C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

348the US behaviour. However, ‘the Dutch never got their own information from assets under theircontrol!’ 1957Nonetheless, on the other hand the value of the UAVs should not be exaggerated, because theVRS had sufficient options for concealing its troops, tanks, artillery and mortars in the mountainousterrain. Apart from this the US intelligence services did not expect a further VRS advance either, butinstead that Mladic would be content to control the southern road. The conclusion by Britishintelligence services, as reported in the press, that an attack was imminent was a typical report atstrategic level that was of no use to the MIS. A few MIS officers talked to the British services but thereport was too vague and did not fit any pattern. 1958The former Head of the MIS/Army, Colonel Bokhoven, also stated that his service did notanticipate the crisis and the fall. The problems were associated with the approaching rotation, wherebythe battalion due to be relieved (and now under-strength) was subjected to ‘pricking’. Perhaps the VRSwas angry about the attack on a Serb village two weeks earlier. The only thing that possibly gave moreinsight was a report made when the 2nd Corps of the ABiH in Tuzla was ordered to lay mines on allroads to and from Srebrenica. The reason for this was that a VRS attack was expected from thedirection of Milici and Han Pijesak. 1959 But this report dated from 7 June. Conversations with otherMIS officers show that small-scale actions such as that in Srebrenica can almost never be predicted onthe basis of intelligence. The VRS already had sufficient military resources in the region to conductsuch an operation. 1960On 6 July the MIS/Army concluded that the VRS would attempt to occupy one or moreDutchbat OPs. It was assumed that this did not involve ‘a large-scale attack (Srebrenica has no greatstrategic value), nor an attempt by the ABiH to break out (too weak)’. 1961 The situation was analysed aday after the start of the attack. One possible reason cited for a large-scale attack was the need for asuccess that could not be achieved in other parts of the operational area. The occupation of the enclavewould cost the VRS relatively little effort. This would then give the VRS greater freedom to act inEastern Bosnia, the line of confrontation would be reduced, troops would be freed for other tasks andthe Drina crossings could be better used and exploited. The disadvantages of a major attack werecondemnation by the international community and the use of NATO air power.Such an attack might not be necessary, because the VRS could switch to a battle of attrition andsimply wait for the enclave to collapse from within. Dutchbat was faced with considerable potentialproblems, such as individual blockades within and outside the enclave, organized group actions, attacks,taking of hostages, escalation through provocation, etc. In the event of the enclave being dismantledthe ABiH could be expected to try to isolate the OPs and to use the troops remaining there as a shield.A direct ABiH attack on Dutchbat to gain possession of heavy weapons was also possible. The ABiHcould quickly achieve complete isolation and total division of Dutchbat. The VRS could in turn alsoisolate OPs and then give Dutchbat the chance to withdraw or to take them off as hostages orprisoners. It could well be expected that the VRS would try to occupy one or more OPs but, onceagain, it was not assumed that a major attack was underway. Srebrenica had no great strategic value. No1962attempt by the ABiH to break out was expected either.This analysis probably never reached Dutchbat. In any case on 5 and 6 July Karremans told theRoyal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff that he did not expect any notable changes to the situation in the1957 Confidential information (80).1958 MoD, SMG 1006/18. Report of conversation, 03/08/95. For the reports see also: House of Commons Hansard, Vol. 264,Column 1010, 25/10/95.1959 Confidential information (36). Also: MoD, SMG 1006/18. Report of conversation, 20/07/95 and Confidential interview(36).1960 MoD, SMG. Report of a conversation, 09/08/95.1961 MoD, MIS/Army. Intrep Srebrenica from the Director of Operations, AIV/KL, No. 32729/4, 06/07/95.1962 MoD, MIS/Army. Kooijmans to YOUGO Dept., around 07/07/95 and INTSUM No. 129/95, 07/07/95.