C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

185much contact with the population. The JCOs did rapidly meet ABiH representatives, a consequence ofwhich was that Karremans banned such meetings in the future, and he also banned the JCOs fromattending the regular meetings between Dutchbat and the warring factions. The JCOs continued withtheir patrols together with the commandos. In April, the fighting increased, and there were rumoursthat the VRS was going to attack the enclave. The local ABiH commander, Oric, seemed to havedisappeared; another SAS patrol then arrived from Zepa on a ‘visit’ to Srebrenica. Dutchbat soldierVan Duijn recalled this incident; he later became acquainted with a British soldier on an SAS course inthe UK who had been in the enclave in April 1995. Van Duijn did not recall seeing the soldier, whichturned out to be correct, because the SAS soldier stated: ‘I arrived with a patrol from the outside.’ Theywere looking for Naser Oric, who had meanwhile left the enclave and was in Tuzla. The SAS soldierswanted to know where he was. Van Duijn later asked how they ended up in Srebrenica; it seemed thatthe SAS unit had simply walked from Zepa to Srebrenica. One of them spoke fluent Serbo-Croat. 974On 25 May, Bosnia-Hercegovina Command informed the commander of the JCOs that anoperation against the eastern enclaves was a realistic probability, and that Srebrenica would then be thefirst on the list. This was passed on to Karremans, but he did not believe it. On 27 May, the VRSannounced to Dutchbat that it intended to capture OP-E. The VRS threatened to use force andDutchbat reinforced the OP; an offer of help from the SAS was rejected by Karremans, because he saidhe had enough soldiers available. Subsequently, on 3 June, OP-E fell into VRS hands. 975On 8 June, the ABiH announced to Dutchbat that an attack on the entire enclave was expectedsoon; the JCOs too then reported that to Karremans. The JCO commander pointed out afterwards,however, that such rumours circulated constantly and were difficult to take seriously. The JCOs hadfurthermore no intelligence of their own that indicated an attack. Only on 9 July was it clear to theJCOs that the VRS wanted to capture the entire enclave. 976 Karremans considered the JCOs mainly aspotential Forward Air Controllers and not so much as useful ‘instruments’ for gathering additionalintelligence. There were differences of opinion between the SAS and Karremans on several occasions,and the battalion commander restricted the opportunities for their operational action considerably. 977Had the SAS gone against the wishes of Karremans, they would have been asked to leave the enclave.After the start of the attack, the JCOs contributed to guiding NATO aircraft to VRS targets (forthis see comprehensively Chapter 6 of Part III of the main Srebrenica report). The JCOs were led byMajor Jacko and had their own communication equipment. Their mission was also to serve as ‘forwardobservers’ during NATO air strikes. That this came too late, had, according to Muslim witnesses, to dowith the fact that the JCO unit had refused to make a correct assessment of the severity of the VRS978attack. Eventually, the SAS would leave the enclave at the same time as Dutchbat. In May 1996, theDaily Telegraph revealed the presence of the SAS in Srebrenica, which had been given the task ofreporting to General Smith in Sarajevo.The SAS also operated in the area of the Scandinavian battalion. This battalion was notauthorized to give orders to them. The ten-man SAS unit did not report to the Scandinavian battalionnor was this unit responsible for the safety of the SAS soldiers. An agreement was reached later withthe commander of Sector North East at least to know in which areas the SAS were located. Accordingto commander Arlefalk of that battalion, the SAS soldiers moved ‘hither and thither’ and so979occasionally got caught up in skirmishes.In addition to British, there were also French Special Forces active in Bosnia, especially in theSkenderija district of Sarajevo. A number of them came from the French Gendarmerie’s special974 Interview with L.C. van Duijn, 02/07/99. A British intelligence source denied that a SAS patrol ever walked from Zepato Srebrenica. Confidential information (85).975 For this, see also Part III of the main Srebrenica report.976 Confidential information (1).977 Confidential interviews (43) and (49). Further: Tom Walker, ‘sAS Book on Bosnia blocked’, The Sunday Times, 09/07/00.978 Jon Swain, ‘The Damned’, The Sunday Times, 12/05/96.979 Interview with G. Arlefalk, 18/05/00.