C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

141opinion. 665 After Croatia had normalized its diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1992, it wasrepresented in Teheran by the Croatian Muslim Osman Muftic, who elaborated the details of theagreement with the Bosnian ambassador in Teheran, Omer Behmen, and a confidant of Izetbegovic,Hasan Cengic.On 1 November 1992, an Iranian Boeing 747 landed in Zagreb with sixty tons of ‘humanitariangoods’. A few days later the Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei donated $ 3.3 million toSarajevo. At the end of November, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, paid a666visit to Zagreb to discuss the further logistical details. This was surprising, because in this periodthere was heavy fighting between Croatia and Bosnia.Perhaps Bonn put pressure on Zagreb to cooperate. Close connections happened to existbetween the German Bundesnachrichtendienst and the Iranian services. For example, this German serviceallegedly supplied computer hardware to Teheran, and it trained Iranian intelligence officers in Munichin 1992.667 In the same period, a variety of clandestine arms supplies were set up for Croatia and Bosniaby Croatian Catholic relief organizations. They ran via Ludwigshafen under the leadership of FatherJohannes, and involved walkie-talkies, helmets, sleeping bags, field kitchens and uniforms, which mainlycame from old stocks from the GDR. 668On 19 January 1993, the Dutch Permanent Representative to NATO, Jacobovits, reported thathis British colleague had announced that the United Kingdom had made démarches in various capitalsin connection with large-scale violations of the arms embargo. Certain Islamic countries were then saidto be in the process of collecting hundreds of millions of dollars for providing the ABiH with a seriousoffensive military capacity. The arms had to be purchased before a resort was made to enforcing theNo Fly Zone. 669Clinton on the stage: American initiatives to lift the arms embargoAround the time of the inauguration of President Bill Clinton, on 20 January 1993, the ABiH was in apoor position militarily, partly because the fighting between Croatia and Bosnia had flared up again.However, Clinton had a much more positive attitude towards the Bosnian issue than his predecessor,Bush, and during his presidential election campaign he argued for lifting the arms embargo against theBosnian Muslims. The future Vice-President Al Gore especially was a supporter of tough politics in theBalkans and the arming of the Muslims. 670 According to the later Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright,a sense of frustration was felt during the election campaign because of the Bush administration’s Bosniapolicy. Little attention was paid to Bosnia under President Bush. His priorities were the Gulf states andSomalia rather than holding Yugoslavia together. For ideological and political reasons, Bush explicitlyopposed any further involvement with the developments in Yugoslavia. The Clinton campaigncapitalized on this.Differences of opinion existed in the American administration under Clinton about the extentto which they should become involved in the conflict in Bosnia. There were different ideas, becausesome (including Albright) had 1938 Munich as a frame of reference in their heads, while others hadVietnam. Everyone did realize that the Balkans would provide the United States with better access tothe Middle East. They also looked at the united Europe and constantly asked why the United Statesalways had to take care of everything. The Clinton administration therefore also looked more often to665 Interview with P. Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.666 Blaine Harden, ‘Middle eastern Muslims Helping Bosnian Defenders Against Serb Forces’, The Washington Post, 27/08/92and John Pomfret, ‘US Allies Fed Pipeline Of Covert Arms in Bosnia’, The Washington Post, 12/05/96.667 Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, ‘The Bundesnachrichtendienst, the Bundeswehr and Sigint in the Cold War and After’, in: Aid& Wiebes (eds.), The secrets of Signals Intelligence, p. 155. See for other accusations: Dzamic, Psi Rata na Balkanu, p. 220.668 Thomas Deichmann, ‘Pater Johannes, patriotischer Waffenhaendler’, Die Tageszeitung, 19/03/96.669 NMFA, PVNATO. PVNATO to Foreign Affairs, no. Brni068/1872, 19/01/93.670 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 159.