C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

277Chapter 7Imagery Intelligence in Bosnia1. Introduction‘Communications without intelligence is noise; intelligence withoutcommunications is irrelevant’,General Alfred M. Gray.The capture and fall of Srebrenica were soon followed by allegations that the American intelligenceservices had aerial and overhead (satellite) images showing VRS preparations for the attack on theenclave. Photographs of the arrest and later executions of the Muslim males were also believed to exist.This can be illustrated by citing some examples. According to Westerman and Rijs, US spy planes andsatellites had photographed the fleet of buses which were brought in to transport the DisplacedPersons after the enclave fell: ‘It beggars belief that the American satellites did not also observe thebuild-up of tanks and artillery near Zeleni Jadar’. 1467 Magda van der Ende, a member of theNetherlands-Srebrenica association, also claimed that satellite photos which ‘must have shown troopconcentrations’ were taken in the weeks leading up to the attack. Van der Ende said that she did notreceive these photos from Minister De Grave because the CIA refused to release them. 1468 Someaccusations went even further and, being of a somewhat cynical nature, were also less credible. Thenewspaper La Croix claimed that the CIA had followed the executions ‘live’ on large screens in theirObservation Room. This allegedly took place in the presence of one of Clinton’s aides, who reportedlydirectly informed the White House and all the allies. 1469Not only were accusations levelled, questions were asked as well. Why did satellites and spyplanes such as the U-2 fail to spot the VRS troop movements and reinforcements around the easternenclaves? Why did the US intelligence community with all its sophisticated technology fail to ‘see’ thedeportation of the Muslims at an early stage, thus enabling timely intervention? And why was theimagery of the buses at Potocari, the rounded-up prisoners and the later executions discovered solate? 1470 As in the previous chapter, the question that needs to be answered is whether real-timeintelligence was available and, if so, why Washington did not inform the other NATO partners in time.Some Dutch parliamentarians appeared confused and ignorant about this issue. For example, a writtenquestion was submitted in the Dutch House of Commons on why NATO satellites were not used.Apparently, the politician was evidently unaware that NATO does not have any such satellites at itsdisposal. 1471 These and other questions were asked after Madeleine Albright, the US PermanentRepresentative at the United Nations had, on 10 August 1995, shown the Security Council photographsof Bosnian Muslim prisoners and churned-up earth where their bodies had been buried afterexecution. 14721467 Westerman & Rijs, Het Zwartste Scenario, pp. 149 – 150; ‘VS wisten al weken tevoren van val Srebrenica’ (The US knewabout the fall of Srebrenica weeks before), De Gelderlander, 13/10/95; Bert Steinmetz, ‘Voorhoeve door VS fout ingelicht’(Voorhoeve wrongly briefed by US), Het Parool, 15/05/96.1468 De Groene Amsterdammer, 10/03/99.1469 ‘AICG call to indict General Janvier’, Bosnia Report, No. 1, November-December 1997, p. 3.1470 This question was also asked during a Netherlands Ministerial Council meeting. See: Objectivized summary of theminutes of the Ministerial Council meeting of 25/08/95, prepared for the purposes of the present NIOD study.1471 MoD, DCBC, box 59, No. 1307, HMID to DS/HOPN, Parliamentary Questions on Srebrenica, 16/11/95.1472 ‘US Reveals Photographs Of Apparent Mass Grave’, International Herald Tribune, 10/08/95 and ‘Up to 2,700 MassacredBy Serbs, UN is Told’, International Herald Tribune, 11/08/95. Doubts were also expressed as to the existence of mass graves