C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

144The Croatian pipeline in practice until the beginning of 1993In the meantime, Iran, and by then also Turkey, supplied arms via Zagreb to Bosnia. 683 In April 1993,there were again discussions on this subject in Teheran between Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Iranians,which were also attended by the Iranian President Rafsanjani and the Bosnian President Izetbegovic.Rafsanjani took this opportunity to offer to supply all old Russian weapons to Bosnia and Croatia,under the condition that the Bosnian Muslims arranged for the transport. There were still some rathersensitive issues between the two countries: during the visit Rafsanjani expressed indignation to theCroatian delegation about the bloodbath in Ahmici, a village in central Bosnia, where more than onehundred Muslims were killed by Croatian units on 16 April 1993. 684Arms and ammunition transport did not always proceed without a hitch. For instance, theBosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic was able to recall an incident in February 1993 in which a delivery ofMilan anti-tank missiles, destined for East Bosnia, was confiscated by Croatian militias. And the leaderof the Bosnian Croats, Boban, told Vance and Owen frankly in March 1993 that he and Croatia hadsuspended the transit of arms because of the ABiH operations around Mostar. 685 Boban had done sobefore, in July 1992. 686Sometimes the Croats sent a signal to Sarajevo referring to the dependence on the Croatianpipeline. For instance, a convoy of the relief organization Merhamet was intercepted in central Bosnia. Itwas transporting relief goods, but arms and ammunition were found under false floors. At the end ofMarch, the two governments attempted to reconcile these problems: President Tudjman and PresidentIzetbegovic reached an agreement in which Croatia would continue to transport arms in exchange forBosnian electricity to Croatian Dalmatia. Tudjman visited Turkey in April 1993 in enhancement of thisagreement. Furthermore, Croatia purchased Russian helicopters destined for Bosnia, which wereproperly delivered in Tuzla. 687 As Sarajevo was very much aware of its dependence on Croatia,Izetbegovic visited Teheran again on 14 September 1993 to deepen the defence relationship.Meanwhile Holbrooke688 was becoming increasingly frustrated that the Croatian pipeline wasnot progressing well. Lake once described Holbrooke as ‘high-maintenance’ 689 . Holbrooke thereforeproposed to deliver arms and ammunition to the ABiH via third party countries. Lake, who had alwayswelcomed such covert operations 690 , nonetheless found the plan ‘too risky’. The Secretary of State,Christopher, shared this view. They did support ‘lift and strike’ but not ‘lift, arm and strike’. 691Holbrooke’s proposals did lead to a debate within the administration. Clinton and State Departmentofficials considered supplies via Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. This was not new: in the 1980s,Saudi Arabia had already supplied arms worth $ 500 million via the CIA to the Mujahedin fighters inAfghanistan. There had also already been a close relationship with Turkey in the area of intelligence forsome considerable time. For instance, there were various American monitoring stations in Turkey, andthere was close collaboration of the Turkish domestic security service with the CIA and the FBI inopposing the terrorism of the PKK. 692 It was proposed at least three times between 1993 and 1995 to683 F. Chipoux, ‘Bosnians getting arms from Islamic countries’, Manchester Guardian Weekly, 30/08/92.684 Magas and Zanic, The War in Croatia and Bosnia Hercegovina, pp. 268-269.685 MoD, MIS/CO, Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 21/93, 22/03/93.686 ‘Bosnische president wil wapens van de Verenigde Staten’ (‘Bosnian president wants arms from the United States’), DeVolkskrant, 09/07/92.687 MoD, MIS/CO, Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 24/93, 05/04/93 and no. 25/93, 13/04/93 andDuygu Bazolu, ‘Implications for Turkey’s relations with Western Europe’, in: Jopp (ed.), The Implications of the Yugoslav Crisis,p. 36.688 Holbrooke was never available for an interview with the NIOD despite various vigorous attempts by the Netherlandsembassy in Washington DC.689 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 178.690 Vernon Loeb, ‘Tony Lake and the CIA’, The Washington Post, 27/11/00.691 Interview with P. Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.692 Confidential information (35).