C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

188to support or evacuate their units. Nonetheless, the US Secretary of Defense, Perry, had indicated thatthe Dutch soldiers in Bosnia would be able to count on support if they were to find themselves indifficulty. The promised support was not specified in detail at the time, and neither did that appear tobe necessary then, with this promise on the table. 996 According to Brinkman, UN-plans for anevacuation continued to be no more than paper tigers. The serious plans had to come from NATO,such as the withdrawal plan Oplan 40104 as well as from the national governments: the British forGorazde and the French for Sarajevo. 997US Special Forces also remained active in Bosnia later. They were said to have been givenpermission to use UNHCR jeeps fitted with special registration plates for their operations. 998 Thesecurity services of the Bosnian Serbs had allegedly occasionally picked up CIA or SAS personnel, butan arrangement was worked out with UNHCR, that they would then issue a statement that it was oneof their people. 999 Dutch soldiers for example observed fifty US Special Forces soldiers in Mostar, whovanished again abruptly. 1000 After July 1995, US Special Forces and the SAS were even more active inthe region; there were said to be serious plans to have them capture Karadzic. 10017. ConclusionsThe following quotation gives a clear indication of what the secret operations in the Balkans were allabout.‘All the conflicts concerned are fundamentally struggles for power, irrespectiveof whether the operations are initiated in order to provide humanitarian aid orto limit the scope of an armed confrontation. (...) Experience shows that theparties to the intervention inevitably become parties to the conflict, with theirown distinct interests’. 1002The secret arms supplies to the warring factions took place within the framework of a complexinternational political constellation.The United States had to deal with a variety of fields of tension. After the Gulf War, it waspayback time and in the Arab world (especially Saudi Arabia) it was expected that Washington wouldsupport the Bosnian Muslims. Furthermore, great pressure was brought to bear on the Clintonadministration by the media and Congress, which was dominated by the Republicans. On the otherhand, open military support would bring the United States into conflict with European countries thatwere contributing ground forces to UNPROFOR. The European countries expected that additionalarms would encourage the conflict to flare up, resulting in a growing stream of Displaced Persons. Thelift and strike strategy (lifting the embargo and resorting to air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs) thatthe Americans opted for, was partly motivated by a desire to meet domestic and foreign pressure: a‘political gesture’, because the US government knew that the Security Council would not agree and thatit would lead to a decision in London and Paris to withdraw from UNPROFOR. The US lobby in theSecurity Council for lifting the arms embargo was also connected to the desire not to have to deployany American ground forces. 1003996 Interview with J.C. Gmelich Meijling, 04/12/01 and also Interview with M.C.J. Felix, 06/04/00.997 Interview with J.W. Brinkman, 11/10/99 and F. van Bouwdijk Bastiaanse, 28/08/00. See also: Välimäki, Intelligence, p. 87.See also Part III of the main Srebrenica report.998 Harald Doornbos, ‘Groene spionnen tussen blauwhelmen’, De Stem, 10/05/95.999 Interview with Milovan Milutinovic, 20-22/03/00.1000 Confidential interview (38).1001 Confidential interview (69) and Maggie O’Keane, ‘Hunting Radovan’, The Guardian, 20/02/01.1002 Välimäki, Intelligence, p. 86.1003 David Morrison, ‘How Bosnia is Becoming a Priority’, National Journal, 20/08/94.