI
Page 100 and 101:
100the authorities should be extrem
Page 102 and 103:
102Yugoslavia. This made the inform
Page 104 and 105:
104The organization of the MIS/Army
Page 106 and 107:
106by UNPROFOR in Zagreb, and there
Page 108 and 109:
108It is important to note that the
Page 110 and 111:
110disposal. Their intelligence off
Page 112 and 113:
112immediate support such as the us
Page 114 and 115:
114A few MIS/Army workers admitted
Page 116 and 117:
116assessment of the local security
Page 118 and 119:
118An US intelligence official reje
Page 120 and 121:
120UN observers in Sarajevo, 559 wh
Page 122 and 123:
122the answer is a flat “no”. I
Page 124 and 125:
124told by the Head of the MIS that
Page 126 and 127:
126on a large scale in Bosnia. The
Page 128 and 129:
128There were several tins involved
Page 130 and 131:
130command. The incident involving
Page 132 and 133:
132but there were UNPROFOR Military
Page 134 and 135:
134office, which was opposite the c
Page 136 and 137:
136van Reijn. 644 It is likewise cl
Page 138 and 139:
138Chapter 4Secret arms supplies an
Page 140 and 141:
140to import them into the region.
Page 142 and 143:
142the UN, which had expressed its
Page 144 and 145:
144The Croatian pipeline in practic
Page 146 and 147:
146The role of the CroatsThe Americ
Page 148 and 149:
148Tudjman needed to hear and after
Page 150 and 151:
150‘In fact, one of the great mis
Page 152 and 153:
152‘... suggesting to a foreign c
Page 154 and 155:
154Deutch’s successor. However, a
Page 156 and 157:
156past already indicated that they
Page 158 and 159:
158allow him (as one of the SDA con
Page 160 and 161:
160The choice of TuzlaVarious Europ
Page 162 and 163:
162Tactical Air Force in Tuzla were
Page 164 and 165:
164military and other assistance fr
Page 166 and 167:
166February 1995. 833 According to
Page 168 and 169:
168sometimes incorrect. Adding new
Page 170 and 171:
170concluded nonetheless that there
Page 172 and 173:
172‘US intelligence agencies were
Page 174 and 175:
174to Tuzla. Incidentally, the DIS
Page 176 and 177:
176did not extend to Croatia. What
Page 178 and 179:
178received intercepts, but account
Page 180 and 181:
1808 March. It stated that ‘the V
Page 182 and 183:
182The number of mercenaries was ne
Page 184 and 185:
1841996 they donated another $ 500,
Page 186 and 187:
186intervention team, where they we
Page 188 and 189:
188to support or evacuate their uni
Page 190 and 191:
190ground forces with a robust mand
Page 192 and 193:
Western intelligence services as th
Page 194 and 195:
194To date little is known about th
Page 196 and 197:
196Advantages of SigintDue to the s
Page 198 and 199:
198the value of the close co-ordina
Page 200 and 201:
200also means that the intelligence
Page 202 and 203:
202communications traffic via walki
Page 204 and 205:
204In fact the existence of Sigint
Page 206 and 207:
206Commanders, the Canadian General
Page 208 and 209:
208to a greater use of intelligence
Page 210 and 211:
210According to press reports the B
Page 212 and 213:
212The military intelligence servic
Page 214 and 215:
214US requirements for open ocean H
Page 216 and 217:
216Another way of retaining some in
Page 218 and 219:
218The Americans also profited from
Page 220 and 221:
220Smith’s staff also received in
Page 222 and 223:
222finally manage to do this - than
Page 224 and 225:
224range of the RC-135 and U-2R rec
Page 226 and 227:
226The Americans generally had stro
Page 228 and 229:
228by Milosevic to get rid of Karad
Page 230 and 231:
230The Bosnian government and the A
Page 232 and 233:
232telephone cables should not run
Page 234 and 235:
234usually not subject to any polit
Page 236 and 237:
236military communications. The Com
Page 238 and 239:
238were routed, such as the UN comm
Page 240 and 241:
240these points. They proposed sett
Page 242 and 243:
242Kok then went to R.J. Hoekstra,
Page 244 and 245:
244remained were items of military
Page 246 and 247:
246He concluded that in Bosnia Humi
Page 248 and 249:
248Chapter 6The Signals Intelligenc
Page 250 and 251:
250obtained the components for four
Page 252 and 253:
252underway the VRS could sometimes
Page 254 and 255:
254a concerted defence shortly befo
Page 256 and 257:
256After the summer of 1993 the Com
Page 258 and 259:
258As far as the technological capa
Page 260 and 261:
260Srebrenica would be coordinated)
Page 262 and 263:
262other documents relating to the
Page 264 and 265:
264as ABiH headquarters in Sarajevo
Page 266 and 267:
266It is more likely that the Elect
Page 268 and 269:
2685. UNPROFOR and Dutchbat as a ta
Page 270 and 271:
270equipment and that the Sigint un
Page 272 and 273:
272UNPROFOR OPs and Sector North Ea
Page 274 and 275:
2746. ConclusionsIt has to be said
Page 276 and 277:
Secondly, the ABiH and the Sigint U
Page 278 and 279:
278The principal aim of this chapte
Page 280 and 281:
280Very little is known of the tech
Page 282 and 283:
282ZIRCON spy satellite. It was als
Page 284 and 285:
284successful, the second was calle
Page 286 and 287:
286conditions, that the operational
Page 288 and 289:
288John. M. Deutch, the later Direc
Page 290 and 291:
290delivered by the French UAVs cou
Page 292 and 293:
292national intelligence authoritie
Page 294 and 295:
294the various US intelligence serv
Page 296 and 297:
296is disputed. Like one US intelli
Page 298 and 299:
2984. How were Albright’s satelli
Page 300 and 301:
300therefore that the late availabi
Page 302 and 303:
302(mist and low-hanging cloud), th
Page 304 and 305:
304where comparisons with the photo
Page 306 and 307:
306aerial photos he had seen of a P
Page 308 and 309:
308to that effect. Perry said that
Page 310 and 311:
310The inevitable conclusion is tha
Page 312 and 313:
312situational awareness, which is
Page 314 and 315:
314Speculation was rife not only in
Page 316 and 317:
316dozens of times in the past, and
Page 318 and 319:
318the ABiH. The question to be exa
Page 320 and 321:
320‘lead me to think that his mai
Page 322 and 323:
322On 9 June the intelligence staff
Page 324 and 325:
324OPs. Karremans noted that this i
Page 326 and 327:
326action on the enclave. 1809 At t
Page 328 and 329:
328build-up or of the aim to conque
Page 330 and 331:
330digging trenches and was going a
Page 332 and 333:
332‘We knew what was going to hap
Page 334 and 335:
334the VRS on 4 and 5 July but had
Page 336 and 337:
336reported, but the reasons for th
Page 338 and 339:
338The level of knowledge of Zagreb
Page 340 and 341:
340BHC also had no indications of V
Page 342 and 343:
342evidence suggests that a major b
Page 344 and 345:
344paramilitary pressure, now that
Page 346 and 347:
346of the use of air power, but sin
Page 348 and 349:
348the US behaviour. However, ‘th
Page 350 and 351:
350leave. No mention was made of th
Page 352 and 353:
352The Central Organization and the
Page 354 and 355:
354A senior BND official also confi
Page 356 and 357:
356James Pardew, who was the head o
Page 358 and 359:
358So which organizations did have
Page 360 and 361:
360confirmation that the ABiH inter
Page 362 and 363:
362UN operations took fifth place i
Page 364 and 365:
364take the whole pocket’. If the
Page 366 and 367:
366latter fact could have been an i
Page 368 and 369:
368explanations given for this are
Page 370 and 371:
370patterns of thought). On 7 July,
Page 372 and 373:
372enclave did not fall due to lack
Page 374 and 375:
3746. Directorate of General Inform
Page 376 and 377:
376Canadian UPROFOR units in Srebre
Page 378 and 379:
2. Sudetic Collection: abstracts of
Page 380 and 381:
380Another twelve private collectio
Page 382 and 383:
Delafon, G. en Sancton, Th., Dear J
Page 384 and 385:
Koedijk, P., J. Linssen en D. Engel
Page 386 and 387:
Shukman, H. (ed), Agents for Change
Page 388 and 389:
388Hilsman, Roger, ‘After the Col
Page 390 and 391:
Hayden, Michael V., ‘Warfighters
Page 392 and 393:
Reijn, Generaal-majoor Joop van,
Page 394 and 395:
394METROThe NationNederlands Dagbla
Page 396 and 397:
Carter JimmyCasey WilliamCengic Hal
Page 398 and 399:
Holbrooke RichardHolm HansHunter Ro
Page 400 and 401:
Ozal T.Palomar JuanPardew JamesParg
Page 402:
Wallin J.M.Warner MichaelWeinberger
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C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

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