C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

97information without compromising its neutrality’. 443 This recommendation was not followed up,however. One year later, a British brigadier came to the conclusion that UNPROFOR was still workingwith the traditional UN system of reporting events, without being actively engaged in intelligencegathering. Furthermore, rarely was anything done in the way of analysis. 444 A fact which was certainlytrue of the Netherlands.The more the conflict in the Balkans intensified, the more the verbal advice of the Head of theMIS to senior Defence officials was not to burn their fingers on the Balkans, to keep well away, not tointervene or send troops, and simply to allow the conflict to burn itself out. In early 1993, when thefirst Dutch signals troops were already in Bosnia, this recommendation was issued via the Deputy CDSand the Secretary-General to the Minister. The British and Danish military intelligence services alsogave identical recommendations to their ministers. The MIS/CO persisted in this position, and theMIS/CO therefore never made an analysis of the situation in Bosnia to consider where Dutch combattroops could operate if they did actually have to go there. Duijn did express negative advice on the lightarms with which Dutchbat was sent to Bosnia.On his appointment, Duijn was confronted with a MIS/CO that had at its disposal only oneBalkans analyst, who initially had to work mainly with open sources. In this phase, the Netherlands stillhad a military attaché in Belgrade, who proved to be an extremely useful source of information. 445However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to freeze relations with Serbia, so that there was athreat that the attaché would have to leave, the consequence of which would be a further deteriorationin the information position of the MIS/CO. At the time, the former Yugoslavia did not have a highpriority in the MIS/CO. MIS staff were then also already heavily burdened with other tasks. Anotherfactor was that MIS/CO staff themselves, like the CDS, continued to cling to the old East-Westmentality, and had trouble making the shift to the new relationships in the Balkans. 446Relationships between the MIS/CO and the other three MISsIn the early 1990s, the MIS/CO was not able to get to grips with the intelligence units of the branchesof the Armed Forces. The MIS of the Royal Netherlands Army (MIS/Army) was said to be relativelycooperative compared with the MIS of the Royal Netherlands Navy and the MIS of the RoyalNetherlands Air Force. The last-mentioned was particularly reticent in sharing intelligence with theMISs of the other Armed Forces and the MIS/CO. This sometimes meant that intelligence would notbe shared by the MIS/Army. In addition, the MISs of the Armed Forces sometimes wanted to winfavour with their own Commander-in-Chief, and that led to situations in which intelligence wasdeliberately withheld.The MISs of the Armed Forces were completely dependent on the Commanders-in-Chief.Another factor was that the CDS in that period did not yet wish to be a supreme commander, and as aconsequence various crisis centres were created in the three branches of the Armed Forces. TheDefence Crisis Management Centre (DCBC) supervised the whole, but that happened only when it wasactivated in a crisis situation. The MIS cell at the DCBC (Current Intelligence Centre, or CIC) wasactivated on 14 March 1994 in connection with Dutchbat’s presence in Bosnia, but was poorly staffedat the time, with the exception of the one Balkans MIS/CO analyst mentioned above.It can be considered remarkable that nothing was ever requested of the MIS/CO again bysenior Ministry of Defence officials or at the instigation of the Ministerial Council within theframework of Yugoslavia. This was all the more remarkable because considerable doubts existed amongsenior Defence officials, on the part of CDS Van der Vlis and Commander-in-Chief of the RoyalNetherlands Army Lieutenant General H.A. Couzy, regarding sending troops to Bosnia. Negative443 Rear Admiral J.J.R. Todd, ‘UK Perspectives of Current Security Arrangements’, in: RUSI Journal, Vol. 139 (February 1994) 1 , p. 35.444 Michael Herman, Intelligence after the Cold War: contributions to international security?, unpublished paper, p. 3.445 NMFA, Archive D EU , Coordination meeting on the former Yugoslavia, No. 32/93, 20/01/93.446 Confidential interview (25).