C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

145engage these countries, but each time Lake and Christopher rejected it out of fear of leaks andEuropean protests.Will the Americans support the Croatian pipeline?The head of the Croatian intelligence service - the son of the Croatian president - Miroslav Tudjman,visited Washington DC in the autumn of 1993. He spoke there with James Woolsey, the director of theCIA, and others. The cynical Woolsey welcomed him with the words: ‘I hear that you’ve discovered thebest kept secret in Washington - that we have no policy towards the former Yugoslavia.’ WhenTudjman stated later to the director of the National Security Agency (NSA) that intelligence for a stableregional solution to the conflict should not be sought in Bosnia, but in Washington, the Americanstated: ‘If something is a secret, we can discover it, but not if it’s a mystery.’ Whether Izetbegovic’searlier visit to Teheran was also on the agenda remains unclear, but in any case Tudjman opposed theinvolvement of Iran. 693Meanwhile, from mid 1993, the idea arose within the American administration of establishing aMuslim-Croat federation. Washington wanted to bring an end to the conflict between Bosnian Muslimsand Croats. In early 1994, the frustrations in Washington increased, partly because of the VRS attackson Sarajevo and Gorazde. On Saturday 5 February 1994, shortly after noon, a mortar shell exploded onSarajevo’s Markale market, close to the cathedral. As a consequence of the attack, approximatelyseventy people died and some two hundred were wounded. It was the heaviest attack on the city. Bloodand severed limbs could be seen all around the market. Western television companies chose not tobroadcast large parts of the available image material because it was too dreadful. Nevertheless, thepictures that were broadcast did have ‘a transforming political impact’. 694The incident coincided with a reorientation of the policy of the major Western countries, andtwo new major players entering the Bosnian drama. In addition to the UN Secretary-General’s specialrepresentative, Akashi, the new British Bosnia Hercegovina Commander (BHC) in Sarajevo, GeneralM. Rose, had taken over the function on 21 January of the Belgian General F. Briquemont. It wasalready noticeable during the NATO summit of 9 and 10 January 1994 that the US administration wasin the process of reconsidering its position on Bosnia. William Perry, who had succeeded Les Aspin asSecretary of Defense, and General John Shalikashvili, who as the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff had taken the place of Colin Powell, were more inclined to deploy air power than their twopredecessors. During a visit by US Secretary of State, Christopher, to Paris on 24 January, the Frenchgovernment had also firmly insisted on a greater US involvement in the crisis in Yugoslavia. One weeklater, on 1 February, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, addressed Christopher in similarterms in Washington. What had happened on 5 February in Sarajevo market also eased the turnaroundof the American administration to become more closely involved in Bosnia. 695The US diplomats Charles Redman and Peter Tarnoff were dispatched to Europe after theattack in Sarajevo. The message that they took with them was that the United States was prepared tocooperate towards peace in Bosnia, but at the same time wished tougher actions against the BosnianSerbs; also, humanitarian convoys must also no longer be obstructed. 696 A suspension of hostilities on23 February and the formation on 13 March 1994 of the federation of Croatia and Bosnia, in whichRedman played an important role, calmed the armed conflict. 697693 Miroslav Tudjman, ‘The First Five Years of the Croatian Intelligence Service’, National Security and The Future, Vol. 1(2000) 2, p. 60.694 Bell, In Harm’s Way, p. 177.695 Cf. Tweede Kamer, Session 1993-1994, Proceedings, p. 3895 (Kooijmans, 16/02/94); Drew, Edge, pp. 410-411 enSchoemaker, ‘Oorlog’, p. 30.696 Interview with Charles Redman, 27/06/01.697 Andreatta, The Bosnian War and the New World Order, p. 14.