C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

167Force Commander and with General Smith, and the conclusion was that the investigation would notyield any satisfactory answers. The NATO report had meanwhile been modified somewhat to bring itmore in line with the UNPROFOR findings. It now stated that there was no ‘conclusive evidence’ ofthe flights.It was difficult to maintain, however, that nothing at all had happened. 838 The later DeputyHead of the MIS, Colonel Bokhoven, confirmed that during his time at UNPROFOR he had alsoheard of the Black Flights. According to him it was clear that they were American or Turkish aircraft. 839Another Dutch officer who had dealings with the Black Flights was Brigadier J.W. Brinkman, who wasChief of Staff at Bosnia-Hercegovina Command from September 1994 to March 1995. Brinkman neverfound any evidence for the clandestine American support to the ABiH, but neither had he ever lookedfor any. He did observe that within six months of the supplies in February and March, the ABiH’sappearance improved considerably: they were wearing real uniforms and carrying better arms.Brinkman heard from local UN commanders that aircraft of unknown origin landed in Tuzla. Theywere C-130s, protected by fighter planes, the signatures of which bore a suspicious resemblance tothose of NATO. 840 Another Dutch staff officer at Bosnia Hercegovina Command, Lieutenant ColonelDe Ruiter, had also heard that supply flights had taken place. Whether the Americans were behindthem was unclear to him, because there were no identifying markings on the aircraft. The supplies alsowent via third party countries, ‘but whatever, there were landings’, according to De Ruiter. 841On 23 February, Annan sent a ‘most immediate code cable’ to Akashi. He referred to DeLapresle’s report and to the Moldestad’s statement. The Norwegian stated in the ‘joint’NATO/UNPROFOR report that he had not seen a C-130, but only heard one. De Lapresle’s earlierreport, however, stated that he definitely had seen a transport-type aircraft, and had also made ananalysis of the flight pattern. Annan wanted to know whether Moldestad had really been interviewed bythe researchers, and Annan also pointed out that the commercial airline traffic to Belgrade usuallyclosed after 16.00 hours. He was prepared to agree to the joint report provided the outstandingquestions and identified contradictions were resolved, and if it could be clearly indicated that theUNPROFOR report was drawn up professionally and in good faith in the first instance, but that newfacts had emerged after a NATO investigation that were not available at the time of the earlierinvestigation. 842This was not the only message that reached Akashi from New York. On 24 February he wastold through his adviser, Jesudas Bell, that UN headquarters through Shashi Tharoor was ‘extremelyupset’ about the clandestine arms flights reports. Meanwhile, more reports had arrived fromUNPROFOR soldiers, who had seen aircraft over Tuzla on 17, 22 and 23 February. Tharoor statedthat New York was outraged at an investigation, described as a joint NATO/UNPROFORinvestigation, that contained so many unanswered questions. If this had been a joint investigation towhich UNPROFOR had linked its name, then the Norwegian report and the commercial airline trafficin Serbian airspace should also have been investigated. On this last matter, UNPROFOR should havecontacted the Serbian authorities through its office in Belgrade and asked them to confirm thecommercial airline traffic, according to Tharoor.Tharoor added that UNPROFOR had put its name to an official investigation report that onthe one hand contradicted the UNPROFOR reports and on the other hand provided no conclusiveevidence why there were such divergent final conclusions. Tharoor felt that the document seriouslyundermined the credibility of UNPROFOR and the UN secretariat. Various delegations had alreadyasked questions because the UNPROFOR reporting on the incidents was so contradictory and838 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 124. Akashi to Annan, Z-310, 23/02/95. For a similar ECMM analysis: NMFA, DDI/DEU,Paris Coreau, 14/03/95.839 Interview with H. Bokhoven, 16/05/01.840 Interview with J.W. Brinkman, 11/10/99.841 Interview with A. de Ruiter, 29/06/00.842 Confidential collection (12), Annan to Akashi, no. 578, 23/02/95.