C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

272UNPROFOR OPs and Sector North East were also intercepted by all the warring factions. Thisexplains how a Danish report of an ABiH column near Tuzla led directly to VRS shelling. The ABiHalso had knowledge of the communications between Dutchbat and the UNMOs. Sometimes, theirreports contained literal quotations from Dutchbat reports. 1446In October 1994 the Royal Netherlands Army used satellite communication equipment in theform of Inmarsat-A terminals as a key communications channel. These terminals were primarilyintended for operational voice/fax traffic to the Netherlands, as well as contacts with the home front.However, they proved inadequate as the units were barely accessible due to the saturation of theInmarsat system. The communication with the home front also impeded operational contact.Consultations were held and a suggestion was mooted to switch to a multiple-channel VSAT network,which used the PTT ground station in Burum (Friesland). This system was also suitable for data, cryptoand video applications. 1447However, on 10 December 1994 two Dutch UN vehicles fitted with satellite communicationequipment were stolen by the Bosnian Serbs near Sarajevo. This gave the VRS the equipment andtechnology to improve their capability for listening in to the Dutch troops. 1448 The Dutch units inUNPROFOR used two civil satellite systems, namely, VSAT and Teledata. Secure and open telephoneand fax traffic could be sent through these systems. It was possible to communicate with Dutchbatthrough the PTT and the satellite communication link. In addition, the Royal Netherlands Army CrisisStaff had a radio connection (HF-EZB) with Dutchbat, which could send written messages, even thoseclassified as ‘secret’. Four international telecom land lines rented from the Bosnian PTT were also usedfor the Transport Battalion. In the meantime, Dutchbat was engaged in negotiations with the BosnianPTT for the rental of international lines at Lukavac. 1449The Dutch ambulances and command vehicles were fitted with satellite communicationequipment for maintaining contact with the command post in the compound. This traffic wasunencrypted. Under the terms of a contract signed with KPN (Dutch PTT) each message was relayedfirst by satellite to Burum and then sent on by satellite or fax. This procedure took approximately threeminutes. Communication with the home front also went by satellite. 1450 The ABiH and the VRSmonitored this open communication to determine the general atmosphere and actual military situationat Dutchbat. Karremans’s predecessor had already discovered that this was going on. 1451 This came tolight, for example, in a memo at the end of 1994 on efficiency improvements at Dutchbat which stated:‘At the moment all connections are being intercepted by both the Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs’. TheDutchbat commander found it absolutely necessary that a secure connection be set up; apparently therewas none at that moment. 1452 These requests, which were submitted in December 1994, did not meetwith an animated response. Indeed, it was not until 9 May 1995 that the Netherlands Army Crisis Staffstarted addressing the problem.The compiler of a memo of May 1995 proposed that Dutchbat use the VSAT system of theUN to establish secure connections between the battalion and Bosnia-Hercegovina Command andSector North East. The argument was that, as the system could also deal with crypto fax traffic, it could‘therefore not be intercepted’. This was wrong: the traffic could certainly be followed. Secure voiceconnections were not possible. As intense use was made of the telephone in a serious crisis, this trafficwas indeed also ‘open’ to all the warring factions. For national use, the Army staff had placed the1446 NIOD, Coll. CD-Roms. Zilich Mehmed to 28 th Division, no. 06-401-103-2/95, 25/06/95.1447 MoD, CRST. Nr. 976, G-6 RNLA Crisis Staff to DOKL.HCIV, no. CRST\1004, 06/10/94 and ‘VSAT-systeem voorteledata’. Compiler F. Polle, no. CRST/1132, 28/10/94.1448 MoD, MIS. File 1378, De gebeurtenissen in het voormalig Joegoslavië van juli 1994 tot januari 1995, (Events in formerYugoslavia from July 1994 to January 1995), 101 MIS/Cie, February 1995.1449 MoD, CRST. File 2504, Information on the communications structure from Major Luiting, 18/05/95.1450 NIOD, Coll. Koreman. Diary Koreman.1451 MoD, Sitreps. Dutchbat Sitrep, 19/04/94.1452 MoD, BDL. File 7914, Commander W.J.E. van Rijn to the Minister, no. S/94/061/4497, 23/12/94.