C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

282ZIRCON spy satellite. It was also dependent on them for Sigint and other sorts of intelligence. Londonpaid £ 500 million to get access to the Imint of the second generation Magnum satellite, which waslaunched in 1995. 1494 The UK did not, therefore, have its own satellite for overhead photo’s.Another satellite intelligence player in Yugoslavia was the Soviet Union. In the 1970s and 1980sthe Soviet Union launched over thirty spy satellites a year. After the USSR collapsed, this numberdeclined sharply. In 1999 there was only one launch and in 2000 there were three. There were fourtypes of Russian satellites. The first was the Yantar-1KFT (codenamed Kometa) which gatheredtopographical intelligence for the Ministry of Defence. The second series was the Yantar-4K2 satellite(codenamed Kobalt) with an endurance of between 60 and 120 days. The Cobalt satellites had threesmall re-entry vehicles on board: two to bring back films to Earth and one to bring back the cameraand the last roll of film. The Yantar-4KS1 (codenamed Neman) satellites were capable of sending digitalimages to ground stations in Russia directly or via communications satellites. They operated for over ayear. During the 1980s it looked as if Moscow would be keeping at least one Neman and one Cobalt1495satellite permanently in space, but this was no longer possible after the country disintegrated.Experts claim that Moscow may have provided the VJ or the VRS with photos, especiallysatellite photos of the military positions of the ABiH and the Croatian forces. This is doubtful, giventhe limited Imint capacity of the Russians and the mediocre resolution of their photos. It is alsodebatable whether such photos would have been of any real use to the VRS in the area of Srebrenica,Zepa and Gorazde. The information position of the Bosnian Serbs on top of the mountains and hillsaround the enclaves was so good that in reality they did not need satellite photos. In this respect Imintdid not play a role in the VRS attack on Srebrenica. 1496 Apart from the USA and Russia, the only othercountry with a reasonably good satellite intelligence capacity is China. There are no indications thatBeijing played a role in Bosnia. Despite the close ties between the Chinese and Serb intelligence servicesin Belgrade, no Imint appears to have been exchanged in 1995. 1497Commercial satellites, such as Landsat, did not play an important role in the conflict either,because of their limited resolution. The French SPOT (Système Pour l’Observation de la Terre), thoughmore suitable, also had a low resolution: it produced monochrome photos with a resolution of someten metres. 1498 More could be expected of the Ikonos satellites, launched by Space Imaging Eosat (SIE)in Arlington, Virginia. SIE also manages the Landsat satellite.Germany was not significantly involved in Satint, as the joint Franco-German Helios satellitewas not launched until August 1995, i.e. after the fall of Srebrenica. It appears therefore that the onlycountry, which was really active in gathering Imint was the US. They had sufficient capacity to takesatellite photos of the ground situation, because a US spy satellite crossed Bosnia twice a day.1499 Imintwas shared with the BND but according to a senior German intelligence official, it often arrived after aspecific German request after only 4 to 5 days. For example, Imint of the Muslim prisoners in the townof Bratunac arrived after the men already had been removed. 1500American Imint technologyThe American U-2s were essential for reconnaissance above Bosnia. Building started on the U-2 in1953 and the first flight over the USSR took place in July 1956. The U-2 programme was the directresponsibility of the CIA. Since then, the U-2 has proven indispensable in diverse international crises1494 Dorril, MI-6, p. 778.1495 Moscow did not even have a single spy satellite in space between 28 September 1996 and 15 May 1997. The most recentphoto-reconnaissance satellite is the Orlets-2 (codenamed Yenissey) which can carry more than 20 capsules that can be sentback to Earth. See: Phillip S. Clark, ‘Russia has no reconnaissance satellites in orbit’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 08/05/01.1496 Confidential interviews (6) and (91).1497 Jasper Becker, ‘spy boss welcomed by Serbian counterpart’, South China Morning Post, 23/06/95.1498 See: Jeffrey Richelson, ‘U.S. Satellite Imagery, 1960 - 1999’, 14/04/99, at: www.gwu.edu.1499 Confidential interview (13).1500 Confidential interview (98).