C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

87Belgrade to place new officials from the Yugoslav security service SDB in The Hague. After this,contacts with Serbs in the Netherlands took place only from SDB headquarters in Belgrade. 398In two confidential reports - Joegoslavië. Brandhaard in Europa (Yugoslavia. Hotbed in Europe)from November 1991 and Joegoslavië. Onverminderd brandhaard in Europa (Yugoslavia. Undiminishedhotbed in Europe) from September 1992 - the BVD again presented in a comprehensive analyses allthe problems that were connected with the war in the Balkans and the possible impact of Yugoslavia’scivil war on the Yugoslav community. The first ‘Hotbed’ report was an exploratory action by TeamAdriaan. According to an official closely involved, obtaining approval was a struggle because the reportactually contained too many hypotheses and assumptions.With respect to what was known as the horizontal threat (within the Yugoslav community), andthe vertical threat (to Dutch subjects and institutions), the service’s outlook in 1992 was more sombrethan it had been one year earlier. Both in 1991 and 1992, attention was paid to the recruitment ofDutch mercenaries for the conflict in Croatia. Finally, in both years, the BVD devoted approximately20 pages to the general political, military and economic situation in Yugoslavia, even though this wasactually a task for the IDB, which was then still functioning. 399An example of such IDB-like BVD reporting was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July1992. The political and military developments were analysed in an interim report on Yugoslavia. Inmilitary terms, the BVD analyst was sombre about the attempts to control the conflict; perhaps itwould still be possible to achieve something with economic sanctions. From a political point of view,according to the analyst, it was necessary to settle the minorities issue, because otherwise a sustainablepeace could not be achieved. Support from the Netherlands for the opposition leader Vuk Draskovicappeared to be advisable, but the disadvantage of this was that the BVD had reason to believe that aYugoslav criminal organization in the Netherlands was providing Draskovic with financial support, afact of which the politician himself might not necessarily be aware. However, it did give food forthought as regards the people in his entourage. 400 In this period, the BVD also made overtures to theMinistry of Foreign Affairs, in order to arrive at joint analyses. Representatives of the Directorate-General of Political Affairs did once consult with the BVD management team, but after that nothingmore was heard from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 401Yugoslavia continued to attract the BVD’s attention in 1993. The more the conflict intensified,the more the service shifted its interest to the activities of the warring factions inside the Netherlands.On 21 April 1993, the service organized a ‘separatism Conference’ at ministerial level, at which therewas a comprehensive discussion of the activities of the organizations from ex-Yugoslavia, and ofYugoslav political crime. The recommendations that emerged from this conference extended to atighter control on the flow of Displaced Persons from the former Yugoslavia, and registration ofDisplaced Persons according to ethnic origin, so as to facilitate separate relief and accommodation.Furthermore, the Displaced Persons were to be informed as clearly as possible about their rights andobligations. Finally, the collaboration between government bodies had to be intensified. 402The BVD also investigated the extent to which politically related crime among ex-Yugoslavswas geared towards supporting the war effort of states and paramilitary groups in the Balkans, such asthe Arkan Tigers and the White Eagles. For the first time, it was also published in an annual report thatthe Bosnian Muslims too were the subject of the BVD’s attention. The SDA, President Izetbegovic’sruling party in Bosnia, was active in the Netherlands in the Merhamet foundation, which was part of aninternational Muslim humanitarian aid organization. However, items were repeatedly found among398 Confidential interview (15).399 Archive BVD, No. 116679, Memo BVD: Yugoslavia. Brandhaard in Europa, 08/11/91, p. 56 and NMFA , 911.31 Yugoslavia, Memo BVD: ‘Yugoslavia. Onverminderd brandhaard inEuropa’, 10/09/92, 96 p.400 NMFA, Archive BZ 345169, Koerten to DEU/OE, No. 2165741, 17/07/92.401 Confidential interview (15).402 NMFA, 911.31 Yugoslavia, Memo BVD to CVIN+ participants, 24/09/93, p. 34. See also: Archive Ministry of General Affairs, Archive KMP, Minister of the Interior to the prime minister,No. 37.253 SG/KAB, 26/05/93 plus memo from the BVD (no. 21822138-08) regarding the current state of the Yugoslav communities in the Netherlands.