C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

271established in 1991, also received considerable American support. It was able to intercept 40,000 GSMsat the same time and to register over 100 conversations with the aid of target words in computers. TheBerlin firm Rhode & Schwartz supplied the hardware and the CIA supplied the programs. The NSEMreportedly collected 70% of all the intelligence delivered to the Croatian political and military leaders. 1436But not only high-level UNPROFOR communication was a key target for all the warringfactions; tactical military communications were important as well. A member of the UNPF intelligencestaff in Zagreb said that the ABiH and the VRS constantly intercepted this traffic, using Motorolasfrom captured UNPROFOR vehicles. The Chief Political Officer of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, PhillipCorwin, said that as it was impossible to change communication codes every time a car was hijacked.They had to assume that their mobile communications were being monitored by all sides. 1437 ABiHsoldiers even broke regularly into these UNPROFOR communications to, for instance, improve targetbearings in observation reports. 1438 The Croatians followed suit. 1439 The British Royal Welch Fusilierspartially solved this problem by using Welsh-speaking communications staff; none of the warringfactions could follow the conversations in Welsh. 1440 UNPROFOR traffic was regularly tapped by theVRS. Scandinavian UNPROFOR units meticulously observed the locations hit by VRS mortargrenades around Tuzla and passed this information on direct to Bosnia-Hercegovina Command via anopen radio link. The VRS listened in to these messages and used the UNPROFOR observations tocorrect their aim. 1441 The VRS only had to ‘capitulate’ when the Scandinavians communicated in one oftheir national languages.Yet another target was the communications of the British SAS. It was not only the NSA thatlistened in to these connections;1442 the ABiH did so as well, but they never managed to break the code.A member of a British intelligence service said that the ABiH probably read ‘open routine traffic’ butnot crypto traffic. This was 100% safe. 1443 The fact that the ABiH was following SAS communicationwas revealed by a report sent by the Bosnian national security services to the 28 th Division. This reportmentioned information that was being passed on by the JCO unit in Srebrenica to the JointCommission Observer headquarters in Sarajevo on the fighting around the enclave and the numbers ofdead and wounded. 1444Dutchbat interceptedThe communication traffic of Dutchbat was an equally important target for Comint. Communicationequipment was regularly stolen from Dutchbat personnel. 1445 The VRS listened in to the traffic betweenthe various OPs and between the OPs and the Dutch base in Potocari. As the OPs were situated onABiH territory, the VRS collected a lot of information on all sorts of military operations, because theDutchbat soldiers dutifully reported all the movements of the ABiH troops. Accordingly, the VRSsometimes fired on targets where Dutchbat had just spotted the ABiH. The connections between the1436 Ivo Pukanic, ‘Echelon Spy System’ and ‘The Details behind the Lepej Affair’, Nacional, Issue 291, 14/06/01; IvoPukanic, ‘The Wiretapping Fever has Shaken the New Government’, Nacional, Issue 292, 21/06/01; Milivoj Dilas, ‘TheWiretapping Affair’, Nacional, Issue 293, 28/06/01 and ‘Croatia Using Advances US-Installed Intelligence Technology’,Belgrade Glas Javnosti, 03/01/02.1437 Corwin, Dubious Mandate, p. 4.1438 Confidential interview (45).1439 Confidential interview (44).1440 Thomas Quiggin, Response to ‘No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN Peacekeeping’, in: Intelligenceand National Security, Vol. 13 (1998) 4 , p. 207.1441 A. Walter Dorn, ‘The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping’, in: International Journalof Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, Vol. 12 (1998) 4 , p. 416.1442 Ed Vulliamy, ‘How the CIA intercepted SAS signals’, The Guardian, 29/01/96.1443 Confidential information (1).1444 NIOD, Coll. CD-Roms. Section MV, 2 nd Corps to 28 th Division, No. 06-05-174/95, 27/06/95.1445 Hans van Alphen, ‘Binnen halve minuut is Dutchbat thuis’ (Dutchbat home in thirty seconds), Haagsche Courant,13/07/95.