C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

255Conclusions on the interception by the Bosnian SerbsAs far as the attack on Srebrenica is concerned, the measures taken by the ABiH for the defence of theenclave probably held no secrets for the Bosnian Serbs if they were passed on through radio. It hasbecome apparent that the ABiH had been making considerable use of these channels in 1993 and 1994as well. Communication traffic between Dutchbat and the ABiH was also constantly and successfullymonitored by the Sigint units of the VRS. The men and boys in the ABiH column heading for Tuzlamust therefore have been an easy prey for the VRS units. It must have been relatively easy to pinpointthe positions of the various groups in this long column by working out cross-bearings on the basis ofthe intercepted messages. In addition, the VRS must have been able to gather intelligence on theinternal problems in the column, the difficulties it encountered, and the internal agreements andplanning. Sigint provided the VRS with clear insight into what was happening within the ABiH andgave it a permanent head start on a group that was already in serious trouble.3. The Signals Intelligence operations of the ABiH‘We were listening to their communications and we could hear them as they crossed the river andheaded to Bratunac.’ This statement was made by a Bosnian intelligence officer, who concluded fromintercepts that the VJ was involved in the attack on Srebrenica. 1347 Sigint not only played a key role inthe VRS attack on Srebrenica in 1995, but also much earlier, in 1993. However, at that time the attackon Srebrenica (and Zepa) did not ultimately go ahead. Mladic knew from his own intelligence servicethat the local ABiH commander of Srebrenica, Naser Oric, was desperate and ready to surrender andtherefore he probably decided to ‘push on’. ABiH soldiers claimed that they had intercepted a radiomessage from Mladic to the VRS besiegers of Srebrenica; at that moment the VRS was 800 metresfrom the centre. Mladic ordered a local VRS colonel to ‘move forward’ and take the town. 1348 The exactwording of the intercepted message was allegedly: ‘Tell all units to enter Srebrenica this night. Gostraight into town, no journalists, no reports, no statements’. 1349 In the same period the BosnianForeign Minister, Haris Silajdzic, showed a journalist from the Washington Post VRS messagesintercepted by the ABiH which indicated that Zepa was to be taken and that everyone there was to bekilled. 1350 The limitations of the ABiH Comint capacity in Srebrenica in the spring of 1993 did not make itany less effective. For instance, the ABiH could intercept VRS communications on HF as well as onwalkie-talkies. They usually achieved this with the assistance of the Srebrenica amateur radio club,which operated in the enclave and was also responsible for the connections with Tuzla and Sarajevo.Two ABiH officers headed a group of forty, all members of the amateur radio club, which had twotransmitter-receivers. Later, the 28 th Division obtained an extra transmitter-receiver, which was capableof intercepting VHF communications. 1351 This equipment, which was flown into the enclave, wassuitable for tracking VRS walkie-talkie communications. In addition, VRS radio equipment wassometimes captured.The Comint reports were always sent to the 2 nd Corps of the ABiH in Tuzla for further analysisand not to the 28 th Division. The results were, of course, sent back to the 28 th Division in Srebrenica.1352ABiH soldiers admitted that the Bosnian Army was not able to decipher the VRS coded messages.During the demilitarization of Srebrenica in 1993 the radio equipment was hidden from UNPROFOR.1347 Cabell Bruce, ‘Belgrade Blamed’, Newsday, 12/08/951348 Mladic would after the fall of Srebrenica boast to DutchBat Commander Karremans that he had again excellentintelligence. Interview with Th.J.P. Karremans, 17/12/98.1349 ‘srebrenica on the verge of falling to Serbs’, The Toronto Star, 17/04/93.1350 Phil McCombs, ‘At the Bosnia Crossroads’, The Washington Post, 05/05/93.1351 Confidential information (38) and interviews with Sefko Hodzic, 24/05/99 and Isnam Taljic 18/05/99.1352 Confidential information (38).