C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

120UN observers in Sarajevo, 559 which stated frankly that the MIS/Army’s information position wasmediocre at best. There was no contact with UNPROFOR at that time. 560The Minister was said later to have issued an edict on reporting more often through the nationalline. Dutch representatives at UNPROFOR did not do so regularly, however. Data from a briefing forVoorhoeve in November 1994 revealed that 60 Dutch soldiers worked at UNPROFOR in Zagreb atthe time and 51 at BHC in Sarajevo. The briefing covered the arguments ‘for’ and ‘against’ dispatchinga third company to yet another enclave, Bihac. 561 The deployment of soldiers for a nation’s ownpurposes was an established practice among other nationalities that were represented in UNPROFOR.The Dutch line, however, was that combat intelligence was important, but that other intelligence was‘dirty’.The Dutch also did not engage in intelligence for UNPROFORA former head of the MIS/Army provided further confirmation of this. When he was still serving withUNPROFOR under General Cot, he occasionally reported via the national line to The Hague. This wasdiscovered by Akashi, who immediately called him to account and warned that it must not happenagain. Another factor was that everyone had a Blue Beret mentality; intelligence was not an acceptableactivity at the UN. 562 The MIS/Army proposed supplying the representatives at UNPROFOR withtheir own secure crypto link with the minister and the CDS, but this idea was rejected. 563This meant that the MIS/CO and MIS/Army were already destined at the outset to lag furtherbehind. 564 Neither did the MIS/Army look specifically for intelligence in UNPROFOR through formerUNPROFOR staff. For example, after his departure from the service, the deputy head of theMIS/Army’s Intelligence Department was Deputy Head of Operations in Zagreb from August 1994 toAugust 1995. He had no direct line or contacts with the MIS/Army and the personnel of this sectionnever called on him. 565 In this way, important information sources were cut off, because theNetherlands was intent on being ‘the best-behaved boy in the class’. 566 As said earlier, the Netherlandsbecame therefore completely dependent on what other intelligence services are prepared to supply tothem. This was not a natural fact, but the result of policy decisions hinged on funding, capability,military and political will.9. Intelligence and senior Ministry of Defence officialsThe next question is what the political and military leaders thought of the usefulness of the MIS, andwhether a view existed in those circles on the role that an intelligence service could play. Was the MISinvolved in the decision-making surrounding the deployment of Dutchbat, and was a risk analysis oradvice ever requested on the deployment of Dutchbat? MIS/CO personnel assert that they were notactively and directly involved in the preparation of the deployment of Dutchbat. This was really thetask of the MIS/Army. The Minister and (the office of) the Secretary-General never requested a riskanalysis of the situation. From other interviews it also appears that Defence Minister Ter Beek wasnever provided with a thorough risk analysis. 567 Nonetheless, the MIS/CO independently produced a559 Paul Ruigrok, ‘Den Haag wist van niets, maar de onderofficieren moesten terug’, in Vrij:Nederland, 30/10/93.560 Wondergem, Je komt anders terug, p. 114.561 MoD, Archive DCBC, Briefing ministers, 07/11/94.562 Interview with H. Bokhoven, 16/05/01.563 Interview with H. Bosch, 10/10/01.564 Confidential interview (24).565 Confidential interview (34) .566 Confidential interviews (28 ) and ( 37).567 In answer to questions in Parliament, Ter Beek claimed that troops were always dispatched on the basis of a careful analysis of the risks. It is unclear whether the Minister had alsoinvolved the MI S in this. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Session 1992-1993, Parliamentary questions No. 462.