C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

35a dual responsibility to support the leadership as well as the troop contingents. With that in mind, thesubstantive content of the intelligence was disseminated broadly to other UN parties without anysimilar restriction. This was done by helping to shape the NATO intelligence flow disseminated viaLinked Operational Intelligence Centre Europe (LOCE) network 133 (an intelligence system set up bythe NATO countries based on a specially constructed highly-secured communication network), as wellas the US products flowing directly to the UN. British and Canadian contributions were similarly mostsubstantial. Also the French contributed. As an aside, MIO staff interviewed could not ever remembera single intelligence report from the Dutch. Even the reports from the released Dutchbat soldiers wereextensively edited by Dutch debriefers and staff and relinquished only under protest. 134Especially during Operation Storm in August 1995 (the Croatian offensive in the Krajina)members of the MIO felt being sidelined. According to one former MIO staff, clear that the DeputyG-2 Officer had special relations with Croatia, and the American officer was said to have known of theattack well in advance. 135 However, an American intelligence official denied this strongly and some USofficials in Zagreb even felt ‘betrayed’ by the US Military Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Herrick,who seemed to know in advance about the Croatian offensive but apparently did not share thisintelligence with his US colleagues. 136 The American opinions and intelligence regarding the launch ofthe Croatian offensive against the Krajina was shared with Unprofor. Zagreb knew on the basis of thisthat something was about to happen. He pointed for example to the message of July 7 th which Akashiforwarded the message to New York. Akashi reported that he was gravely concerned about thedangerous situation in Croatia. The developments could quickly deteriorate in a full scale war. Therewas an expectation of a renewed Croatian military offensive at ‘practically anytime’. And indeed: USintelligence assessments on July 10 th indicated that Croatian forces were poised to attack with virtuallyno advance warning. However, the attack did not actually begin until August 4 th . The reason for thedelay has never been adequately explained. 137According to former staff of the MIO in Zagreb, the quality of the local staff was varied. Somewere professional intelligence officers, but others often had no operational or intelligence backgroundat all. Their performance was therefore mediocre. What is more, in common with many other missions,some officers were only interested in the financial rewards, and did little work.Neither was there a culture of debating opposing perceptions or unusual opinions, which wouldhave been beneficial to forming balanced views. This applied not so much to the MIO but in particularto the debates in the UN staff in general. Furthermore, the intelligence officers would often take heedof the prevailing political and military views in their country of origin, which sometimes led to theproduction of politicized intelligence, or the deliberate disregarding of certain unwelcome issues.Originally, no input at all came from the UN DPKO and UNPROFOR itself with respect tobuilding up the necessary facilities. The office of the new MIO received only office furniture, telephoneconnections and a few old PCs. Standard office items were also issued rather frugally, which led tonewcomers being advised to bring their own items with them. Moreover, the MIO originally had noconnection with the outside world by modem, so that e-mail traffic and Internet access wereimpossible. Neither did the MIO have any strongboxes or secure rooms, so it was not safe to leavedocuments there. The office was accessible to everyone throughout the day. Locally hired cleaningpersonnel could walk in and out unobstructed. Some of the staff assumed that all rooms were buggedand that most discussions were monitored. Only later this situation at UN HQ in Zagreb improvedconsiderably. In 1995, for example, the personal office of the Force Commander, the personal office ofthe Deputy Force Commander and the office of American Deputy G-2 were regularly checked andconfirmed by competent authority to be free of bugs on a recurring basis.133 Another network was BICES: Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System.134 Confidential information (80).135 R. Theunens, ‘Intelligence en vredesoperaties’ (‘Intelligence and peace operations’), Militaire Spectator, 170 (2001) 11, p. 603.136 Confidential information (80).137 Confidential information (80).