C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

226The Americans generally had strong capabilities for intercepting high-level communicationstraffic. This is also indicated by the fact that the NSA trained and employed Serbo-Croat translators. 1200However, the main focus of the efforts was on important military traffic, and that was harder tomonitor. Statements by US sources are confirmed by members of the Canadian intelligencecommunity. This is important, because only Canada – and to a lesser extent also the United Kingdom –has a special relationship with America in this respect, and thus access to high-level Sigint. DespiteAmerican concern about General Rose’s alleged sympathy for the Serb cause and political differencesbetween the Clinton government and Whitehall about policy regarding Bosnia, the British like theCanadians continued to have direct access to the Sigint archives and databanks of the NSA and CIA.But GCHQ also independently achieved successes in the Sigint war. British sources confirm thatGCHQ (not necessarily via the UKUSA alliance) sometimes managed to intercept and monitor theconversations of the major political and military leaders in the former Yugoslavia. 1201 The question iswhether this also included communications traffic relevant to the eastern enclaves. This is probable, butthe British services concentrated exclusively on Gorazde because British ground troops were stationedin this enclave. When the threat to Gorazde became greater in July 1995, communications traffic –probably intercepted by the British – indicated that the VRS was building up a Command and ControlArchitecture. At the same time it was admitted that it was difficult to gather intelligence on the BosnianSerbs. 1202 The GCHQ also had difficulties getting started in this area, and thus gave priority to Comintregarding the VRS and ABiH around Gorazde. The second area of attention was formed by the otherBritish military units in Bosnia.Monitoring military targets in the Republika SrpskaA major part of the efforts of the NSA regarding Comint was concentrated on the VRS, under thecommand of General Ratko Mladic and his headquarters in Han Pijesak in eastern Bosnia. Spying onthe military communications traffic of the VRS originally seemed relatively simple, so that the NSA wasable to follow the military activities of the VRS in general terms. The VRS had minimal capabilities andresources for transmitting tactical military and operational radio traffic in encrypted and coded form.Military units of the VRS were, to begin with, completely dependent on the radios and walkie-talkiesprovided by the Yugoslav army (the VJ) in Belgrade.Later however the VRS also acquired walkie-talkies that had been bought on the open market.These were used to maintain contacts with the local commanders. This often created difficulties forintelligence services, regarding not only the VRS but the Yugoslav army as well. Comint staff whoworked in Bosnia had good reason to call the war in the region a ‘walkie-talkie war’, since most of theVRS communications took place via Motorolas or walkie-talkies of Japanese manufacture. Nowadaysthis traffic would be easier to intercept by satellite, but in 1994-1995 satellites were not yet able tointercept communications via Motorolas on a large scale given the extremely mountainous terrain ofEastern Bosnia. Only RC-135 aircraft were able to do this, but even then only under perfect conditions.Due to the limited range of these walkie-talkies (3 to 25 km), proper interception of suchcommunications traffic required a monitoring station in the vicinity, but there were none. Inmountainous terrain it is not possible to pick up signals from walkie-talkies, radiotelephones or VHFtransmitters at long range. Additionally, the communications equipment of a tank had a maximumrange of 60 km, thus making it difficult to monitor these as well. US intelligence officials admitted thisfrankly to the journalist Gutman. The UK Defence Intelligence Staff was faced with the same problem.Due to the mountainous terrain in Bosnia, the results of the intercepted military Comint from theGCHQ and NSA were not spectacular. 1203 When asked about this, Canadian intelligence officials1200 Bamford, Body of Secrets, p. 616.1201 Confidential interview (11).1202 Confidential information (183).1203 Roy Gutman, ‘UN’s Deadly Deal’, Newsday, 29/05/96 and Urban, UK Eyes, pp. 216-217.