C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

136van Reijn. 644 It is likewise clear that the information position of the MIS/CO, which had to advise theMinister, the CDS and senior Ministry of Defence officials, constantly lagged behind that of theMIS/Army. Raw intelligence was often held back by senior MIS officers in the Armed Forces, whoattended first to the interests of their own branch of the Armed Forces and their own Commander-in-Chief. In this sense, it reflected the relationship between the senior RNLA officers and the CentralOrganization as a whole. Here too, there was no question of a regular exchange of information, and theMinister complained about the paltry amount of intelligence that reached him from the Army.This mutual infighting had a significant influence on the coordination and rapport between theMIS analysts. In the period up to 1996, there were serious problems at the MIS as a consequence of the‘independence’ of the departments in the Armed Forces; management problems as a consequence ofthe lack of insight into these departments; a lack of insight into the effective use of personnel andmaterial resources; lack of clarity among foreign intelligence services as a consequence of diffuse andfragmented deployment of the Dutch intelligence services. The tensions between the intelligenceservices worked to the considerable detriment of their information position. Only after Srebrenica didthe realization dawn that the MIS could not continue in this way. It also needs to be said, however, thatpolitical, administrative or military guidance was also sadly lacking. An anti-intelligence attitudeprevailed in The Hague as regards the use of intelligence and security services in peacekeepingoperations in a UN context. There was no insistence from senior Army officers that additionalintelligence be gathered, and no control was asserted. What is more: no role whatsoever was set asidefor the MIS/Army. Senior Ministry of Defence officials also asserted no control or showed any specialinterest in the work of the MIS. No additional financial or other resources became available, and theyhad to make do with what they had. The Minister’s interest in the work of his service did not increasesignificantly, and in any case no specific requests were made for threat or risk analyses prior todeployment. The MIS/CO and the MIS/Army were not consulted by the Minister and senior militaryofficers regarding the deployment. Once the decision had been taken, the service was not givenadditional equipment to step up its efforts. The cutbacks in the Armed Forces appear to have beenmore important than obtaining additional intelligence that could have been important to the security ofthe Dutch soldiers in Bosnia. There was no sign of heightened awareness at the Ministry of Defence interms of evaluating this situation.The same was true of Parliament. Neither before the decision to deploy nor after the actualdeployment did Parliament insist on an improvement in the Dutch information position in the field ofintelligence. Intelligence and security services played no significant role in Parliament either. Parliamenteven thought it unnecessary to inquire cautiously about the information position. The same applied tothe press: there too, intelligence and security services played no role. If they had done, it would possiblyhave been a reason for the Ministry of Defence to do something structural about it. In terms ofstructural consideration of the use and availability of intelligence, the Netherlands is a ‘poor’ country.No enthusiasm existed for carrying out serious intelligence gathering. This is regrettable, becauseformer GCHQ employee Michael Herman rightly pointed out that good intelligence acquired bycivilian and military intelligence services puts a country in a position ‘to punch above its weight’.645There was apparently no such need in the Netherlands.When a senior foreign intelligence official did read a draft of this study chapter his commentswere very harsh. ‘Where Dutch policymakers, military leaders and lower ranking military personnelwere derelict in their duty, and failed to take the least effort at remedial action, some heads should roll’.He added to this: ‘Leaders knew the risk, sent those young boys in there with nothing but their spoons.Commanders knew it, and made it worse. General officers in UN positions of influence went out oftheir way to spit on those who may have been able to help. And they’re spitting still’. He finished withthis remark: ‘They failed to act in anticipation of the known risk, they stood by idly as the facts became644 Major General Joop van Reijn, ‘De Militaire Inlichtingendienst, vandaag en morgen’ (The MIS, today and tomorow) , in: Militaire Spectator, Vol . 170 (2001) 11 , p. 585.645 M. Herman, Diplomacy and Intelligence, Diplomatic Studies Programme Discussion Paper no. 39, z.pl. 1998, p. 10.