C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

321stated that the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force could have serious implications. Although itwas not intended for deployment in the enclaves, the VRS could well view the Rapid Reaction Force asa renewed threat and as additional proof of support for the Bosnian government. 1774 The VRS couldtake retaliatory measures against UNPROFOR, including direct attacks on troops and installations. Itwould also become more difficult to move reinforcements to the enclaves. Sarajevo would initiallywelcome these developments, but the reaction would be negative if the new troops were intended toassist the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the enclaves. 1775Smith remained gloomy about the long-term prospects. In an analysis issued on 6 June heconcluded that the VRS ‘wants a conclusion this year’. In his opinion the ABiH had no interest in aceasefire; moreover UNPROFOR was no longer seen as a peacekeeping force. The VRS wanted toneutralize UNPROFOR; as said, the troops in the enclaves were actually hostages. Moreover, Close AirSupport would in the future be ‘of doubtful value except as a measure of last resort and once potentialhostages have been removed to safety’. 1776The low-level effect of Close Air Support was also revealed by a conversation held on 2 June inNaples between the British Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, and the NATO Admiral Leighton Smith,who gave a detailed account of the problems in the relationship between the UN and NATO. AdmiralSmith saw no political goals in Bosnia that could still be achieved in the long term. The existingmandate was mainly responsive in nature; consequently there was no realistic military goal. AdmiralSmith was satisfied with the air operations; he had 216 aircraft at his disposal. But, emphasized Smith,‘it was impossible to win the battle with the Serbs by air power alone’. Hurd then asked if it was a myththat the enclaves could be defended and protected from the air. Admiral Smith’s answer to this was:‘absolutely’. Most attacks were carried out with mortars, which were often transported by two men;these could be set up and dismantled within a few minutes and then be concealed in barns or houses.Close Air Support could do nothing against this type of operation. 1777Despite this General Smith did not expect any operations by the VRS in Sarajevo in view of thepolitical implications, negative publicity and lack of infantry. The VRS tactics boiled down to increasingpressure ‘to degrade and deplete the ABiH to the point of capitulation’. Mladic was convinced that thismethod of slow strangulation would not provoke any response from NATO, and thus the VRS wouldcontinue to attack military targets in and around the enclaves. He expected that the ABiH would slowlylose much of its territory around the eastern enclaves and would gradually run out of ammunition. Thiswould force the ABiH to withdraw for its own safety into more populated areas among the largenumbers of Displaced Persons. The ABiH would try to use UNPROFOR as a shield and this in turncould provoke a VRS response against UNPROFOR. 1778Following the fall of OP-E the intelligence section of Unprofor in Zagreb drew up an ‘EasternEnclaves Assessment’ which predicted that the VRS would try to gain a stronger hold on the activitiesof the ABiH in the enclave. Although it was not expected that the VRS would attack the enclave, onecould expect operations intended to force the ABiH further away from the most importantcommunications links to the north and south of the enclave. Since the ABiH was not in a position totake effective countermeasures, the intelligence cell predicted that the VRS operation would progressslowly and methodically so as to minimize the number of casualties in its own ranks. The intelligenceofficer was convinced: ‘The VRS is not expected to seize the Safe Area, preferring to leave the refugeeproblem to the local ABiH authorities to solve.’ This analysis was partly based on the previouslymentioned report and estimate by Karremans. 17791774 United Nations, Srebrenica Report, pp. 63-64.1775 Confidential collection (4). Memorandum Warring factions’ responses to UN ‘reinforced’ peacekeeping from Capt. R. Theunensto COS, Zagreb, 02/06/95.1776 Confidential collection (4). Memorandum Unprofor reinforcements from General Smith, No. 8190, 06/06/95.1777 Confidential information (62).1778 Confidential collection (4). Memorandum Eastern Enclaves Operations - Assessment by General Smith, No. 8940, 06/06/95.1779 Confidential collection (4). Eastern Enclaves Assessment, Annex A to Unprofor 800, 06/05/95.