C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

58overall command, then this would prove awkward because of the bias in the American view. ‘It is likelythat any such mission will be interventionist rather than neutral in nature (anti-Serb sentiments on theUS part will continue even after a peace accord).’ 240One Canadian intelligence official with considerable experience in Serbia confirmed this picture.Neutral reports came from the Western services in Belgrade, which was theoretically the primarypurpose of intelligence. This balanced view was also supplied to the headquarters of NATO. But subtledistinctions should have been picked up by policymakers in Washington and elsewhere, which did nothappen, according to this official. The US policy was partisan, and the intelligence community wasinsufficiently involved. American politicians were stuck in a ‘good guy, bad guy’ mindset. The Canadianview was that the involvement of the international community made the conflict worse, and that theywould have done better to keep out. 241Confronted with this view, the then CIA director, James Woolsey, 242 agreed that his analystsgenerally had no black-and-white typology of the warring factions. According to Woolsey it was not thecase that the CIA during his tenure was stressing Bosnian atrocities or giving any policy advice againstintervention. ‘Indeed we were giving no policy advice at all’. What the CIA was consistently saying wasthat the Bosnians committed a small number of atrocities, the Croatians more, and the Serbs a greatmany. As regards conveying this message to the Clinton administration, he stated: ‘it was swimmingagainst the stream.’ The CIA also suggested that the killing would not stop without someone’sintervening. 243The Deputy Commander US European Command (EUCOM), US General Chuck Boyd,claimed that EUCOM was the best source of intelligence concerning the Balkans. However, EUCOMofficials claimed that when US assessments got to Washington DC the intelligence seemed to gothrough a metamorphosis into pro-Bosnian statements. Even when US military intelligence exposedmany media reports from Sarajevo as little more than Bosnian propaganda, Clinton Administrationofficials were more likely to believe press reports than EUCOM or the UN. The willingness ofWashington’s policy elite to base its rhetorical responses on one-sided media reports, dismayed seniorUS military officials. Boyd also found out how badly informed US Secretary of Defence, William Perry,was. 244That the CIA had a different view was also evident from remarks Woolsey made during his visitto Minister Ter Beek in The Hague on 10 December 1993. The situation in Bosnia was described byWoolsey’s staff as a ‘postponement of the surrender of the Muslims, so that the conflict was keptgoing’. 245 Woolsey in an interview with the author gave Haiti as an example of a similar situation, wherethe American government wished to provide full support to opposition leader J.B. Aristide. However,the intelligence community immediately said: ‘Hey, wait a minute. He is a problem.’ But the politiciansdid not wish to listen. Woolsey gave another example: according to the political leaders in Washington,a coalition government would be formed in Somalia. The US intelligence community pointed out thatthis would never happen, 246 but again the politicians did not wish to hear the message. 247The American services opposed this political wishful thinking and repeatedly pointed out thatthe Muslims had close links with various fundamentalist Islamic governments and terrorist movementsand were also supplied with arms from Iran. The intelligence services also argued that the BosnianMuslims had also committed massacres, although there was a difference in scale: the Bosnian Muslimshad perhaps murdered hundreds, the Croats thousands and the Serbs tens of thousands, but that did240 Confidential information (7).241 Confidential interview (2).242 See for his appointment: Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 190.243 Interviews with R.J. Woolsey, 08/06/00 and 01/10/02.244 Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, p. 92.245 MoD, DJZ, Memorandum for the minister, D93/514, 13/12/93. Further: Interview with A.L. ter Beek, 13/01/00.246 See also: Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 253.247 Interview with R.J. Woolsey, 08/06/00.