C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

323The Military Intelligence Service of the Central Organization of the Ministry of Defence(MIS/CO) made a negative estimate of the long-term viability of the enclave right from the start. Sincethe creation of the Safe Areas, the MIS/CO had consistently pointed to the risk inherent forUNPROFOR. The strength of UNPROFOR was not sufficient to be able to successfully defend theexisting positions. This was indeed not the aim, because the mandate stated that attacks or aggressionshould primarily be deterred by the presence of the UN troops.From the moment that Dutchbat arrived, the VRS was in a position to take the enclave. Thequestion was not whether the VRS was able to do this, but whether and when the VRS wanted to do it.The MIS/CO did not expect, however, that a potential offensive would go further than occupation ofthe south-eastern corner of the enclave, which was of tactical relevance to the VRS. 1787 On 23 MayKaradzic stated that the VRS would conquer the eastern enclaves and Sarajevo unless the ABiH wasdisarmed and withdrawn in these areas. The MIS/CO analysis was that he had primarily said this inorder to direct international attention to the fact that the UN had not responded to the presence ofBosnian heavy weapons in towns and enclaves. MIS/CO also pointed to the recent sorties from these‘safe areas’. 1788 Karadzic’s declaration on 23 May that the VRS was going to conquer the easternenclaves was also by the Canadian diplomat Snider and the Canadian intelligence community notviewed as a threat. Only if Mladic were to say the same would it have been a real threat. 1789It was thus expected by many organizations and persons that in the long term the enclaves werenot viable and would disappear. However, no major attack was expected. But strategic prior knowledgeis not the same as tactical prior knowledge. The latter involves clear intelligence which makes it veryclear that an attack is being prepared. Below it is examined whether this type of prior knowledge waspresent or not. This is done by reviewing the hard intelligence that was available at various levels. Werethere tactical indications, such as military transports, troop concentrations and reports that providedmutual corroboration? Before answering these questions it is important firstly to give a brief reminderof how the actual attack took place 1790 , as this will provide a framework for answering the formulatedquestions.4. The attack on SrebrenicaOn 3 June, OP-E at the southern tip of the enclave fell into the hands of the VRS. After this attackDutchbat expected on 4 June that the VRS would continue the assault within 36 hours. The indirectdeclared objective of the VRS was to take the valley of the River Jadar and the mountains to the northof this up to Mount Kak: ‘As a coincidence this line matches the southern border of the enclave as theVRS sees it.’ 1791 In an assessment a day later Karremans reported that the VRS attitude had hardenedand the status quo had disappeared. He feared that if UNPROFOR did not take any effective militarycountermeasures, the VRS would respond to this by trying to take the entire southern flank, whichwould make the situation of the population worse. Karremans did not consider the use of air strikes tobe opportune either. 1792The situation remained threatening. On 8 June ABiH representatives requested an urgentmeeting with Dutchbat. The deputy commander of the ABiH said that he expected a major attack. TheVRS was concentrating around the enclave and special combat troops had been reported; these unitswere the same ones that had attacked OP-E. Zero Hour was expected to be the evening of 8 June orthe morning of 9 June. Mladic was to personally lead the attack, which was intended to neutralize all1787 NIOD, Memo from Military Intelligence Service to the NIOD, January 1998.1788 Military Intelligence Service/CO. Memorandum on Developments in the former Yugoslav Federation, No. 24/95,23/05/95.1789 Interview with Dennis Snider, 17/11/99.1790 This is dealt with in detail in Chapters 5 and 6 of Part III of the main Srebrenica report.1791 MoD, DCBC, Box 4, HQ Dutchbat to CO SNE, T-068, 04/06/95.1792 MoD, CRST. No. DE00309, Karremans to C-KL Crisis Staff, TK9589, 05/06/95.