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C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

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183command and the rival Iranian, Saudi, Turkish and Malaysian-back groups all operated accord<strong>in</strong>g to theirown ag<strong>en</strong>das. 953Merc<strong>en</strong>aries of non-Yugoslav orig<strong>in</strong> were <strong>in</strong>volved from the outbreak of the armed conflict. Anactive group was the Mujahed<strong>in</strong>. These were non-Bosnian, Islamic-fundam<strong>en</strong>talist fighters fromTurkey, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Afghanistan, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore,the names of Jihad, Fis, Hamas and Hezbollah were l<strong>in</strong>ked with the Mujahed<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Bosnia. Sray estimatedthe number of Mujahed<strong>in</strong> fighters at 4000; <strong>in</strong> April 1994, the CIA arrived at the conclusion that therewere approximately 400 fighters. 954 In 1994, the UN put the number 955 at 450 to 500, and <strong>in</strong> 1995 atapproximately 600. American estimates, however, spoke of 1200 to 1400. A BVD report from late 1995likewise gave an estimate of only 200.This group withdrew from the cont<strong>rol</strong> of the Bosnian authorities, both politically and militarily.There were unconfirmed reports of cont<strong>rol</strong> by authorities of the countries of orig<strong>in</strong>, by Islamicfundam<strong>en</strong>talistterrorist organizations and by crim<strong>in</strong>al organizations.956 The Mujahed<strong>in</strong> formed part ofthe 4th, 7th and 8th Muslimski briga<strong>de</strong>, stationed around Z<strong>en</strong>ica <strong>in</strong> c<strong>en</strong>tral Bosnia, and took part <strong>in</strong> theactivities of several paramilitary units, such as the Black Swans. They fell un<strong>de</strong>r the responsibility of theABiH 3rd and 7th Corps. Furthermore, there were approximately 25 other Muslim factions and unitsactive <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, which also <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d wom<strong>en</strong>. 957These groups were supplied by the ABiH, but operated <strong>de</strong>c<strong>en</strong>trally as special units or shocktroops. Many ABiH sources, accord<strong>in</strong>g to an <strong>in</strong>ternal UNPROFOR report, consi<strong>de</strong>red their militaryvalue to be limited. Nonetheless, the UNPROFOR <strong>in</strong>tellig<strong>en</strong>ce staff followed their movem<strong>en</strong>ts closely.The UN estimated their number <strong>in</strong> the summer of 1995 to be no more than 1500 fighters. 958 Militaryexperts were, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the BVD, of the op<strong>in</strong>ion that because of their small number, the threat fromthese Mujahed<strong>in</strong> should not be overestimated. 959Furthermore, the population was not particularly <strong>en</strong>thusiastic about the fighters and appearedto be <strong>in</strong>differ<strong>en</strong>t to their religious propaganda. The Bosnian governm<strong>en</strong>t appeared to have lessantipathy to the Mujahed<strong>in</strong>. Presid<strong>en</strong>t Izetbegovic especially appeared to see the fighters as ‘a conduitfor funds from the Gulf and Middle East’. 960 With<strong>in</strong> the framework of the Dayton agreem<strong>en</strong>t, theMujahed<strong>in</strong> fighters should have left Bosnia before 13 January 1996. 961 In October, UNPROFORconclu<strong>de</strong>d that the numbers had <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to betwe<strong>en</strong> 700 and 800. The pres<strong>en</strong>ce of the Mujahed<strong>in</strong> wasused by the Croats <strong>in</strong> particular to <strong>de</strong>lay the process of reconciliation and normalization. The numberof clashes with the local population around Tuzla <strong>in</strong>creased, and the risk to the British UNPROFORunits was <strong>de</strong>emed to be significant. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the ABiH, radical elem<strong>en</strong>ts with<strong>in</strong> the 7th MuslimskiBriga<strong>de</strong> were responsible. The mood <strong>de</strong>teriorated after a British soldier killed a Mujahed<strong>in</strong> fighter.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to UNPROFOR, the US pressure on Izetbegovic was stepped up strongly to force theMujahed<strong>in</strong> out of Bosnia. 962 Janvier also appealed to the UN <strong>in</strong> New York to step up pressure on theBosnian and Croatian ambassadors. 963 Iran did cont<strong>in</strong>ue to support Izetbegovic, and <strong>in</strong> the autumn of953 Ripley, Merc<strong>en</strong>aries, p. 57.954 James Ris<strong>en</strong>, ‘Iran gave Bosnia lea<strong>de</strong>r $ 500,000’, Los Angeles Times, 31/12/96.955 UNNY, DPKO, Co<strong>de</strong>d Cables UNPOROFOR. <strong>De</strong> Lapresle to Annan, Z-1371, 07/09/94; UNNY, UNPROFOR, Box88039. DFC to Brigadier Baril, 03/11/94.956 Archives BVD, BVD Report The Mujahed<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, 29/01/96.957 For an overview of most paramilitary factions and the <strong>rol</strong>e of merc<strong>en</strong>aries and volunteers, See: MoD, MIS/RNLA.Sup<strong>in</strong>trep no. 29417/4/040794, 04/07/94.958 UNNY, DPKO, File #87303. G-2 to COS, 07/01/95 and UNGE, UNPROFOR, Janvier to Annan, Z-1623, Mujahed<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>Bosnia, 08/09/95.959 Archives BVD, BVD Report The Mujahed<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, 29/01/96.960 UNGE, UNPROFOR. Janvier to Annan, Z-1623, Mujahed<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, 08/09/95.961 Archives BVD, BVD Report The Mujahed<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, 29/01/96.962 UNGE, UNPROFOR. Akashi to Annan, Z-2024, Update on Mujahed<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, 31/10/95.963 UNGE, UNPROFOR. Janvier to Kittani, Z-2040, Mujahed<strong>in</strong> Activities <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, 03/11/95.

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