C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

256After the summer of 1993 the Comint network was greatly extended; new equipment was smuggled in,especially in 1994. 1353 The couriers between Srebrenica and Zepa were issued with ten pieces of RUP-12and IC H 10 portable radio equipment, which was also used to track and intercept VRS messages enroute. In January and February 1995 additional portable radio equipment, including a short-wave radio,50 metres of coax cable, a short-wave antenna and telephone cables were brought into Srebrenica.The Comint experts of the 28 th Division were constantly requesting new equipment, as thequality of the supplied equipment left much to be desired. New problems soon arose: the batteriescould not be charged easily. There was not enough fuel for the generators and the ABiH was foreverwrestling with flat storage batteries. A decision was taken to bring an ‘energy-saving’ Bertoli generatorby helicopter to Srebrenica. Later, the ABiH illegally tapped electricity from Dutchbat to help solve thisproblem.1354 Sigint experts often dub the conflict in Eastern Bosnia ‘the Motorola War’. Everyone usedwalkie-talkies in the mountainous terrain because they were ideal for short-range military-tacticalcommunications. The ABiH was very active in intercepting traffic around Srebrenica, both from theenclave itself and from special interception stations. The fact that the Muslims were intercepting VRSradio communications around the enclave was also brought to light by Milos Stankovic, translatorinterpreterto General Rose and later Smith. During his stay in Srebrenica in the spring of 1993Stankovic had tried to win the trust of the Bosnian Serbs by disclosing the burial place of his father, aCetnik, who was handed over by the British and was subsequently executed by Tito’s troops. ABiHofficers referred to this a day later; suddenly, they also knew of the burial place. 1355Not only the ABiH tried to intercept (sometimes successfully) walkie-talkie communicationfrom Srebrenica, it also had various interception stations outside the enclave. The most important ofthese were in Okresanica and Konjuh, which formed the operational base of the Electronic WarfareUnit of the ABiH 2 nd Corps, the Electronic Warfare Unit of the 21 st Division and – from April 1993 –the Sigint section of the Bosnian National Security Service. Though this latter unit workedindependently, it shared some of its intelligence with the Electronic Warfare Unit of the 2 nd Corps,especially during the events in Srebrenica. This unit focused on the interception of civilcommunications in Srpska in the Podrinje and around Zvornik and Vlasenica, though it also followedmilitary communications.In 1992, the ABiH started organizing activities related primarily to Comint in Eastern Bosniathrough permanent interception stations. There is not much archive material for this start-up period,but it was possible to build the following reconstruction on the basis of interviews and confidentialinformation. There was, to begin with, very little technological expertise. Only one unit hadinterception equipment, as a lot had been taken by the VJ. At that time, it was possible to intercept twoHF, four VHF and two air force channels from Konjuh and Okresanica; one soldier was available perwavelength for this purpose. He decided which frequency to intercept and reported verbally. Theinformation was not analysed, and there were no crypto analysts, so the ABiH could only interceptopen communication.The intelligence was, however, good because the VRS did not bother to encrypt its messages atfirst. The Bosnians discovered that the higher the rank of the commander, the more open was the VRScommunication. The VRS was scarcely aware of communications security, even though it emerged atKrstic’s trial that it had always known that the ABiH could intercept their messages. Apparently, thiswas a risk they were willing to take. In 1992 the Bosnian Serbs had already pinpointed the location ofnine well-equipped and manned ABiH interception stations. A signals officer of the Drina Corpstestified to the Yugoslavia Tribunal that the communications security was not properly observed. 1356Consequently, the ABiH could collect intelligence on, say, VRS units, the location of VRS radio1353 UNGE, ICTY. 283 rd Brigade to 2 nd Corps, no. 191-10/94, 07/11/94.1354 UNGE, ICTY. Cos Enver Hadzihasanovic to Naser Oric, no. 1-1/224-1, 07/02/95 and NIOD, MIS CD-Roms, 28 thDivision to 2 nd Corps, no. 02-08-04/95,17/02/95.1355 Stankovic, Trusted Mole, p. 251.1356 Judgement in the Krstic Trial, § 113, p. 42.