C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

574. The perception and information position of the Western intelligence servicesThe extremely complex and chaotic conflict in Bosnia, with its various warring factions and constantlychanging alliances, sometimes caused not only confusion within the Western intelligence community,but also internal division. The question arose as to which warring faction to attach credence to, andwhether the ‘good guys, bad guys’ view, which was so often expressed by politicians and in the press,was appropriate. It was not always clear how authentic all the assertions of the warring factions were,and neither were the actual power relationships, nor whether each faction observed the recently agreedceasefire. A clear, ready and reliable answer to these questions could not always be given by theintelligence sources.In the United States there were significant political differences of opinion between theAmerican intelligence community, the White House and the State Department. 236 This was evidentfrom various interviews, but also from a top secret Canadian document, which contained acomprehensive analysis of the thinking in the intelligence community in Washington, which reflectedthe Canadian intelligence view on the conflict. The document, from the late autumn of 1994, offers arevealing glimpse into American foreign policy. 237The American intelligence and security services adopted the position that all warring factionswere guilty of atrocities, and that there were no ‘good guys’. All the parties did unspeakably brutalthings to all the other parties and this was the collective view of US military analysts throughoutEurope. 238 Furthermore, the services felt that the Bosnian Serbs until then were the best at observingthe agreement on ceasefires and humanitarian relief. The fighting between the Muslims and Croats incentral Bosnia formed the greatest obstacle for the relief. The American services felt that they set downa more balanced view in their reports, but that ‘US policy statements do not portray a balanced view ofevents in Bosnia’. The State Department and President Clinton, according to these services, wereconsistently pro-Muslim and anti-Serb, and the political statements on the situation in Bosnia were‘generally distortions of the truth which portray the Serbs in a very negative way compared to the otherfactions. This was generally accomplished by failing to note undesirable activities on the parts of theCroats and Muslims.’ Both American and Canadian services knew, for example, that the ABiH harassedVRS positions around Sarajevo almost daily, but this was never reported or confirmed by Americanpolicymakers. Furthermore, many of the humanitarian problems in Sarajevo were said to be caused bythe Muslims, and a great deal of money was apparently made on the black market. In spite of this ‘hard’intelligence, the State Department continued to pin the blame for the conflict on the Bosnian Serbs. 239This was also true for the negotiations in Geneva. The Croats and Bosnian Serbs had adopted acooperative attitude, in contrast to the Muslims, who, in the view of the American and Canadianservices, caused the majority of the problems in the negotiations. This was partly due to the Americanpolitical and diplomatic support of the Muslims. Many representatives of the State Department were ofthe opinion that the Bosnian Serbs must not retain territory that had been gained through ‘aggression’against the Muslims. In this, they overlooked that this was a civil war, ‘fought by unequal "partners",not an invasion of a sovereign state by a foreign aggressor’, according to their Canadian counterparts.In 1994 the Canadian intelligence community arrived at the conclusion that a disjoint existedbetween the American intelligence services and the State Department. The latter body conducted apolicy of confrontation against the Bosnian Serbs (‘bad guys’), and from a Canadian point of view thiswas an undesirable policy. It appeared as if the Clinton administration was following a strategy orientedtowards failure of the negotiations; this policy actually conflicted with the general view within theAmerican intelligence community. Canadian officials who drafted this report were pessimistic about thefuture. If a peace accord were to be achieved and a peacekeeping mission were to fall under American236 For example: Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, pp. 282-331.237 Confidential information (7).238 Confidential information (80).239 Confidential information (7).