C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

318the ABiH. The question to be examined now is what intelligence services or the ABiH were able todiscover and report about the military preparations of the VRS. Did they provide indications in time,and if so, how were these evaluated and interpreted, and finally: what was done with this intelligence?3. Strategic prior knowledgeEver since the establishment of the Safe Areas there had been discussions – albeit quiet ones – in theinternational political arena, about the inevitability of giving up the enclaves. This could take placethrough forced or voluntary surrender or through an exchange of the Safe Areas for other territory.Robert Hayden reported for instance that staff of the State Department had told him at the start of1994 that they were convinced that Srebrenica would no longer be under Muslim control at the end ofthe war, but that they ‘were unwilling for moral reasons to urge the Muslims to cede the town’. 1750 Theauthor Sadkovich pointed out that US negotiator Charles Redman travelled to Pale at the end of 1994with a proposal that the eastern enclaves be exchanged for territory around Sarajevo. 1751 Indeed, duringinternational consultations Redman had indeed considered the option of exchanging Srebrenica andZepa for territory around Sarajevo. At the same time, however, he thought that public opinion and theClinton government would block this proposal. 1752 But even before this, the matter had been discussedwithin the Bosnian government.It was clear that the abandonment of the enclaves had been the subject of discussion indiplomatic circles for some time, because it was generally acknowledged that they were not viable. Asenior German diplomat confirmed that Redman was aiming for ‘an exchange of territories. However,Bosnia had to agree. Sarajevo always maintained mixed feelings about the enclaves as a bargaining chip.’The Bosnian Serb side showed interest too, as revealed by all sorts of direct bilateral contacts. Karadzicregularly bombarded Bonn with all sorts of secret letters and memos in this respect.1753 Members of theUS intelligence community confirmed that in Pale there were advocates of the plans for the exchangeof territories. 1754 The existence of mixed feelings in Sarajevo was confirmed by a member of the StateDepartment. The body language of the Bosnian representatives showed that some of these too were infavour of ‘swapping away the enclaves’: this issue created tensions within the Bosnian government. 1755All things considered, there was thus some willingness among the warring factions to exchange theenclaves for other territory.From the military perspective too it was assumed that the enclaves had little chance of survivalin the long term. In a secret memorandum to the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff in the autumn of1994, the Canadian Major General Ray Crabbe, at the time Deputy Force Commander ofUNPROFOR, reported that UNPROFOR staff in Zagreb had ‘a very uneasy feeling regarding thesituation in the eastern enclaves’ and regarding ‘the potential vulnerability of the enclaves to militaryaction by the BSA [VRS]’. This latter possibility should not be ruled out, according to Crabbe.1756 Hedid not fear an imminent attack, but in the long term the situation could only get worse. A briefing atthe Ministry of Defence in December 1994 also stated the expectation that ‘in the long term, theenclave will fall to the Bosnian Serbs’. But the aim of the VRS was not, it was thought, the conquest ofSrebrenica, because it had no military significance and a conquest would provoke a serious internationalresponse. Srebrenica would fall because of the intolerable humanitarian and socio-economic situationthere. 17571750 Robert M. Hayden, ‘Reply’, Slavic Review, Vol. 55 (1996) 4, p. 777.1751 Sadkovich, Media, p. 216.1752 Honig & Both, Srebrenica, p. 163.1753 Confidential interview (53).1754 Confidential interviews (7).1755 Confidential interview (3).1756 Confidential information (58).1757 MoD, CRST. G-2 Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff to Military Intelligence Service/CO, 07/12/94.