C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

Western intelligence services as the best organized smuggler in the Balkans. Large deliveries probablytook place completely outside the view of ICFY, and much was supplied with low-flying helicopters orthrough the Krajina; this then happened with the knowledge of Croatia, which had an interest in asustained conflict between the ABiH and the VRS because it tied up Bosnian-Serb troops, who could thennot be deployed against the Croats. It also assured that the ABiH was not nurturing any particularly largescaleoffensive plans against Croatia. Zagreb will moreover, as with Iran, have skimmed the Serbiansupplies.The arms supplies to the warring factions increased the instability in the region and allowed thearmed conflict to flare up. It is no coincidence that offensives by the ABiH, VRS or Croats took place afew weeks after the military material was delivered. A common pattern was as follows: clandestinesupplies, training - whether or not supervised by instructors - and after that the start of offensives. Newarms mostly facilitated, the VRS complained, renewed sorties from the enclaves into Serbian villagesand military positions, which in turn provoked a response from the VRS. Finally, the reconstruction ofthe secret arms supplies shows that divergent views existed in the various NATO member states on thepossible consequences for the UNPROFOR troops in the former Yugoslavia. Washington haddifferent ideas on this from most European capitals, but then Washington had no ground forces inBosnia.192