C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

260Srebrenica would be coordinated) until 6 July. Though this radio silence was not entirely observed, nomajor preparations could be construed from an analysis of the communications. All that the ABiHknew was that troops were being regrouped near Skelani and Bratunac.The ABiH could also follow, to some extent, the movement of VRS tanks and troops and thearrival of reinforcements. However, it had no insight into the actual intentions of the VRS. So, as therewas no real-time intelligence, the ABiH did not realize that the VRS was preparing a major offensive. Itwas unknown which units of the Zvornik Brigade were heading south. Nor was anything reportedabout buses that were ferrying in fresh troops. An ABiH soldier who was involved in this said thatthere was no foreknowledge and that the ABiH could not break the VRS code. 1369This is contradicted by other ABiH military, who allege that there was intelligence available andthat it was possible to break the code. Statements by witnesses could imply that the army command ofthe ABiH in Sarajevo, or at least the leaders of the 2 nd Corps in Tuzla, were actually aware of thepreparations the VRS were making to attack Srebrenica. For example, the electronic warfare expert ofthe 2 nd Corps in Tuzla, Captain Hajrudin Kisic, stated that the 2 nd Corps knew from Sigint that theattack was pending long before it happened. 1370 Kisic initially worked in the Operations Section, butwas seconded to the Electronic Warfare Unit because there were no Sigint experts in the 2 nd Corps. Inhis estimation, Sigint provided important prior information on the forthcoming attack. It was not toodifficult for Kisic to construe this from intercepted messages: he had lived in Serbia for nine years,during which time he worked for the Operations Section of the VJ. He said that the training hereceived there – under heavy Soviet influence – and the operations left little scope for originality: hecould easily identify the same patterns in the VRS. The main VRS communication tower, situated at analtitude of 1,537 metres at Veliki Zep, had a wide range, so Kisic’s unit picked up real-time interceptsfrom Tuzla. The VRS used an analogue signals system and coded as well as open traffic, but these,according to Kisic, presented no problems for the ABiH.The VRS communication ran between Veliki Zep and Pribicevac. A lot of information wasderived from high-placed officers’ complaints about the vision and behaviour of Mladic. The ABiH wasalso assisted by the frequent use that Mladic made of open lines. This is how one of Kisic’ unitsmanaged to intercept calls between General Zivanovic, Commander of the Drina Corps, and ColonelVukovic of the Skelani Brigade. The Skelani Brigade was positioned on both sides of the road at ZeleniJadar; the Bratunac Brigade was in the east, the Milici Brigade in the north-west and the RomaniaBrigade in the west. There were no conventional front lines. The VRS controlled the keycommunication lines and the heights. Covert allusions were made to the planned attack in the form ofcomments such as ‘spring is coming’; Kisic could remember that OP-E was captured around the timeof this intercept.General Sead Delic, Commander of the ABiH 2 nd Corps, confirmed that the leaders of hisCorps in Tuzla had prior intelligence of the VRS attack. The 2 nd Corps is supposed to have warnedCommander Karremans, but he did not believe them. The ABiH also sent warnings to Sector NorthEast of UNPROFOR, but they did not share in its conviction. ABiH intelligence was not takenseriously. 1371 The ABiH commander in Sarajevo, General Rasim Delic, also stated that messages fromMladic had been intercepted, which indicated that he was gearing up for an attack. According toGeneral Delic, confidential information from one of the US intelligence services confirmed that aconversation had taken place between Mladic and Milosevic. For a whole week all sorts of subjectswere discussed with Belgrade. Delic reported the conversation as follows: ‘Look, Mladic, are you reallygoing to Srebrenica?’. The answer was ‘Of course, I haven’t finished the job. I’m going to take Zepaand Gorazde as well.’ There were other signs, such as the regrouping of troops, propaganda, theincreasing frequency of incidents around the Safe Areas, and statements from the international1369 Confidential interview (73).1370 Interview with Hajrudin Kisic, 17 and 18/05/99.1371 Interview with Sead Delic, 10/03/99.