C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

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JAC - Joint Analysis CenterJARIC - Joint Aerial Reconnaissance Intelligence CentreJCO - Joint Commission ObserverJCS - Joint Chiefs of StaffJIC - Joint Intelligence CommitteeJNA - Jugoslovenska Narodna ArmijaKFOR - Kosovo ForceKLA - Kosovo Liberation ArmyLIC - Low Intensity ConflictLOCE - Linked Operational Intelligence Centre EuropeMIC - Mid Intensity ConflictMICIV - Ministerial Committee for the Intelligence and Security ServicesMID - Militaire InlichtingendienstMIO - Military Information OfficeMIS - Netherlands Military Intelligence ServiceMPRI - Military Professional Resources IncorporatedMSC - Military Staff Committee of the United NationsMSF - Médecins sans FrontièresNAC - North Atlantic CouncilNATO - North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationNETHNIC - Netherlands National Intelligence CellNFZ - No Fly ZoneNGO - Non-Governmental OrganisationNIE - National Intelligence EstimateNIMA - National Imagery and Mapping AgencyNORAD - North American Air Defense AgreementNPIC - National Photographic Interpretation CenterNSA - National Security AgencyNRO - National Reconnaissance OfficeNSC - National Security CouncilOP - Observation PostOPSTINA - District of local government in Bosnia HerzegovinaORCI - Office for Research and the Collection of InformationOSCE - Organisation for Security and Cooperation in EuropeOSINT - Open Source IntelligenceOVIC - Operational Sigint Centre in the NetherlandsPDD - Presidential Decision DirectivePGP - Pretty Good PrivacyPHOTINT - Photo IntelligencePJHQ - Permanent Joint HeadquartersPRD - Presidential Review DirectiveRADINT - Radar IntelligenceRM - Royal MarinesRS - Republika SerpskaSACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)SAM - Surface to Air MissileSAS - Special Air ServicesSAT - Southern Air TransportSATINT - Satellite IntelligenceSBP - Staff Bureau Foreign Political DevelopmentsSBS - Special Boat Services6
7SCS - Special Collection ServiceSEAD - Suppression of Enemy Air DefenceSFOR - Stabilisation Force (NATO - Bosnia)SGR - Service Generale de ReinseignementSHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)SHED - Special Handling and Evaluation DetachmentSIE - Special Intelligence EstimateSIGINT - Signals IntelligenceSIS - Secret Intelligence ServiceSISMI - Servizio Informazioni e Sicurezza MilitareSNE - Sector North EastSPOT - Système Pour l’Observation de la TerreSVIC - Strategic Sigint Centre in the NetherlandsSWENIC - Swedish National Intelligence CellTAB - Tuzla Air BaseTACRECCE - Tactical Air ReconnaissanceTACSAT - Tactical Satellite RadioTIVC - Royal Netherlands Navy Technical Information Processing CentreTWRA - Third World Relief AgencyUAV - Unmanned Aerial VehicleUN - United NationsUNDOF - United Nations Disengagement Observer ForceUNDP - United Nations Development ProgrammeUNHCR - United Nations High Commission for RefugeesUNMIK - United Nations Mission in KosovoUNMO - United Nation Military ObserverUNOSOM - United Nations Operation in SomaliaUNPROFOR - United Nations Protection ForceUNPF - United Nations Protection ForceUNSCOM - United Nations Special Commission in IraqUSMC - United States Marine CorpsVHF - Very High FrequencyVJ - Vojska JugoslavijaVOPP - Vance Owen Peace PlanVRS - Vojska Republika SrpskaWEU - Western European Union3. IntroductionSarajevo was a nest of spies at the time of the war in Bosnia. Everyonespied on everyone: the warring parties as well as the countries of theUN peacekeeping force. 1On 3 March 1994, 570 Dutch peacekeepers formally relieved the Canadian soldiers who had beenstationed in Srebrenica since 1993. Within the framework of the United Nations peace mission inBosnia-Hercegovina, the Dutch unit arrived there as part of the United Nations Protection Force(UNPROFOR). The Dutch battalion (Dutchbat) was placed in a small town located in East Bosnia in adeep valley with steep mountainsides, close to the river Drina. Except for a couple of days in April1 ‘sarajevo zat vol spionnen in oorlog’ (‘sarajevo was full of spies during war’), Het Parool, 24/04/98.
Page 1: Srebrenica: a ‘safe’ areaAppend
Page 5: CIC - Current Intelligence CentreCI
Page 9 and 10: 9still active staff of intelligence
Page 11 and 12: 11Chapter 1The United Nations and I
Page 13 and 14: 13with setting the objectives of gr
Page 15 and 16: 15gathered, organized and analysed
Page 17 and 18: 17The second phase in the intellige
Page 19 and 20: 19can also be or become intelligenc
Page 21 and 22: 21additional financial and other in
Page 23 and 24: 23undermined the idea that the inte
Page 25 and 26: 25that the safety of their personne
Page 27 and 28: 27to generate an all-source perspec
Page 29 and 30: 29in all, Van Kappen found it a ‘
Page 31 and 32: 31The first step taken by the Bush
Page 33 and 34: 33Virginia, where it was decided wh
Page 35 and 36: 35a dual responsibility to support
Page 37 and 38: 37had indications that this attack
Page 39 and 40: 39example, the following is contain
Page 41 and 42: 41played an important role. For thi
Page 43 and 44: 43any indication of action taken. T
Page 45 and 46: 45verification flights by unmanned
Page 47 and 48: 47NATO’s most important troop-con
Page 49 and 50: 49strategic systems were revamped t
Page 51 and 52: 51Another problem was that good (no
Page 53 and 54: 53American National Reconnaissance
Page 55 and 56: 55Soviet Union’s intercontinental
Page 57 and 58:
574. The perception and information
Page 59:
59not detract from the fact that
Page 62 and 63:
62intelligence officers even told t
Page 64:
64the mandate differently or which
Page 67:
67atrocities but the Bosnian Serbs
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70Republika Srpska. The work was no
Page 72 and 73:
72from the fact that the Direction
Page 74 and 75:
74involved in intelligence activiti
Page 76 and 77:
76Forces were said to have received
Page 78 and 79:
78exchange, then generally speaking
Page 80 and 81:
80Chapter 3Dutch intelligence and s
Page 82 and 83:
82reorganization of the MIS. In 199
Page 84 and 85:
84commotion flaring up within the s
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86intelligence. 394 Until that time
Page 88 and 89:
88their relief goods for Bosnia tha
Page 90 and 91:
90The BVD collaborated closely on Y
Page 94 and 95:
94cutbacks recommended by the Van I
Page 97 and 98:
97information without compromising
Page 99 and 100:
99Yugoslavia did not prove to be a
Page 101 and 102:
101MIS/CO. Intelligence sharing wit
Page 103 and 104:
103German, Italian and Danish intel
Page 105 and 106:
105Originally, the European Bureau
Page 107 and 108:
107that an insight was obtained usi
Page 109 and 110:
109They made civil and military ris
Page 111 and 112:
111In other words, the flow of info
Page 113 and 114:
113three tasks: looking for indicat
Page 115 and 116:
115In reality the MIS/Army function
Page 117 and 118:
117his benefit, and many others. It
Page 119 and 120:
119too. This had already been estab
Page 121 and 122:
121negative assessment: not to go t
Page 123 and 124:
123capacity of the UN, but as descr
Page 125 and 126:
125organizations that could possibl
Page 127 and 128:
127Department, the Counterintellige
Page 129 and 130:
129MIS/Air Force officer went to Tu
Page 131 and 132:
131entering into close relationship
Page 133 and 134:
133One envelope contained several f
Page 135 and 136:
135any indications of continuous gu
Page 137 and 138:
137more and more clear, turned a de
Page 139 and 140:
139intended to monitor the border c
Page 141 and 142:
141opinion. 665 After Croatia had n
Page 143 and 144:
143Lake’s statement. 676 As a Can
Page 145 and 146:
145engage these countries, but each
Page 147 and 148:
147Later that day, Galbraith report
Page 149 and 150:
149form of photos taken by spy sate
Page 151 and 152:
151In the summer and autumn of 1994
Page 153 and 154:
153starting to have concerns about
Page 155 and 156:
155preferred provider of weapons to
Page 157 and 158:
157Because of the logistical useful
Page 159 and 160:
159An Islamic humanitarian organiza
Page 161 and 162:
161and 1 rocket launcher for a TF-8
Page 163 and 164:
163the convoys from Croatia with ar
Page 165 and 166:
165The attempt at a cover-upAs ment
Page 167 and 168:
167Force Commander and with General
Page 169 and 170:
169urging it, because they suspecte
Page 171 and 172:
171General and researcher, Brendan
Page 173 and 174:
173mm guns, 2000 pistols, 211,000 h
Page 175 and 176:
175divergent opinions on the Serbia
Page 177 and 178:
177had total freedom of movement al
Page 179 and 180:
179violations were observed. These
Page 181 and 182:
181and Jugoslavija Publik. Accordin
Page 183 and 184:
183command and the rival Iranian, S
Page 185 and 186:
185much contact with the population
Page 187 and 188:
187from the enclave a total of 140
Page 189 and 190:
189The third party country strategy
Page 191 and 192:
191the warring factions, namely tha
Page 193 and 194:
193Chapter 5The Signals Intelligenc
Page 195 and 196:
195In addition Comint can be import
Page 197 and 198:
197policymakers, however. As a resu
Page 199 and 200:
199A second disadvantage of Sigint,
Page 201 and 202:
201All efforts can of course also b
Page 203 and 204:
203125 linguists to provide transla
Page 205 and 206:
205time intercepts involved here we
Page 207 and 208:
207conclusion that the contribution
Page 209 and 210:
209happened during the Gulf War, wh
Page 211 and 212:
211The Gulf War showed that there w
Page 213 and 214:
213Despite this reservation there i
Page 215 and 216:
215The NSA and CIA, as well as GCHQ
Page 217 and 218:
217million messages, sent via Intel
Page 219 and 220:
219Zagreb, Morgan, - Svensson was o
Page 221 and 222:
221Monitoring targets in SerbiaOffi
Page 223 and 224:
223jar’, said an US intelligence
Page 225 and 226:
225Naturally the Serbs had taken pr
Page 227 and 228:
227confirmed that monitoring walkie
Page 229 and 230:
229The same month new articles appe
Page 231 and 232:
231‘They more or less admitted th
Page 233 and 234:
233have been part of a Bosnian gove
Page 235 and 236:
235get O’Grady out of Bosnian Ser
Page 237 and 238:
237as the Balkans. Two to three yea
Page 239 and 240:
239Comint archive and other archive
Page 241 and 242:
241Bokhoven Couzy supported him in
Page 243 and 244:
243communications traffic of UNPROF
Page 245 and 246:
245Moreover, the NSA is reported to
Page 247 and 248:
247The role of the Netherlands: no
Page 249 and 250:
249made by Krstic and other Bosnian
Page 251 and 252:
251messages, which were intercepted
Page 253 and 254:
253later treetops were used. Throug
Page 255 and 256:
255Conclusions on the interception
Page 257 and 258:
257equipment, planned operations, t
Page 259 and 260:
259made it impossible to follow the
Page 261 and 262:
261community that the situation was
Page 263 and 264:
263commander of the Bosnian-Serb Dr
Page 265 and 266:
265to headquarters. The Comint oper
Page 267 and 268:
267Intelligence Community had no ac
Page 269 and 270:
269aid being sent to Sarajevo. Both
Page 271 and 272:
271established in 1991, also receiv
Page 273 and 274:
273crypto telephone and fax with th
Page 275 and 276:
275to Baxter, the Military Assistan
Page 277 and 278:
277Chapter 7Imagery Intelligence in
Page 279 and 280:
2792. What instruments were availab
Page 281 and 282:
281would leave around 18 hours out
Page 283 and 284:
283and has provided policy-makers w
Page 285 and 286:
285operational in Bosnia, like the
Page 287 and 288:
287lines and troop movements. After
Page 289 and 290:
289around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Thi
Page 291 and 292:
291that especially American, French
Page 293 and 294:
293So, it would have been impossibl
Page 295 and 296:
2953. With whom was imagery intelli
Page 297 and 298:
297available. 1606 The head of the
Page 299 and 300:
299war crimes had probably been per
Page 301 and 302:
301a US national asset (unknow is w
Page 303 and 304:
303Mostar and loitered in Zepa area
Page 305 and 306:
305Albright shows the photosOn 10 A
Page 307 and 308:
307was taken some time in 1999, eve
Page 309 and 310:
309tracking the civilian toll had v
Page 311 and 312:
311solution to such problems in ad
Page 313 and 314:
313Chapter 8Was ‘Srebrenica’ an
Page 315 and 316:
315gathered intelligence, then it m
Page 317 and 318:
317the VRS attack should aim to tak
Page 319 and 320:
319In January 1995 a European intel
Page 321 and 322:
321stated that the deployment of th
Page 323 and 324:
323The Military Intelligence Servic
Page 325 and 326:
325by the Norwegian Brigadier Gener
Page 327 and 328:
327Bosnian Serbs decided that they
Page 329 and 330:
329the enclaves in the very near fu
Page 331 and 332:
331enclave was seriously confined b
Page 333 and 334:
333The VRS’s most important commu
Page 335 and 336:
335archives, together with intervie
Page 337 and 338:
337the hills and mountains along th
Page 339 and 340:
339from Sarajevo, because they were
Page 341 and 342:
341The UN headquarters in New YorkT
Page 343 and 344:
343Who did have prior knowledge? In
Page 345 and 346:
345offensive was stopped before the
Page 347 and 348:
347leadership of the Republika Srps
Page 349 and 350:
349coming 24 hours. 1963 On 11 July
Page 351 and 352:
351that it was established that the
Page 353 and 354:
353very short period: 2 to 6 July.
Page 355 and 356:
355transport VRS troops. 2006 Howev
Page 357 and 358:
357In this respect the author Russe
Page 359 and 360:
359(presumably they were referring
Page 361 and 362:
361nations and within NATO never to
Page 363 and 364:
363expectation that ‘on balance i
Page 365 and 366:
365thorny issue. A foreign intellig
Page 367 and 368:
367was a correct analysis, as was l
Page 369 and 370:
369believes any news in Sarajevo.
Page 371 and 372:
371as said before, this is not a na
Page 373 and 374:
373Chapter 9Survey of archival reco
Page 375 and 376:
375Collection of the Economic Inves
Page 377 and 378:
377archive a number of messages fro
Page 379 and 380:
37930. Uiterweer Post Collection: n
Page 381 and 382:
Bodansky, Y., Offensive in the Balk
Page 383 and 384:
Halberstam, David, War in a Time of
Page 385 and 386:
O.O’shea, Brendan, Crisis at Biha
Page 387 and 388:
387Woolsey, R.J., Partners for Peac
Page 389 and 390:
Boyle, Alan, ‘spies in the watch
Page 391 and 392:
Macdonald, Lt.-Colonel Oliver A.K.,
Page 393 and 394:
393Zumach, A. ‘US intelligence kn
Page 395 and 396:
Arafat YasserAristide J.B.‘Arkan
Page 397 and 398:
Felix M.C.J.Franken R.A.Franssen N.
Page 399 and 400:
Makar AndjelkoMarchal LucMarguin J.
Page 401 and 402:
Soljic VladimirSoubirou AndréSoyst
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C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

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