C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

214US requirements for open ocean HF intercept, particularly high speed burst data streams. Similarly, USElint assets were committed to meet UK Elint requirements during conflicts such as the Falklands. 1133Indeed, the NSA could dictate in general terms which targets the UKUSA and Third Party alliesshould focus on. In these countries this was at the expense of certain targets that the governments werealso interested in: the investment needed to monitor these targets independently was too great forthem. Furthermore, most of the allies were dependent on the American computer-assisted analysiscapability. Only the NSA was able to break and to translate the greatest number of, and hardest, codes.This relationship of dependence meant that the NSA could ultimately determine which decoded andanalysed Sigint it was prepared to share with its allies. Limitations were even placed on the sharing ofComint with London. The reason given for this was that British personnel could be unmasked as KGBspies.In those cases where this intelligence was shared, technical details such as frequency, date andtime were first removed from the intercept. The compartmentalization (the strict separation of theactivities of Americans and other personnel) at monitoring stations was taken to extremes. To give oneexample, British staff working at the US Sigint site at RAF Chicksands were explicitly forbidden toenter the so-called Joint Operations Centre Chicksands. This centre was manned exclusively by USpersonnel. 1134However, the NSA was not the only party to withhold intelligence: the GCHQ also kept somethings to itself, such as decoded communications traffic contained in clandestine Soviet radio trafficbetween Moscow and the Soviet mission to Mao’s Communist forces in Yenan. At a later date theBritish were prepared to hand over these intercepts. 1135 Third Party countries were often treated evenworse by the United States. They were expected primarily to simply deliver Sigint, while they seldomgot back decoded, translated and analysed intelligence products derived from this raw material: this wasnot considered desirable by the NSA or the CIA. The reason for this was usually American fears ofleaks, or incorrect or uncontrolled use of the information.This situation was often a cause for complaint, for instance by the West German, Norwegian,Danish and also Dutch governments, but it made little impression on the Americans. Staff of theBundesnachrichtendienst, for instance, complained that they were treated by the NSA as a second-gradeally. At the joint American-German Sigint station in Augsburg, for example, German requests regardingcertain targets were always put at the back of the queue: the American targets always took priority. TheBND staff were also not allowed to enter certain parts of the monitoring station. British staff at theAnglo-American Teufelsberg monitoring station in Berlin experienced similar treatment. In September1999, a tour of the station was conducted during a public, CIA-organized conference; some formerBritish Sigint staff then discovered for the first time that this monitoring station contained rooms thatthey did not even know existed.1136 However, this must have been fairly junior Brits because seniorGCHQ staff helped to plan that station with the Americans and walked all over the place wheneverthey wanted. 1137The fear of leaks often prompted the NSA to break off contacts with other services. Thecollaboration with France was broken off in the 1960s, for instance, when it was discovered that theFrench Foreign Intelligence Service had been infiltrated by the KGB. It was only after ten years that thecollaboration was resumed. 1138 The forerunner of the Dutch Afdeling Verbindingsinlichtingen, the TechnischInformatie en Verwerkings Centrum (TIVC) (Technical Information and Processing Centre), alsoencountered regular rebuffs. It became clear that the love was felt on one side only, that of the Dutch.1133 Confidential information (80).1134 Duncan Campbell, ‘Over Here and Under Cover’, The Independent, 06/10/93, p. 24.1135 Matthew Aid & Cees Wiebes, ‘Conclusions’, in: Aid & Wiebes (eds.), Secrets, p. 322.1136 Various interviews during the conference on The Intelligence War in Berlin, 1946-1961 at the Teufelsberg, Berlin, 10-12/09/99.1137 Confidential information (84).1138 Mangold, Cold Warrior, p. 134.