C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

94cutbacks recommended by the Van Idsinga Commission, a strengthening of the MIS/CO analysiscapacity from 28 to 42 staff was deemed necessary, whereas the same commission recommended thatthe number of Army intelligence positions could be reduced from 47 to 41. For the intelligencedomain, the desirability of a decentralized approach was confirmed, however: in other words in theArmed Forces as opposed to the Central Organization. 431In the 1990s, crisis management and peace operations also made their mark on thecounterintelligence and security domain. This mainly involved promoting the security of Dutchsoldiers. The debriefing of military personnel that had participated in peace operations was becomingincreasingly important with a view to security aspects. All in all, the crisis management operations led tonew intelligence requirements, which would seriously aggravate the pressure of work on the MIS,especially after the summer of 1995. 432The MIS/CO’s sourcesThe Intelligence Staff of the MIS/CO was to make use of Open Source Intelligence (Osint), HumanIntelligence (Humint) and Signals Intelligence (Sigint) for its intelligence production. The MIS hasinvested in the development of open sources, especially in recent years. This has meant more use ofcommercial data banks and Internet. It goes without saying that the service also had many national andinternational professional journals, weekly magazines and daily newspapers at its disposal. The MIS alsoexhibited the international tendency of making exhaustive use of open sources prior to resorting tomore clandestine sources of information, such as human sources and Sigint. Another source ofintelligence was the reports of the military attachés in other countries. 433With respect to information from human sources, there was an Operations Department withinthe MIS/CO that was responsible for recruiting and running informants and agents. This departmentwas mainly created from the collaboration of the Counterintelligence (CI) departments of the ‘old’military intelligence services of the Royal Netherlands Army and the Royal Netherlands Air Force. Thisdepartment originally restricted itself to counterintelligence operations, but after the ForeignIntelligence Service (IDB) was disbanded on 1 January 1994, Operations started to make its owncontribution to ‘filling the hole’ left by the IDB. A start was then made on building up Humintresources and closer collaboration with the BVD. 434 Since mid 1996, this Operations Department hasmade an actual start on operations in the intelligence and counterintelligence area. The written accountsof the operational work can be found in what are known as the ‘O Files’ that contain data on thesource, the operation files with information on the development of the operation, and finally theinformation files containing the intelligence provided by the source. The information reports were sentto users, such as the Intelligence Department, also at the MIS/CO. 435The MIS/CO also engaged in procuring Sigint. In 1995 there were three military units involvedin this, one for each branch of the Armed Forces: the First Air Force Signals Group, the 898 th RoyalNetherlands Army Signals Battalion, and the Royal Netherlands Navy Technical InformationProcessing Centre (TIVC). Until 1996, these three operated separately from each other, but in that yearthey were integrated to create one Sigint Department, which comprised two sections: the OperationalSigint Centre (OVIC) located at Eibergen (in the Dutch province of Gelderland) and the StrategicSigint Centre (SVIC) in The Hague.The Royal Netherlands Army’s 898 th Signals Battalion in Eibergen was engaged primarily inintercepting military tactical message traffic (in the HF band). The Royal Netherlands Navy’s TIVC431 MoD , Archive MI S /CO , Report Van Idsinga, DIS/95/21.11/809 , 29/ 0 3/95 .432 MoD, Archive MI S/CO , Organization and Information Directorate, New balance. MI S Audit Report. Phase 2, pp. 1 and 78, 04/11/98. See also: MoD , Archive CSKL 1994,DOKL/IV, Staff 1 Lk to Crisis staff, No. G2/5818, 11/07/94.433 Engelen, De Militaire Inlichtingend ienst , p. 145.434 Interview with HMID, P.J. Duijn, 04/04/01.435 Engelen, De Militaire Inlichtingendienst, pp. 143-144.