C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

148Tudjman needed to hear and after talks with Izetbegovic he decided to take immediate action. From 29April to 2 May 1994, the Croatian prime minister, Valentic, and the Bosnian deputy prime ministervisited Teheran for consultations with President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani. A tripartite agreement wasdrawn up for arms supplies and humanitarian assistance to Bosnia.Resumption of the arms suppliesThe first consignment from Iran landed in Zagreb on 4 May, with sixty tons of explosives and militaryequipment on board. The arms were transported in Croatian army trucks along the Adriatic coast toBosnia. The first consignment was probably an Iranian gift. Subsequently it appeared that Teheranwanted hard currency for the supplies. On 6 May, Ali Akbar Velayati visited Zagreb to discuss thefurther logistics arrangements. He travelled on to Sarajevo to present a cheque for $ 1 million toIzetbegovic. Because the supplies attracted too much attention at Pleso Airport in Zagreb, the flightssubsequently went mainly to the Croatian island of Krk. Shortly after Iranian cargo aircraft had landedthere, a number of Croatian helicopters arrived to continue transporting the load after dusk. Moreover,Albania was prepared to act as a transit port. 712In the summer of 1994, the first reports started to arrive that the Croats and Bosnian Muslimshad again travelled to Teheran to reach a new agreement. According to British diplomatic sources, asecret agreement was reached in Teheran between the Iranians and Croats in June 1994. Thefoundation for this was laid in May, during the Croatian prime minister’s visit to Teheran. Thefollowing agreement was reached: Iran purchased five oil tankers and three cargo vessels from Croatiaworth $ 150 million. Teheran was to pay this amount as follows: 25 percent in oil; 50 percent in cashand 25 percent in credit. In exchange, Iran would be provided unhindered access to Bosnia via Croatia.In this way, Teheran would initiate a flow of humanitarian relief and arms to Bosnia. 713 Oneconsequence of the new US policy was that the British intelligence and security services stood alone inthis phase because the American services no longer provided intelligence on violations of theembargo. 714Not everything went smoothly with the supplies in practice, because a helicopter (an MR-8MTV-I) exploded at Zagreb airport in the night of 4 December 1994. It was President Izetbegovic’spersonal helicopter, which was completely filled with ammunition and explosives. The officialstatement to UNPROFOR was that a tanker had exploded, and the European Monitoring mission,ECMM, was told that a pyromaniac had committed suicide. 715The American assistant secretary Vershbow admitted to Dutch diplomats in July 1994 that hewas aware of Islamic supplies and that part of the arms were handed over as ‘bounty’ to the Croats. Healso expected that once the arms embargo had been lifted, a part of the American supplies wouldremain behind in Zagreb to ensure the cooperation of the Croats. He acknowledged that this couldhave negative consequences for UNPROFOR and the UN’s refugee organization, UNHCR, but theywould just have to be ‘redeployed’ somewhere else. 716 It was apparently that ‘simple’.The American division on the Croatian pipeline remainsAfter this secret agreement to resume arms supplies, the ball started to roll in the United States. TheCIA gathered an increasing amount of evidence of Iranian arms supplies via Croatia to Bosnia, in the712 For statements from 1993: MoD, MIS/CO. Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 24/93, 05/04/93 andno. 50/93, 24/08/93, and interview with Paul Koring, 05/07/00. Further: John Pomfret, ‘Iran ships material for arms toBosnians’, in: The Washington Post, 13/05/94 and ‘US Allies Fed Pipeline Of Covert Arms in Bosnia’, The Washington Post,12/05/96.713 Confidential information (20).714 Interview with P. Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.715 O’shea, Crisis at Bihac, p. 156.716 NMFA, DEU/ARA/05274. Bentinck to Foreign Affairs, no. Wasi485/13220, 15/07/93.