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C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

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254a concerted <strong>de</strong>f<strong>en</strong>ce shortly before the attack. 1339 These assertions were d<strong>en</strong>ied by Dutchbat. 1340 Thebelief by the ABiH soldiers that such an agreem<strong>en</strong>t had be<strong>en</strong> reached was more a question of wishfulth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. They referred to it <strong>in</strong> early July <strong>in</strong> their communications with 2 nd Corps of the ABiH <strong>in</strong> Tuzla.It is only logical that the VRS would have <strong>in</strong>tercepted these transmissions and would have be<strong>en</strong> awareof the discussions betwe<strong>en</strong> Dutchbat and the ABiH.On 9 July Osman Suljic, the War Presid<strong>en</strong>t of Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica, called Presid<strong>en</strong>t Izetbegovic. Dur<strong>in</strong>gthis call Suljic asked the Bosnian Presid<strong>en</strong>t to save the population of Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica but Izetbegovic did notrespond. It is likely that this too was <strong>in</strong>tercepted by the VRS.1341 The belief that this call <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed was<strong>in</strong>tercepted, is supported by the fact that, on 10 July 1995, the headquarters of the 2 nd Corps <strong>in</strong> Tuzlas<strong>en</strong>t another message to, among others, the 28 th Division say<strong>in</strong>g that the VRS had aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>cipheredsome co<strong>de</strong>d ABiH docum<strong>en</strong>ts. This had happ<strong>en</strong>ed because of weak cryptographic protection: the co<strong>de</strong>had be<strong>en</strong> cracked with the aid of a calculator. A special measure was th<strong>en</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduced whereby the 28 thDivision <strong>in</strong> Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica was or<strong>de</strong>red to keep messages which were transmitted through HF, VHF andUHF to a bare m<strong>in</strong>imum and to use the K-2 crypto programme. G<strong>en</strong>eral docum<strong>en</strong>ts had to be co<strong>de</strong>dby means of frequ<strong>en</strong>tly chang<strong>in</strong>g frequ<strong>en</strong>cies and keys. Telephonic contacts with the 2 nd Corps of theABiH <strong>in</strong> Tuzla could only take place after changes had be<strong>en</strong> ma<strong>de</strong> to the secret names and numbers. 1342However, Lelic’s appar<strong>en</strong>tly weak crypto programme was used right up to the fall of Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica.Interception of the column head<strong>in</strong>g from Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica to TuzlaThe flight of the column of Bosnian Muslims from Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica to Tuzla is addressed <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>tail <strong>in</strong> Chapter1 of Part IV of the Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica report. 1343 This section explores how far the VRS was able to <strong>in</strong>terceptcalls ma<strong>de</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g this ev<strong>en</strong>t. The ABiH took along a laptop computer with crypto software, which waslater <strong>de</strong>stroyed by the operator. The VRS found the <strong>de</strong>molished laptop and took the operator prisoner.He was tak<strong>en</strong> to Zvornik where he was tortured <strong>in</strong> the hope that he would disclose his secrets. TheABiH knew through Com<strong>in</strong>t that he had be<strong>en</strong> arrested and tak<strong>en</strong> to Zvornik. The operator did notbreak un<strong>de</strong>r torture and the VRS ev<strong>en</strong>tually released him. 1344It was fairly easy for the VRS to track the ABiH column as it ma<strong>de</strong> its way to Tuzla.Throughout the journey the ABiH used various Moto<strong>rol</strong>a walkie-talkies, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the YEASU. Thesehad probably be<strong>en</strong> supplied to the 28 th Division <strong>in</strong> the spr<strong>in</strong>g of 1995; spare batteries were chargedbefore the column set out. The differ<strong>en</strong>t parts of the column communicated through couriers andMoto<strong>rol</strong>as; the <strong>van</strong>guard ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed contact with the command of the 28 th Division, the middle sectionand the rearguard (on another frequ<strong>en</strong>cy). The comman<strong>de</strong>r of the 28 th Division was <strong>in</strong> the middle andhad an overview of the whole column. Some 20 Moto<strong>rol</strong>as were used <strong>in</strong> the course of the manoeuvre.The VRS were constantly tuned <strong>in</strong> to the YEASU Moto<strong>rol</strong>as and knew the exact locations of thediffer<strong>en</strong>t segm<strong>en</strong>ts of the column. H<strong>en</strong>ce, they could easily launch targeted shell<strong>in</strong>g and claim manyvictims. 1345 Two <strong>in</strong>tercepts by the <strong>in</strong>tellig<strong>en</strong>ce service of the Dr<strong>in</strong>a Corps of the VRS, s<strong>en</strong>t through thepolice station at the town Bijelj<strong>in</strong>a, <strong>in</strong>dicated that two groups <strong>in</strong> the column attempted to get<strong>in</strong>structions on how to act wh<strong>en</strong> they ran <strong>in</strong>to an ambush near Kam<strong>en</strong>ica. Later, the VRS experi<strong>en</strong>ced<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g difficulty wh<strong>en</strong> it tried to <strong>in</strong>tercept the Moto<strong>rol</strong>as of the ABiH, because the batteriesgradually ran out and use had to be kept to a m<strong>in</strong>imum. Wh<strong>en</strong> the ABiH reached the village Baljkovicathe batteries were flat. 13461339 ABiH Tuzla. 2 nd Corps, no number. Additional statem<strong>en</strong>t by Ramiz Becirovic, 16/04/98, based on an earlier statem<strong>en</strong>t of11/08/95.1340 See Chapter 6 of Part III of the ma<strong>in</strong> Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica report for a <strong>de</strong>tailed discussion.1341 Interview with Osman Suljic, 04/03/98.1342 NIOD, Coll. CD-Roms. 2 nd Corps to 28 th Division, no. 02/08-684/2, 10/07/95.1343 See for the English version: www.srebr<strong>en</strong>ica.nl1344 Confid<strong>en</strong>tial <strong>in</strong>formation (37).1345 Confid<strong>en</strong>tial <strong>in</strong>formation (37).1346 For the journey to Tuzla: Chapter 1 <strong>in</strong> Part IV of the ma<strong>in</strong> Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica report.

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