C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

107that an insight was obtained using Sigint into the VRS communication networks, which then succeededthrough makeshift measures and personal contacts. 485The MIS/Army had no unique sources for Bosnia, and the political need in this respect did notappear to be great. In order to follow the war in Bosnia as well as possible, the analysts were dependenton fellow intelligence services, UNPROFOR, UNMOs, and the ECMM. At the request of theMIS/Army, the CDS, Van den Breemen made enquiries of General Shaliskashvili, the Chairman of theUS Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), for more intelligence, but this revealed that the American intelligenceservices also had no clearer picture concerning the eastern enclaves. Attempts were also made to gatheradditional intelligence from the German Bundesnachrichtendienst, but they had little effect. 486Should the MIS/Army or Dutchbat have done more themselves in the domain of intelligence?According to MIS employees, foreign intelligence on Yugoslavia yielded little or nothing on Srebrenicathat proved valuable after analysis. This prompts the question of whether Dutchbat itself could orshould have resorted to intelligence gathering, to support the work of the MIS/Army for thesubsequent benefit of the battalion. Many studies have shown that in complex peacekeeping operations,Human Intelligence (Humint) is often the most important source of intelligence. An American militaryofficer therefore argued for keeping the methods of intelligence gathering ‘simple’. 487 In an area such asBosnia, there was a shortage of all sorts of (especially American) advanced technical systems. Advancedespionage aircraft were not able to locate mines or snipers, or to determine the role of the localmafia. 488 The author David Charters asserts that each peacekeeper is in fact a gatherer of intelligence.Each contact with the local population and authorities should provide added value. In his view,intelligence gathering and reporting should be second nature to each commander involved in apeacekeeping operation. 489Dutchbat’s need for a good intelligence structure was already evident from the earlierexperiences of the British Army in Bosnia. This was reported on in February 1994 by the militaryattaché in London. The experiences of the British battalion in Bosnia between May and November1993 indicated that a successful task execution depended on the intelligence. For example, intelligencewould provide more advance assurance of whether a convoy would reach the final destination. Withoutsome assurance there was hardly any point in setting out. Dutchbat’s intelligence information sourceswere local military commanders, the population, ex-soldiers from the region, UNMOs, InternationalRed Cross workers, and their own officers. 490It became clear in June 1994 that the Dutchbat commander felt that he was not receivingenough intelligence. It is evident from the reports by the Dutch Deputy Commander of Sector NorthEast in Tuzla, Colonel C.L. Brantz, of his visit to Srebrenica that since the deployment of Dutchbat Ion 1 March 1994, the Dutchbat commander had repeatedly stressed that his ‘world’ was extremelylimited by a lack of intelligence. Anticipating developments outside the enclave and verifying theinformation given by the warring factions was hardly possible, if at all, in the situation as it existed,argued Brantz. He pointed out that the intelligence picture was mainly based on irregular discussionswith ABiH and VRS soldiers, UNMOs and observations from OPs. Support from the Netherlandscould possibly alleviate part of this shortcoming. Whether this was feasible in practice remained to beseen, according to Brantz; the Royal Netherlands Army did not have much in the way of resources ofits own in the mission area.485 Confidential interviews (21 ) , ( 33 ) , ( 35 ) , ( 37 ) and ( 39).486 Confidential interview (36).487 Cf. Colonel H. Allen Boyd, ‘Joint Intelligence in Support of Peace Operations’, in: Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, January-March 1999 and Välimäki, Intelligence, p. 56.488 Cf. Lt. Colonel Collin A. Agee, ‘Too Much Data --Too Little Intel?, in: Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, January-March 1999 , passim .489 David A. Charters, ‘Out of the Closet: Intelligence Support for Post-Modernist Peacekeeping’, in: The Pearson Papers, No. 4, Intelligence and Peacekeeping, Halifax, 1999, p. 61.490 M oD , ArchiveCSKL 1994 , Bureau Army Attache to Head SitCen, No. 2602/1827, 26/02/94.