C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

336reported, but the reasons for these could only be guessed at. As said, it was not thought that thesepresaged an attack. There was no reason that the staff of SNE could see why Haukland’s plannedholiday leave should not go ahead. Following his return he discovered that Tuzla had known nothing.He doubted whether the ABiH had indeed known of the attack. If that had been the case, then Delicwould have contacted him, but he never did this. The Norwegian did not receive any intelligence fromUNPROFOR or NATO. His SNE was ‘blindfolded in the dark’. 1875 In April 1995, for instance, theSector command had submitted five requests to NATO for Imint, but NATO had refused to supplythese. 1876 According to the British Lieutenant Colonel C.A. Le Hardy of SNE in Tuzla, his organizationhad insufficient priority at BHC in Sarajevo. When SNE sent documents to Sarajevo no answer wasreceived. When Le Hardy paid a visit to BHC, no map of SNE could be found ‘Outside Sarajevo wecouldn’t get BHC’s attention for any case’, he added critically. No intelligence was ever received fromBHC. 1877 The attack also came as a great surprise to the Commander of the Danish tanks in Tuzla,Captain N. Petersen. In the preceding months he had never received any reports about a possiblemilitary build-up of the VRS. Just a few days before the attack he received reports about a troop buildup,supplied by the intelligence officer of the Swedish battalion. The final attack on Srebrenica was amajor surprise. He immediately put his unit in the highest state of alert and started deploying his tanksover various defensive positions. If he had had any earlier indications, he would have taken thesemeasures earlier too. 1878 The same went for the Commander of the Scandinavian battalion, Colonel G.Arlefalk. 1879But according to the liaison officer of the 2nd Corps, Mehmed Suljkanovic, UNPROFOR wasindeed informed. All available intelligence, according to him, was shared. Before the fall Suljkanovicalso tried to make clear to the Deputy Commander of SNE, Colonel Brantz, that the matter wasserious, but the latter attached little credibility to the reports. 1880 On 8 July it was still (rightly) assumedat SNE that the VRS did not plan to take the entire enclave. In line with this, in the evening of 8 July1995 the Chief Political Officer of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, Phillip Corwin, received a telephone callfrom the Civil Affairs Officer in SNE, the American Ken Biser, who told him that the VRS planned totake over a few OPs in order to control the southern route. This would shorten the Serb supply line byabout 60 kilometres. According to Biser the VRS did not appear to want to take the entire enclave‘since there are 50,000 Muslims in it and they wouldn’t know what to do with them’. 1881What was known by Bosnia Hercegovina Command (BHC) in Sarajevo?BHC not only had all UNPROFOR reports at its disposal, but also national intelligence. General Smithcould call on the British intelligence services, and his own intelligence officer was an American. On 15June the Office of the Regional Senior Military Observer in Sarajevo reported in a general, periodicassessment that the situation in Srebrenica was possibly the most threatening, compared with the twoother eastern enclaves. According to this organization Mladic had instructed his VRS to conductoffensive operations. The VRS was reportedly concentrating troops around the enclave for thisoperation, or had already done this. Here too it was not expected that an attempt would be made toconquer the enclave, but possibly Mladic wanted to reduce the size in a first phase, or to better control1875 Interview with Hagrup Haukland, 03/05/99. Early in 1995 he received constant complaints about ABiH attacks fromthe enclave on Serb villages. Haukland then went to General Sead (‘little’) Delic and asked him to end these provocations.This was because the VRS retaliated with artillery and mortar bombardments on the population of the enclave. GeneralDelic declared: ‘I do not care’.1876 NIOD, Letter from Minister J. Pronk to NIOD, 29/05/01.1877 Interview with C.A. Le Hardy, 08/10/97.1878 Interview with N.E. Petersen, 29/10/99.1879 Interview with G. Arlefalk, 18/05/00.1880 Interview with Mehmed Suljkanovic, 18/05/99.1881 NIOD, Coll. Clingendael. Note for the File, Drafter P. Corwin, 08/07/95.