C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

358So which organizations did have clear indications?The question remains: despite Mladic’s late decision to undertake an assault on Srebrenica might there,notwithstanding all denials, be indications that foreign military intelligence services knew something?Research has shown that this Canadian did have suspicions that the VRS was up to something. Forsome considerable time Ottawa had been warned by Canadian staff in Zagreb and Sarajevo that in thelonger term the VRS would go on the attack. Reportedly the build-up was monitored by Ottawathrough Humint, Sigint and Imint. But it still remained unclear whether the VRS aims were confined tothe southern tip or encompassed the entire enclave. It had often happened that the VRS massed troopsat certain places. Everyone then expected an attack or an operation, but ultimately it failed tomaterialize. When the ABiH did this, however, it was a sure indication that a military operation wasgoing to take place. 2022 On the basis of Imint the J-2 Military Intelligence Cell at the CanadianDepartment of National Defence (DND) reportedly ascertained that two groups of T-54 tanks weremoving in the direction of the enclaves. One later turned off towards Srebrenica, heading for thesouthern tip of the enclave, and the other unit headed for Zepa. This happened 2 to 3 weeks before theevent, and the intelligence officials wondered whether this was a reconnaissance mission. ‘What wasgoing on?’ The Canadian military intelligence service also established that the VRS had moved new andheavier long-range artillery to Sugar Hill, the mount that controlled Tuzla and Tuzla Air Base.Relocations of other artillery in the direction of Zvornik and Bratunac were also observed.Imint from satellites and U-2s over Eastern Bosnia was, according to some Canadian sources,rapidly available in Ottawa. One can, however, doubt if this was indeed so rapidly as outlined to theauthor. Even if DIA gave the Canadians the second copy from RAF Alconbury, they still had morethan a week’s delay, because the shipment out of the UK was usually at least a week after the U-2mission was flown. If the DIA took the time to make a third copy for the Canadians from their ownDIA copy, one must add at least another day. Satellite imagery is a different story of course, but it doesnot provide the comprehensive coverage required to maintain the sort of picture as described by the2023Canadians.In addition, the SAS had managed to take photographs of the new artillery and tanks from closeup. Reports were also received that frequently changing VJ units had been observed at the southern tipof the enclave. This was evident from the shoulder emblems on the uniforms and the Belgrade dialectspoken. Partly on the basis of this intelligence a briefing was given to the Deputy Chief of DefenceStaff, General Armand Roy, two weeks before the attack. In this briefing analysts forecasted thatsomething would happen around Srebrenica in the near future. Roy is said to have rejected thehowever: he did not believe in an attack. Ottawa probably had the same intelligence at its disposal asthe British DIS, but a different conclusion was drawn.It also seems that the Bosnian Muslims, on the basis of Comint, also knew of a Serb action longin advance. In Chapter 6 of this study it was established that they did have intercepts, but that thesewere first analysed weeks or months later. The Muslims had insufficient personnel, interceptionequipment, cryptoanalysts and analysis capabilities, and no internal communication network to get thegathered Comint to where it was needed quickly and efficiently. The method of interception andprocessing was too labour intensive, meaning that many messages were ‘missed’. It is likely that onlyfragments were intercepted. Nonetheless, these fragments could sometimes have provided quiteimportant intelligence, but not the full picture. But let us suppose that these intercepts were indeedavailable in real time and not too late. Were they then passed on to the US intelligence services? Or didthe Americans gather such information themselves via satellites or aircraft? In June 1995 US officialsadmitted that intelligence about tactical military matters provided largely through technical sources2022 Confidential interviews (9) and (60).2023 Confidential information (80).