C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

363expectation that ‘on balance it is judged that the Bosnian Serbs will probably not seek to over-run the“safe areas” for the moment’. 2051 It must be doubted whether this US and British intelligence about animminent attack was ‘hard’, as Mladic first decided at the end of June to set the operation in motion.At a meeting in The Hague on 15 November 1995, a senior DIS official, Commodore J.G.F.Cooke, emphatically denied that the British services had had prior knowledge of the attack. Cooke hadbeen sent to The Hague on behalf of this service to calm matters at the request of the British Chief ofDefence Staff, Field Marshall Sir Peter Inge. There was great concern at the Dutch Ministry of Defencethat British and other Western services had withheld information. Cooke talked to the Commander inChief of the Army and to the Head of the MIS and made clear that the DIS had not known anything2052more than had been passed on to the Dutch. The CIA later also denied that it had held suchinformation.The highest US military commanders also firmly denied having had prior knowledge of theevent. According to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO (SACEUR) General GeorgeJoulwan, it was only two or three days before the fall of Srebrenica that a feeling arose that an attackmight take place. It was clear that the VRS wanted to take control of Eastern Bosnia. This intention didnot change over the years, and in this respect their aims were clear. Good intelligence was availableabout the way that the VRS acted; the VRS very quickly gathered troops around Srebrenica ‘to supportforward elements already in place’. The same later happened at Zepa. This should have been a ‘trigger’:the reports of troops being massed and artillery being moved into position.2053 Admiral Leighton Smithalso stated that he had had no hard intelligence that Mladic was planning to attack. His intelligence wasnot good; the VRS efficiently rendered its communications secure. It was only three to four daysbeforehand that troop movements were observed. At this point it became clear to him that anoperation was probably imminent. 2054Despite this, articles about prior knowledge continued to appear. In response to a spate ofpublications at the end of 1996 the Dutch Chief of Defence Staff, General Henk van den Breemen,wrote to his British colleague Inge and requested him to investigate what signs the British intelligencecommunity had received concerning the attack on Srebrenica. Would a warning have been possible?The response from Inge and the enclosed DIS Assessment from 30 June 1995 indicates the following.The assessment was based on various sources and no further analysis was made until after the fall. TheDIS regarded the enclave as ‘virtually indefensible’. The VRS had the military strength to take theenclave at any moment they wished. When the attack finally materialized, the DIS believed that theVRS was interested only in the southern road. ‘It was only the rapid and unexpected collapse ofgovernment defences which led them to push on and take the enclave at that point.’According to Inge the Ministry of Defence in London had once again checked the archives ofthe British intelligence community to see whether this analysis still stood. Following a detailed study ofdocuments it appeared that this was still the case. Inge concluded with the remark: ‘I am clear that wehad no tactical warning on timing which might have helped to forestall events there.’ 2055 A study of theDIS Assessment of the situation around Srebrenica on the eve of the definitive attack reveals that theDIS was highly uncertain about the intentions of the VRS. This document was drawn up shortly beforethe final attack on Srebrenica and the DIS did not have a ‘tactical warning of an upcoming attack’.There were no indicators that the ‘VRS would launch an attack without warning’. The service did,however, establish that the VRS had long been complaining about the ABiH sorties conducted from a‘demilitarized zone’. At the end of June 1995 the DIS concluded that ‘tension is high around theSrebrenica enclave, but there are no indicators to suggest that the VRS are about to launch an attack to2051 Confidential interview (8).2052 Confidential interview (8).2053 Interview with George Joulwan, 08/06/002054 Interview with Leighton Smith, 06/06/00.2055 NIOD, Coll. Van den Breemen. Letter from Sir Peter Inge to Henk van den Breemen, No. D/CDS/1/8/6, 29/01/97 plusDIS Assessment, 30/06/95.