C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

206Commanders, the Canadian Generals Ray Crabbe and later Barry Ashton. 1091 There was a considerableoverlap between the activities of the NSA and the Canadian unit in Pleso. Both services ensured aconstant flow of Comint for the Canadian troops participating in UNPROFOR, who were stationed inVisoko and at other locations. This CFIOG also had a special, secure link to the intelligence staff at theCanadian Department of National Defence, thus giving them access in near-real-time to UKUSASigint. 1092The British Signals intelligence serviceThe United Kingdom was also active in Bosnia in this field, through the Government CommunicationsHeadquarters (GCHQ). Compared with the two other British intelligence services, MI5 and MI6, muchless has been published and much less is known about the GCHQ. A bibliography of the Britishintelligence and security services refers to hundreds of publications, of which only six relate to theGCHQ in the time following 1945. Nevertheless, this service, measured by the volume of producedintelligence, by the size of the annual budget and by the size of its staff, is the biggest service. In 1966the GCHQ, and the organizations that gathered intelligence for the service, employed some 11,000people: more than the combined strengths of MI6 and MI5. The service was also larger than the entireBritish diplomatic service, including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London and theoverseas embassies and consulates. 1093Thanks to the participation in the UKUSA alliance, the GCHQ is said to have acquired a strongposition in the United Kingdom. However, the GCHQ was rather overshadowed by the NSA. At thestart of the 1950s, due to budgetary reasons and the ‘shrinkage’ of the British Empire, London wasforced to reduce its activities in the field of Comint and cryptanalysis. GCHQ had to close monitoringstations and make staff redundant. As a result it became increasingly dependent on the NSA forfinancial support and technical equipment, such as receivers and fast computers. 1094 Two Britishauthors issue a tough verdict on this period: from a ‘post-Second World War partnership of equals’ therelationship between the NSA and the GCHQ became a ‘master-servant arrangement ofconvenience’. 1095GCHQ became used to this situation and was even able to gain an advantage from it. Theattraction of US dollars and sophisticated technology was irresistible. Former GCHQ official MichaelHerman wrote, for instance: ‘For Britain and others, access to the United States’ weight of resources,technology and expertise is an overwhelming attraction’. 1096 The relative decay of the strength andcapacity of the GCHQ meant that over the years London gained more advantages from therelationship with the NSA that it contributed. This did however mean that the GCHQ seemed evenmore strongly ‘married’ to the NSA. 1097 The annual report of the British Parliamentary Intelligence andSecurity Committee thus stated, with regard to the intelligence of GCHQ, that ‘the quality of theintelligence gathered clearly reflects the value of the close coordination under the UKUSAagreement’. 1098The fear of being marginalized in the UKUSA alliance, due to the shrinking significance,budgets and technical resources of the GCHQ, became a serious concern in London in the 1970s and1980s. An internal memorandum of the GCHQ, the Strategic Direction Summary, came to the1091 Confidential interview (54).1092 Confidential interviews (9), (62) and (90).1093 For the early period of GCHQ see: Richard J. Aldrich, ‘GCHQ and Sigint in the Early Cold War 1945-1970’, in: Aid &Wiebes (eds.), Secrets, pp. 67-96.1094 Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘GCHQ’s Service to US Crucial’, The Guardian, 17/05/94.1095 Lanning & Norton-Taylor, Conflict, p. 33.1096 Herman, Intelligence, p. 204.1097 Grant, Intimate Relations, pp. 3-4.1098 CM 4897, Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 1999-2000, 02/11/00. For this report see: http://www.officialdocuments.co.uk/document/cm48/4897/4897-02.htm.